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Abstract 
 
The overall aim of this research is to conduct an in-depth study of the political 
construction of biofuels in Indonesia and explain the implications for understanding 
the development of the contemporary biofuel industrial complex. The research 
focuses on building understanding of the role of politics and the materiality of crops 
in the development of agro-fuel alliances. The overall argument is that the alliance 
between biofuel and large agro industries did not happen as a form of capitalization 
on biofuel policy by private stakeholders, but instead involves interactions between 
complex political process within government and both the biofuel and agricultural 
feedstock industries. The research combines concepts from political ecology and 
agrarian political economy to create a conceptual basis for understanding the 
political processes underlying the biofuel nexus in Indonesia. The study involved an 
abductive analysis conducted as a means of interpreting the complex data used in 
this research, which included policy documents, interviews and field observations. 
The research concludes that though the Indonesian government created policy 
initially intended to use biofuels as means to solve problems of energy security, 
environment and rural poverty, ultimately policy (both directly and indirectly) resulted 
in outcomes that favoured the emergence of alliances between biofuel companies 
and large agro industries. Such alliances did not result in the resolution of the 
problems that the government initially set out to address. The research shows how 
the bonding between biodiesel and palm oil agro industries were, in part, created 
through both historical and contemporary policy processes. However, ultimately the 
analysis reveals the significance of inertia and insufficient political will in the 
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implementation of biofuel policy for the emergence of agro-fuel alliances and failures 
to address the core policy problems of energy security, environment and rural 
poverty.  
 
 
Keywords: Biofuels, Political Ecology, Agrarian Political Economy, Indonesia, 
Energy Politics 
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Chapter One 
Introduction  
 
The overall aim of this research is to conduct an in-depth study of the political 
construction of biofuels in Indonesia and explain the implications for understanding 
the development of the contemporary biofuel industrial complex. The Indonesian 
context is one where policies that were intended to solve the country’s energy 
security problem, while also reducing rural poverty, have become manifest as 
policies that largely align with the interests of large palm oil industries. This thesis 
argues that this is not an inevitable outcome of industry manipulation but was made 
possible through a confluence of political, social and material actions over time.  The 
research shows how the underlying politics and materiality of the crops used to 
produce biofuels (i.e. sugarcane for bioethanol and palm oil for biodiesel), as well as 
the market structure within which they are produced, combined with wider inertia 
within the political system to shape and reshape contemporary biofuel policy. The 
overall argument is that the alliance between biofuel and large agro industries did not 
happen as a form of capitalization of biofuel policy by private stakeholders, but 
instead involved interactions between complex political processes within the 
government and both the biofuel and agricultural feedstock industries. 
The thesis builds from existing work on the politics of biofuels in Indonesia that has 
addressed questions primarily from either a political ecology or political economy 
perspective. I argue that though research grounded in each of these traditions is 
important for understanding the processes and implications of biofuel policy, 
18 
 
combining them offers greater conceptual insights into questions concerning the 
construction of the current biofuel complex.  
This introductory chapter is comprised of four sections. The first section discusses 
the research background, characterising the key issues that have shaped 
Indonesia’s biofuel policy, focusing on the importance of narratives about energy 
security crises, environmental degradation and rural poverty. The second section 
introduces the research questions that the thesis aims to address. The third section 
explains the Indonesian case study and provides details on the research context. 
Finally, the structure of the thesis is explained in the last section. 
 
1.1. Indonesia’s Energy Crisis: Searching for a Fossil Fuel Alternative 
Indonesia relies heavily on energy from natural resources such as oil, coal and 
timber to support its economic development. According to Indonesia’s budget 
statistics (Ministry of Finance, 2004), the oil and gas sector from 1970 to 2000 had 
contributed on average 38.0 percent to government revenue and 19.8 percent to the 
country’s GDP. This makes oil and gas the most influential sector of Indonesia’s 
economy. From 1971 to 1999, Indonesia produced more than 1.5 million barrels of 
oil per day and was a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) (Nasir, 2014). However, oil production has been steadily decreasing since 
2000, and with an average depletion rate of 10-12 percent per year and the failure to 
find a new oil reserve, Indonesia’s oil production has, since 2005, shrunk to below 
one million barrels per day (Bappenas, 2014; Nasir, 2014). In line with the decrease 
in oil production, its impact on government revenue and contribution to GDP has 
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decreased to approximately 23 percent and 8.7 percent respectively over the last 
decade (Ministry of Finance, 2015). 
In this context, instead of refining its crude oil production to fulfil domestic 
consumption and exporting its excess abroad, Indonesia’s government has 
developed a policy to export most of its crude oil production and import fuel, such as 
gasoline, diesel and kerosene for domestic consumption (Nasir, 2014). Although 
there is no clear explanation why Indonesia has implemented this policy, it is implied 
that the government only exported the excess of oil production and used the revenue 
to import fuel. Moreover, the government also subsidized domestic fuel prices with 
the intention of stabilizing the domestic price and protecting those people on low 
incomes (MoF, 2004, 2008, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1  
Indonesia’s Oil Production and Revenue Balance 
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The policy of exporting oil, while importing and subsidizing fuel has been 
implemented since the 1970s when Indonesia produced more than 1 million barrels 
of oil per day and domestic fuel consumption was still below 400 thousand barrels 
per day (Ministry of Finance, 2004; Rakhmanto, 2006; Nasir, 2014). Thus, the 
government still received profit from exporting oil despite having to import and 
subsidise fuel for domestic consumption (Figure 1.1). However, the government did 
not increase its oil refining capacity to meet domestic fuel consumption although it 
was continuously increasing - with a growth rate of 6.1 percent annually from 1970 to 
2012 (Dartanto, 2012; Nasir, 2014). There is currently very little understanding as to 
why the government was reluctant to build more oil refineries at that time to meet 
domestic fuel demand (Rakhmanto, 2006, 2012). 
Although the fuel subsidy policy was initially designed to support people on low 
incomes, it had major weaknesses. Firstly, as the country’s economy grew, so did 
fuel consumption, putting pressure on the government’s budget allocation for other 
public spending (Ministry of Finance, 2015). Secondly, the fuel subsidy did not reach 
its main target, low income people, because these people did not own private 
transportation. Conversely, fuel subsidies were primarily enjoyed by middle and 
upper income groups because they were the ones that usually owned private 
transportation (Dartanto, 2012). Thus, the benefit of the fuel subsidy did not directly 
reach its target population.  
Nonetheless, there would be negative consequences for those on low incomes if the 
fuel subsidy was reduced. This is because reducing the subsidy would result in high 
inflation because overall transportation costs would increase, which would, in turn, 
cause an increase in the price of goods and services, such as food prices and 
commuting costs. This would detrimentally impact low income groups. As a result, 
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any government policy to reduce the fuel subsidy has become a sensitive political 
and social issue. Thus, the government’s efforts to reduce the burden of the fuel 
subsidy on the public purse became subject to intractable problems amid deep 
concerns that, were it to drastically reduce the fuel subsidy, it could cause political 
and social upheaval within the country. 
Furthermore, Indonesia’s macro-economic policies were heavily influenced by 
geopolitical issues internationally, such as the American war with Iraq in 2003 and 
the global financial crisis of 2008. These major global events would affect the oil 
price and subsequently the amount of fuel subsidy. Although the volatility of oil prices 
influenced government revenue from oil production, the primary issues concerned 
dwindling oil production, which caused any revenue received to become much 
smaller than government expenditure on the domestic fuel subsidy. This meant, 
however, that it was even more difficult for Indonesia to overcome the impact of 
global economic events and policies that affected the international price of oil and 
currency volatility (Ministry of Finance, 2008, 2012, 2013). 
Despite the volatility of both the currency and the international oil price, the 
government managed to reform the fuel subsidy policy several times between 2005 
and 2015. Nevertheless, only the last fuel subsidy reform implemented in 2015 had 
significant impact, as the amount of the fuel subsidy decreased substantially from 
approximately 13 percent of government spending in 2014 to just above 3 percent in 
the 2015 budget (Ministry of Finance, 2015). This significant reform was successfully 
implemented partly because of the favourable impact of a sudden drop in the oil 
price at the end of 2014 and despite the fact that government revenue from the oil 
sector was also decreasing.  
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Before 2015, however, subsidy policy reforms were merely implemented as a means 
to ease the budget pressure due to the volatility of international oil prices and the 
consequences of importing and subsidizing fuel. Such policy had also become a 
political commodity where the voice of those in favour of continuing the fuel subsidy 
gained favour from the people, especially during a national election. This would be 
the case particularly between 2005 and 2010 as the combination of a skyrocketing 
oil price, failure to find new oil reserves and invest in refineries, as well as failure to 
completely remove the fuel subsidy, resulted in significant pressure on both the 
government budget for subsidising fuel and on the trade balance for importing it 
(Dartanto, 2012; Nasir, 2014; Rakhmanto, 2012). Thus, the scene was set for the 
government to become focused on seeking to establish an alternative fuel source to 
reduce this burden with minimum consequences.  
Biofuel was initially adopted as part of the country’s renewable energy policy, 
arguably, because it was the only renewable energy resource suitable for 
combustion engines in vehicles such as cars, buses and trucks without these 
vehicles requiring further modification (Foidl et al, 1996; Mol, 2007; Lubad & 
Widiastuti, 2010). This means biofuel can utilize the current infrastructure used by 
the fossil fuel market and allow fossil fuel consumers to switch to biofuel with minimal 
to zero cost. Thus, the emergence of biofuel has created a new opportunity for the 
Indonesian government due to its potentiality to reduce the country’s dependency on 
fossil fuel. 
The implementation of the biofuel policy was constructed as bringing a double 
economic benefit arising from a reduction of subsidies on the one hand and an 
improvement in the trade balance (by reducing fuel imports) on the other. Moreover, 
it was highlighted for its role in reducing the country’s carbon emissions and 
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increasing rural farmers’ incomes (Mol, 2007; Ministry of Finance, 2013). Thus, 
biofuel development was ultimately cast not only as a renewable energy policy that 
could solve the Indonesian energy security problem relating to transport, but also as 
a way to bring balance between meeting energy demands, environmental 
preservation and increasing people’s welfare.  
However, biofuel policy went through drastic changes within a decade after being 
implemented. These changes saw large agro industries gain significant advantage 
and the government fail to achieve any of the purported policy targets besides the 
reduction of the fossil fuel subsidy due to the reasons stated above. Initially, the 
government promoted non-edible feedstock to develop the biofuel industry - 
sugarcane for bioethanol and jatropha for biodiesel. Yet, the government eventually 
came to rely on the palm oil industry to support its biofuel policy. Moreover, despite 
the government’s attempt to develop both the bioethanol and biodiesel industries, 
only the latter prevailed as it was supported by the palm oil industry. Interestingly, 
despite Indonesia’s status as the world’s major palm oil producer, it did not 
necessarily mean that the government achieved its policy target of solving energy 
security problems. The problem of a trade deficit from fuel imports still exists. 
Thus, the hegemony of the palm oil industry over Indonesia’s biofuel policy suggests 
that there is a political dynamic within the biofuel complex that creates such a 
condition. However, existing knowledge evident within the literature, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, is insufficient to explain the dynamic of Indonesia’s biofuel 
policy. This research attempts to fill this gap in the literature. The next section 
discusses the focus of the research along with the questions that will be answered in 
the thesis. 
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1.2. Research Focus, Questions and Objectives 
In many countries around the world, biofuel policy has purportedly been designed 
with the purpose of addressing issues of both energy security, needed to retain 
related economic growth, and carbon emission reductions (Mol, 2007). In the context 
of Indonesia, however, instead of reaching this goal, biofuel policy has become 
deeply aligned with the interests of the palm oil industry. The Indonesian government 
is still unable to meet its mandatory biofuel blending policy - intended to address 
energy security problems - despite the abundance of palm oil available for biofuel 
feedstock, and the development of biofuels has, in practice, caused increases in 
carbon emissions through forest fires and land use change. Much of the existing 
research on biofuels in Indonesia has focused on these consequences of biofuel 
development and associated problems of environment and social justice. Where the 
focus has been on politics and policy related to biofuels (rather than its outcomes), 
the emphasis has been on showing industry co-option of biofuel policy to align with 
its own interests. By contrast, this research explores the tensions and interactions 
between different actors involved in biofuel development revealing how these 
relations have shaped and reshaped contemporary biofuel policy in ways that cannot 
be attributed wholly to industry manipulation. Thus, this research aims to conduct an 
in-depth study on the politics of biofuel policy, examining the key factors that shape 
the contemporary trajectory of Indonesia’s biofuel policy.  In order to reach this goal, 
this research has four interrelated objectives. 
1. To examine the history of relevant transformations and policies in Indonesia in 
order to build insight into the implications of longer-term political trajectories for 
modern day biofuel policy and production. 
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2. To understand how the material development of different types of biofuel (i.e. 
bioethanol and biodiesel) plays a role in government policy and associated 
outcomes related to the biofuel industrial complex. 
3. To understand the underlying politics shaping the biofuel energy nexus and the 
way it has influenced the trajectory of biofuel policy. 
4. To examine the interconnections between industry and government and how 
these relations (re)shaped biofuel policy to favour particular actors and materials. 
Based on the objectives of this research, the discussion focuses on the politics 
engulfing biofuel policy from the initiation of relevant policies to the recent situation, 
where outcomes are very much aligned with particular industries’ interests. The 
research has one overarching question, which is also embedded in the research title 
“How have large agro industries gained favour within the Indonesian government’s 
biofuel policy?”. In an attempt to fully answer this question, there are three sub-
questions around which the analysis is structured.  
1. How has the longer-term history of agrarian development and policy in 
Indonesia shaped modern day biofuel production? 
2. How has the biofuel industry and its market structure reshaped contemporary 
Indonesia’s biofuel policies?  
3. How are politics and political processes enacted by actors involved in the 
biofuel energy nexus in ways that have shaped biofuel policy and practice in 
particular ways? 
The analyses in this thesis will contribute to the existing literature in three primary 
ways. Firstly, it contributes to the body of literature in political ecology and agrarian 
political economy through building insights into the underlying politics of biofuel 
26 
 
policies. The research discusses factors, such as the importance of the market and 
historical agrarian policy, that have often been neglected by researchers working 
from political ecology and economy perspectives.  Through the thesis I argue that 
both of these factors have been highly influential in shaping and reshaping the 
trajectory of biofuel policy.  
Secondly, this research also produces insights that will be beneficial for policy 
makers in helping them to understand the factors that influence the success and 
failure of biofuel policy. It also provides understanding of the different facets of the 
biofuel industry, which could help policy makers to formulate policy in accordance 
with different industry needs.  
Finally, this research is using Indonesia as a case study, where the contemporary 
politics of biofuels has been overlooked somewhat within existing research, despite 
its global importance to the industry. The current biofuel case studies on Indonesia 
have often focused on industrial development alone (e.g. Nurdyastuti, 2005; 
Wardhani and Pertiwi, 2013) and/or environment and social justice issues arising as 
a result of biofuel development (e.g. Silitonga et al., 2011; Obidzinsky et al., 2012). 
With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Afiff, 2014), there is a clear gap 
in the literature concerning the contemporary politics of biofuels in Indonesia.   
 
1.3. Introducing Indonesia as the Biofuel Case Study  
This section introduces Indonesia as the case study location for examination of 
biofuel policy in this thesis. Indonesia is an archipelagic country in South East Asia 
and the largest archipelagic country in the world which consists of 17,508 islands 
with an area of 1,904,569 square kilometres where 95% of it is a land area 
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(Frederick and Worden, 2011). There are five main islands in the country namely 
Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua where all monoculture plantations 
are located. With a population of more than 245 million people, Indonesia has the 
fourth largest population in the world (United Nations Data Booklet, 2017). The 
country is divided into 34 provinces where each province has its own legislature and 
an elected governor (The Jakarta Globe, 2012). Provinces are then subdivided into 
regencies (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota). Each of these subdivisions has its 
own legislature and elected head of regency (bupati) and mayor (walikota) for the 
regency and municipalities respectively. Both provincial divisions and the further 
subdivisions are called regional government. 
Picture 1.1 
Provinces of Indonesia 
 
Source: http://www.geocurrents.info (downloaded in 2019) 
The subdivision of provinces is further divided into districts (kecamatan) and each of 
these is divided again into villages. As the lowest level of government administration, 
villages are unique in their governance arrangements. There are two types of 
villages that share the same government administrative level under the district but 
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are different politically, socially and economically. These types of village are called 
desa (rural) and kelurahan (sub-district). Thus, the term ‘rural’ in this research refers 
to desa not only to differentiate the geographic scale, but also the local political 
entity. 
What makes desa distinct is the agrarian culture of its economy, with desa being  
heavily reliant on small scale plantations for their local economic and social 
wellbeing. Such plantations are either dominated by food crops, such as rice and 
vegetables, or revenue crops, such as sugarcane and palm oil. In general, farmers 
reliant on the agro based economy have considerably lower welfare than those living 
in urban areas. These agrarian communities, in particular, came to play an important 
part in biofuel policy and politics, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
To investigate the geography of crops used for biofuel, it is important to also 
understand the different political periods in Indonesia (Figure 1.2), which will be 
further elaborated in Chapter four. The thesis will highlight how the legacy of the 
previus policies has a profound effect on the current spread of the crops used for 
biofuel feedstcok on the major islands in Indonesia. These crops would be palm oil 
as biodiesel feedstcok and sugarcane as bioethanol feedstcok. 
Palm oil plantations are located in 23 out of 34 provinces in Indonesia across the five 
major islands Jawa, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. These plantations 
were developed at different times within the different islands. Those established on 
Source: Author's produced
Political System Timeline in Indonesia
Figure 1.2
Cultivating system during colonial period
Japannese occupation 
and war of 
independence
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Sumatra Island particularly in the North Sumatra Provinces are considered to be the 
first palm plantations created in Indonesia (Fauzi et al., 2012). Meanwhile, palm 
plantations created on Papua Island are considered to be the most recently 
established (Obidzinsky et al., 2012). This has had implications for the impact of the 
plantations within the different regions. Whilst in regions where palm oil plantations 
have been established for a long period, they have been mutually beneficial both 
socially and environmentally, in other regions especially where the plantations are 
newly established, the effects have been the opposite (ibid). This makes conducting 
research on Indonesian biofuel development both interesting and challenging due to 
the many palm oil plantations that have been established over many years. Chapter 
3 will include detailed discussion of these distinctive challenges for researching 
biofuels. 
Whereas palm plantations are established on all major islands, sugarcane 
plantations are found predominantly on Java Island, particularly the East Java 
Province (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014). This is related to the historical development 
of farming in Java and the long history of sugar cane plantations on the island, dating 
back to the 17th century when sugar cane was introduced by European and Chinese 
traders (Knight, 2018). At that time, the rural farmers produced sugarcane-based 
sugar as a revenue crop, while they used palm-based sugar for daily consumption. 
Thus, farmers planted sugarcane as a side crop alongside their primary crop of rice; 
this was a practice that continued for two centuries. Thus, having planted sugarcane 
for generations the farmers were already highly adept at growing this crop. This 
history had implications for the shape of agrarian policy, which will be discussed in-
depth in Chapter 4. 
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The Indonesian case study of biofuel policy offers unique insights due to the dynamic 
politics of biofuel in the country and relative wealth of biofuel crops. Indonesia has 
well established sugarcane and palm oil plantations and has implemented policies 
designed to stimulate growth of other biofuel feedstocks, such as Jathropa. This 
wealth in biofuel feedstocks has seen the country emerge as the largest palm oil 
producer in the world. However, Indonesia is still unable to meet its domestic biofuel 
targets.  I will argue that this is, in part, reflective of political tensions related to the 
relationship between biofuels and their feedstock. This will be examined in depth 
within this thesis 
 
1.4. Thesis Structure 
This thesis is composed of eight chapters beginning with this introductory chapter. 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature setting the context for biofuel research and 
for this study in particular. It begins with discussion of biofuel, particularly regarding 
its promise versus the reality of the implementation of the policy. It then reviews the 
literature within political ecology and its current discussion about biofuel policy and 
politics where large agro corporations have managed to profit from the policy. It also 
reviews the literature in agrarian political economy since it gives greater 
understanding about the interrelation between the government, farmers and large 
agro-industry. These strands from the literature in both political ecology and agrarian 
political economy create the research opportunity that becomes the core analysis in 
this research.   
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used in this research, which involves a 
qualitative ‘abductive’ approach (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Timmermans and 
31 
 
Tavory, 2012). This chapter explains the case study location of the research and 
provides justification for its selection. It then explains the research design and 
strategy for conducting the research and details the methods, including interviews, 
field observations and document analysis. It ends with discussion of the data 
analysis and writing process. 
The first of four empirical chapters, Chapter 4 discusses the influence of historical 
agrarian policy on contemporary biofuel policy in Indonesia. The analysis begins with 
a focus on colonial rule and practices that saw sugarcane crops emerge in the 
country and farmers with small holdings ultimately become the backbone for a large 
industry that was the hallmark for Indonesia’s subsequent agrarian policy in the 
1970s to 1980s. The analysis discusses the different crops used in contemporary 
biofuel policy (i.e. sugarcane and palm oil) and reveals how the agrarian policy in the 
1970s and 1980s shaped their performance and reshaped the implementation of 
biofuel policy. This chapter argues that past agrarian policy is an important factor in 
shaping the performance of the biofuel industry and in ultimately leading to the 
particular outcomes that are seen in contemporary biofuel policy - namely support for 
palm oil, despite the initial intentions.   
In Chapter 5 the focus is on the interconnections between historical agrarian policy 
and politics and the contemporary performance of the biofuel industry as it relates to 
the structure of the market for feedstock crops. This chapter highlights the 
importance of an integrated and cohesive agro-industry as an essential condition to 
support the biofuel industry. Besides analysing the market structure for the two 
primary biofuel crops in Indonesia (i.e. palm oil and sugarcane), it also analyses the 
different production processes of the forms of biofuel associated with each crop (i.e. 
bioethanol and biodiesel), showing how this is another factor that has shaped the 
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implementation of biofuel policy. This chapter also addresses the politics of 
knowledge, showing the importance of understanding the technical aspects of the 
production processes within government for policy implications to be better 
anticipated and intentions realised in practice.   
The remaining two empirical chapters focus on the contemporary context and the 
politics of biofuels. Chapter 6 addresses issues of policy conflict and fragmentation 
showing how this had major implications for the shape of contemporary biofuel 
policy. This chapter also explores the political dynamics of biofuel policy and, in 
particular, looks at the role of political elites in contributing to the development of 
contemporary biofuel policy. In this regard, the chapter draws conclusions related to 
challenges of political will within political elite groups as core to key failures and 
(unintended) policy outcomes.   
Building on the previous chapter, Chapter 7 explores government politics as they 
relate specifically to the palm oil industry and highlights how the political dynamics 
provided openings for the agro palm industry to opportunistically take advantage of 
government biofuel policy. This chapter discusses the crucial role that policy played 
(however unintentionally) in shaping the biodiesel industry and eventually providing 
the foundations for an agro-fuel alliance between the palm and biodiesel industries. 
The chapter ultimately provides further support for the core arguments relating to 
contemporary governance and problems of political will amongst elites.   
Finally, Chapter 8 synthesizes the research findings and core arguments. It 
highlights the findings from each empirical chapter and narrates the connections 
between the different insights produced. This chapter reflects on the challenges and 
limitations of the research and suggests some future research that could potentially 
be conducted using this research as its foundation. Finally, a set of 
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recommendations are made that could potentially improve the current condition for 
Indonesia’s biofuel policy.       
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Chapter Two 
Conceptualizing Agro-Fuel Alliances: 
The Politics of Biofuel 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on the politics of biofuel, 
focusing on the importance of both agricultural and biofuel production industries. As 
an innovation, biofuel is often sold as the panacea to problems of governments in 
both developed and developing countries eager to acquire the anticipated benefits. 
However, review of the current literature discussing biofuels shows how politics that 
cut across the interests of state actors and large corporations have led to the rise of 
agro-fuel alliances that could possibly be the cause for such an innovation being 
unable to deliver on its promise. Much of the existing literature is grounded in 
political ecology and agrarian political economy, as such, this review draws together 
two strands of literature in order to build a basis for analysing agro-fuel alliances.  
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section discusses literature that 
highlights the way biofuel policies and practices have shifted away from their ‘green’ 
trajectory and exacerbated the problems that they are supposed to solve. The 
second and third sections examine the literature on political ecology and agrarian 
political economy and discuss key themes relevant to understanding agro-fuel 
alliances, which are a central focus for these biofuel policy studies. The fourth 
section discusses the two key aspects of agro-fuel alliances identifiable within the 
literature; firstly, the power of large capital and secondly the government relationship 
with large industries. Finally, the chapter closes by introducing the identified 
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knowledge gap within the existing body of literature that the current research aims to 
address. 
 
2.1. The Promise and the Critiques of Biofuel Policy 
Multiple countries around the world have implemented biofuel policies due to their 
promise to be a panacea for tackling environmental (e.g. climate change) and 
economic development problems, but research has shown how often such policies 
have merely exacerbated these existing problems. In this context, biofuels have 
become a hotly contested tool of sustainable development (Searchinger et al., 2008; 
Cherubini et al., 2009; Fargione et al., 2008; Fernandes et al., 2010; Ariza-
Montobbio et al., 2010; Obidzinsky et al., 2012). This section will discuss existing 
analyses of biofuel policies and the arguments that have been put forward to suggest 
they have been ineffective in resolving key issues relating to the environment and 
economy. This will set the context for the thesis and for the analysis of the biofuel 
energy system in Indonesia.  
Studies in the field of chemical engineering, biology and economic and 
environmental sociology argue that biofuels are an ecological innovation for solving 
problems relating to the economy and environment (Foidl et al., 1996; Huber, 2008; 
Janicke, 2008; Silitonga et al., 2011). Environmental sociologists and ecological 
modernization theorists such as Arthur Mol (2007) and Joseph Huber (2008) claim 
that countries such as USA, EU and Brazil are implementing biofuel policies to 
reduce fossil fuel dependency, reduce carbon emissions and increase rural farmers’ 
incomes. Biofuel is also positioned as a cheaper substitute for fossil fuels. In this 
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context, biofuel is perceived as a ‘silver bullet’ for solving problems of energy 
security, rural poverty and climate change (Fatimah, 2015).  
Added to this, it has been suggested that governments anticipate that the growing 
interest in biofuels will eventually create new biofuel industries, establish new 
markets and stimulate domestic economic growth (Ernsting, 2007). This makes 
pursuing biofuel policies favourable for both developed and developing countries, 
where developed countries would use biofuels as a way of reducing fossil fuel 
consumption and developing countries would use biofuel as a way to increase 
economic growth by either producing biofuel or its feedstock (Oliviera et al., 2017). 
Based on this, it is possible to conclude that a set of high expectations has been 
placed on biofuels. Thus, countries that want to develop biofuel industries utilize a 
variety of policy instruments to create growth within the sector (Amir et al., 2008; 
Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; Mol, 2007; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2009).  
Most of the countries that develop biofuel industries such as Brazil, the USA and EU 
states use a national policy approach, such as mandatory blending of biofuel with 
fossil fuels, subsidies to the biofuel industry and export taxes for biofuel products 
(Oliviera et al., 2017). Implementation of such polices has successfully positioned 
those countries as major players in the global biofuel energy system as both 
producers and consumers (Mol, 2007). However, some biofuel policy studies in 
developing countries such as India and Indonesia showed that instead of creating 
national policies, the central government used a direct approach to farmers and 
smallholders to plant certain crops to be used as biofuel feedstock (Amir et al., 2008; 
Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; Fatimah, 2015). Thus, instead of creating policies to 
incentivize the biofuel industry to grow, the governments in both countries are 
actively advertising biofuel as a profitable endeavour for rural farmers. These 
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different policy approaches show the governments’ clear intentions towards 
developing their respective biofuel industries.  
However, Castan-Broto (2015) asserts that implementing a low carbon transition 
policy could create an inconsistent result between the policy expectation and the 
outcome emerging from the policy implementation - and biofuel policy is one 
example. Whilst biofuel is able to deliver its promise of reducing fossil fuel 
dependency by increasing the use of renewable fuels as proposed by its proponents 
(e.g. Mol, 2007; Huber, 2008; Ernsting, 2007), analyses using the lenses of political 
ecology and agrarian political economy have shown that government support for 
biofuel policies has, in many instances, created an alliance between biofuel 
industries and large agro-companies (White and Dasgupta, 2011; Ariza-Montobbio et 
al., 2010; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2009; Obidzinsky et al., 2012; Oliviera et al., 
2017). Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck (2009) have examined multi-case studies on 
biofuel policies in countries such as Columbia, Brazil and USA, and argue that 
biofuel policy has become a lucrative business opportunity for capital-rich private 
stakeholders. This is because biofuel industries are benefiting from government 
subsidies and mandatory blending mandates, which lowers their business risk while 
ensuring profit for these companies (Oliviera et al., 2017). Holander’s (2011) study 
on biofuel policy in Brazil has also shown how policies that were implemented have 
created an alliance between agro companies and biofuel industries. The alliance was 
able to successfully capitalize on biofuel policy implementation in foreign markets 
(such as in the USA) as overseas demand for biofuel was high while local biofuel 
industries were unable to fill the demand. This suggests biofuel policies have 
frequently generated lucrative business opportunities for large agro-companies. 
Thus, an unexpected consequence emerged as biofuel policy became a policy that 
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was capitalized upon by the alliance between biofuel industries and large agro 
industries.  
Political ecologists and agrarian political economists have also criticised government 
biofuel policies that sought to empower rural farmers (Amir et al., 2008; Ariza-
Montobbio et al., 2010; Fatimah, 2015). Studies conducted by Amir et al. (2008) and 
Fatimah (2015) on Indonesia’s biofuel policy have shown that the government’s 
attempt to use farmers to plant jatropha, a crop designated to be a biofuel feedstock, 
culminated in total failure since the domestic biofuel industries did not want to buy 
the crop from farmers. Instead, the industries preferred to buy crude palm oil (CPO) 
from the local palm oil industry since it is much cheaper and more abundant. Both 
Amir et al.’s (2008) and Fatimah’s (2015) studies have shown that the biofuel 
industry would prefer to be supplied by large agro-industry rather than small scale 
farmers, as the former can provide a more reliable and cheaper feedstock material 
for the biofuel industry than the latter. Another similar study highlighting the failure of 
using farmers as biofuel industry suppliers was conducted by Ariza-Montobbio et al. 
(2010) in India. Their study found that the biofuel industry prefers to be supplied by 
farmers with large capital rather than small farmers despite them all planting the 
same crop, jatropha. These studies have shown that using rural farmers to support 
the biofuel industry has often not been viable, since they could not produce the 
feedstock materials abundantly or cheaply enough for the industry. Conversely, large 
plantations do not have any difficulties in filling the industry’s demands due to their 
ability to scale-up production and be more efficient compared to rural farmers (Ariza-
Montobbio et al., 2010; Castelanos-Navarette and Jansen, 2015). The biofuel case 
studies on jatropha in India and Indonesia have shown that biofuel industries would 
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rather ally with large agro industries than small holding rural farmers despite 
governmental efforts to promote rural farmers as biofuel industry feedstock suppliers.  
The promise of biofuels as a route to address climate change has also created a 
contradiction. Analyses of the life cycle of biofuels show that biofuel production could 
only result in zero carbon emissions if its feedstock is planted on land without 
replacing any existing vegetation (Searchinger et al., 2008; Cherubini et al., 2009; 
Fargione et al., 2008). However, research shows how the implementation of biofuel 
policies has caused increasing demand for feedstock crops, such as sugarcane, 
palm oil, rapeseed and soy. This demand has been met by increasing production 
through expanding plantation sizes, often in areas of important existing value in 
terms of carbon absorption such as rain forests (Fernandes et al., 2010). For 
example, studies in emerging market countries such as Brazil (Lima et al., 2011) and 
Indonesia (Varkkey, 2012) have highlighted the actions of agro-companies 
expanding plantations in place of adjacent pristine forest. Even if biofuel production 
does not replace pristine forest in favour of feedstock plantations, Pineiro et al.’s 
(2009) biofuel study in USA found that land use changes for biofuel feedstock 
expansion can still cause net carbon emission release. Their study used time series 
data of farm plots used to plant diverse types of crops and compared them with 
those used exclusively for a single crop to produce biofuel. They found that the 
former had a better result in terms of sequestering carbon than the latter. Thus, 
biofuel production that is expected to reduce carbon emissions by using a renewable 
energy source, has unexpectedly released more carbon into the atmosphere due to 
the negative impact on land conversion and monoculture farming techniques. 
Political ecology scholars have also pointed out social justice problems, such as land 
grabbing and conflict with large agro companies, as consequences of political 
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support for biofuels. Fernandes et al. (2010) highlight how the expansion of 
sugarcane plantations in Brazil, encouraged through the government’s ambition to 
increase biofuel production, has led to agro-companies renting farmers’ land for 
sugarcane cultivation. This has ultimately resulted in overuse and deterioration of the 
land due to plantation activity and has locked landowners into a dependency 
relationship with plantation companies (ibid.).  
Similarly, Obidzinsky et al. (2012) claim that government-driven palm oil plantation 
expansion in Indonesia has prevented indigenous forest communities from utilizing 
the forest and threatened their livelihoods. Although in both case studies the farmers 
and indigenous forest communities remain on their respective land, they have 
essentially lost the benefits they previously gained from it, as they cannot plant other 
types of food crop or use it for hunting and gathering activities owing to the 
destruction caused by plantation activity. Thus, land grabbing for biofuel purposes 
does not have to mean banishing certain groups of people from their land entirely, 
but can simply prevent people from using the land to their benefit, with the same 
effect of disfranchising these communities.  
Research also points to a rise in conflict between neighbouring communities and 
plantation companies. Neville undertook fieldwork in Kenya (2015) and Tanzania 
(Neville and Daugverne, 2012) utilising interviews and ethnography and found that 
biofuels policy was generating conflicts between communities and plantation 
companies as the latter was damaging the environment and failed to provide fair 
compensation for the former. In other studies, conflict has also been revealed 
between agro companies and the locals who work as their labourers triggered by 
harsh working conditions, low wages and the use of under-age workers (Wilkinson 
and Herrera, 2011; Hunsberger et al., 2017). Thus, instead of increasing rural 
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people’s welfare, biofuel policy implementation has become the source of conflict 
between locals and biofuel companies, impoverishing their livelihoods and making 
the idea of biofuel policy development for rural people’s benefit highly contestable. 
Conflict around biofuels has been shown to not only occur between agro companies 
and locals directly involved in or displaced by plantations, but also between 
communities around plantation areas due to the uneven distribution of benefits and 
costs as a consequence of a plantation’s existence. Obidzinsky et al.’s (2012) 
ethnographic research in Indonesia has found that agro companies prefer to pay 
more for skilled labourers and less for those who are unskilled. The skilled labourers 
are essentially migrant workers who moved to the area with previous experience of 
working in large plantations. Meanwhile, the plantation activity has damaged the 
indigenous people’s environment and deprived them of their existing livelihood. They 
have lost their means to fulfil rudimentary needs which has forced them to live either 
as underpaid workers on the plantation or become marginalized in the community 
amongst the well-off migrants (ibid.). The disproportionate distribution of benefits 
between these two communities on agro companies’ plantations has also, in some 
cases, escalated into physical conflict with human casualties (Peluzo, 2008). Such 
an occurrence is not unique to a case study in one country, as Daugverne and 
Neville (2010) have reported similar patterns elsewhere in other developing countries 
that are promoting biofuel industries. This evidence leads to a further disintegration 
of the claim that biofuel development benefits rural people and can address issues of 
rural poverty.         
Although multiple governments have implemented biofuel policies as a panacea to 
problems relating to environment and economic development, studies of policy 
implementation have shown that there are several unwanted consequences. While 
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the research discussed thus far has addressed the implications of biofuels policy in 
terms of plantation expansion and the consequences for local communities, other 
studies have been concerned with the nature of the industry that has produced these 
outcomes. In particular, the emergence of an industrial alliance between biofuel 
industries and large agro companies has formed a focus for analysis. Some argue 
that it is this industrial alliance that has caused biofuel policy not only to fail to meet 
its expectations, but actually escalate the problems that it is intending to solve.  
There is ample literature discussing the impact of biofuel policy on environmental 
and social justice issues (as shown above). I will focus the discussion now on this 
alliance between agro companies and biofuel industries, commonly known as the 
agro-fuel alliance drawing primarily on studies grounded in agrarian political 
economy and political ecology (e.g. Fernanders et al., 2010; White and Dasgupta, 
2011). This alliance has been examined for its potential in explaining the political 
construction of the biofuel energy system and the power relations between 
stakeholders involved in this system. In the next section, I will discuss the relevant 
concepts arising from political ecology to enhance understanding of this alliance, 
before moving to address agrarian political economy. These two areas of theory and 
research provide a grounding for my research and subsequent analysis.  
 
2.2. Political Ecology: The Politics of Market Creation and the Corporate 
Interest in Capitalizing on Government Policy    
Political ecology offers a critical lens of analysis for examining the interplay of politics 
and power in the changing social and physical environment (Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie 
and Brookfield, 1987). Research working with this perspective examines the power 
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relations between actors concerning politics, economy and environment with respect 
to the social structure and culture of the people in the respective region (Blaikie and 
Brookfield 1987b:17 as found in Bryant, 1992; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Rocheleau, 
2008). Political ecologists such as Bryant and Bailey (1997) and Robbins (2012) 
argue that the central idea of political ecology is the changing of environment either 
negatively or positively as a result of political processes, where the costs and 
benefits of this change are shared unequally among the actors involved. Thus, 
political ecologists study the power interplay of politics that leaves ecological 
impacts, as well as affecting those who depend on it for their livelihoods and 
wellbeing.  
This body of literature has been widely used in many disciplinary areas examining 
human-environment relationships since it was first developed in the 1970s (Robbins, 
2012), as well as being applied to a wide range of global issues, such as the 
geopolitics of food (Wainwright and Mercer, 2010), food production sustainability 
(Emel and Neo, 2010; Guthman, 2010), the politics of eco-certification (Eden, 2010), 
land management politics (Boras Jr et al., 2010) and the politics of agricultural 
practices (Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010). This makes political ecology a highly 
relevant lens of analysis to examine the politics of the biofuel energy system. It offers 
a set of concepts and ideas that are particularly relevant for the analysis in this 
thesis.   
Firstly, political ecology studies have provided insights relevant to understanding the 
way market creation from new policy implementation has given power to certain 
actors to influence and capitalize on the newly created market. For instance, Heidi 
Bachram’s (2004) study of carbon offset projects such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) shows the way policy implementation creates a new market that 
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certain actors can capitalize on and to an extent control, while others cannot. The 
CDM is designed to facilitate carbon offsetting in developed countries by undertaking 
activities to assist clean development in developing countries (e.g. planting trees or 
investing in clean energy projects). This creates a business opportunity for certain 
private stakeholders to sell carbon credits for clean development activities 
undertaken in developing countries. This gives power to private stakeholders to 
decide, for example, what kind of activity they develop and how they implement it. 
Such decisions are, in turn, dependent on the market demand for carbon credits 
(Bachram, 2004; Gerber, 2011). This idea concerning how certain actors can 
capitalize on new market creation arising from policy implementation is highly 
relevant in analysing the agro-fuel alliance within the biofuel energy system. This is 
due to the reality that biofuel policy implementation has created a new market 
exclusively for biofuels (as explained in the above section).  
A key argument developed by some political ecologists, such as Bryant and Bailey 
(1997), is that that government policies often tend to be favourable to certain actors, 
such as large corporations, as they have access to influence the decision makers. 
An example of this can be found in Stonich and Vandergeest’s (2001) research on 
the Honduras government’s policy to develop aqua culture farming - the main 
economic activity for people living in the country’s coastal regions. They revealed 
that the policy has created a lucrative business opportunity for large investors with 
the Honduran government eventually acting more like a corporate partner by 
providing support such as cultivated area availability and security measures. Other 
studies examining how government policy favours large corporations include 
analysis of the Laos energy transition policy (Baird and Quastel; 2015; Smits, 2015), 
the water privatization policy in England (Bakker, 2000), the Tanzania eco-tourism 
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policy (2001) and the jungle nationalization policy in South East Asia (Peluso and 
Vandergeest, 2010).  
While these studies offer multiple case examples of how large corporations gain 
favour from government policies, they do not provide sufficient justification for a 
wider generalisation regarding how the policies operate. Sovacool (2010) argues that 
there are many examples where governments are genuinely attempting to implement 
policy to increase people’s welfare through the utilization of natural resources. 
Although his study only uses macroeconomic indicators from the respective 
countries as the data source, he shows that the government may have a more 
complex role than merely operating in favour on large corporations.  
The second key line of conceptual development within political ecology that is 
relevant to this thesis is the analysis of politics and power relations within resource 
markets. A key example of this can be found in Eden’s (2011) study of eco-
certification. She found that labelling a product with a ‘green’ label increased the 
market share of the respective product as consumers have grown aware of the 
importance of environmental preservation. This makes ‘green’ labelling a resource 
product created from consumer power by demanding goods that do not harm the 
environment in their production. This new resource product (i.e. green labelling) is, in 
turn, translated into a new market opportunity for certain actors by establishing an 
institution to issue such labels. Van dam et al. (2008) highlights how the goods 
producers along with some NGOs and international organizations have 
representatives in the institution that issue such ‘green’ labels. This creates a power 
dynamic between companies that produce the goods and the institutions that issue 
labels to influence consumers in their choice to buy the respective goods.  
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The concept of power relations does not only exist within the resource market but 
also between private stakeholders and state actors. This is vividly seen in Baird and 
Quastel’s (2015) research as they examine the growing demand for electricity in 
Thailand as a market opportunity to be capitalized on by the neighbouring country of 
Laos. For a landlocked country with a lack of natural resources such as Laos, a 
proposal by large corporations to build a huge hydro-energy dam was viewed as an 
important development solution. The importance of the dam for Laos created an 
imbalance in the power relations between corporate and state actors as there was 
pressure for the Laos government to ensure the dam was built in their territory. This 
imbalance made the government fully cooperative with the investors’ requests, 
including relocating entire communities as well as using coercive techniques to 
ensure the respective communities consented to their land being flooded by the new 
dam reservoir (Lawrence, 2009). This concept of power dynamics and uneven power 
relations is relevant and important to understanding the politics of biofuels. Political 
ecology, in this respect, offers a suite of concepts for thinking about the creation of 
markets, as well as vested interests between large industries and governments. 
Although these case studies (e.g. Stonich and Vandergeest, 2001; Neuman; 2001; 
Baird and Quastel, 2015) are generally more focused on social justice and 
environmental impacts linked to government policy implementation, they also provide 
insight into the politics of market creation and how such processes can be 
capitalized on by particular actors creating power imbalances between the 
stakeholders involved. These key concepts from political ecology will be utilised in 
the thesis to inform the analysis and provide a way in to understanding how private 
actors perceive biofuel policy and capitalize on it. However, I argue that insights and 
concepts from political ecology are insufficient to understand the dynamic 
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metabolism of the biofuel complex, particularly the involvement of large agro 
companies within this energy system. In the next section, I introduce the lens of 
agrarian political economy and assert that the insights and concepts from this 
theoretical lens are needed to be able to fully explain the processes of biofuel 
development in Indonesia. 
 
2.3. Agrarian Political Economy: The Politics between Government, Farmers 
and Agro-Industry 
Agrarian political economy (APE) is argued by its advocates, such as Henry 
Bernstein (2010), to be the study of “the social relations and dynamics of production 
and reproduction, property and power in agrarian formations and their processes of 
change, both historical and contemporary” (p.1). He later refined his characterisation 
of APE defining it as studies focused on the agrarian transition to capitalism 
especially in developed countries and the way colonialism in the late 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century has influenced developing countries’ agrarian policy 
(Bernstein, 2016). Thus, studies of APE have a historical focus on agrarian policy 
transformations relating to the change in the sector from one which was controlled by 
rural farmers to one that through processes of industrialization came to be controlled 
by large capital and foreign investment. The relevance and importance of APE as a 
lens of analysis for biofuel policy studies is because agrarian political economists 
have studied agro-fuel alliances by examining the power relations between large 
agro industries and stakeholders involved in the implementation of biofuel policies 
(e.g. Fernandes et al., 2010; White and Dasgupta; 2011; Daugverne and Neville, 
2010; Hollander, 2011; Pye, 2011; Gillon, 2010). Moreover, their focus on this 
alliance is not only because biofuel industries are using agricultural products as their 
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raw materials, but also because government politics in the agricultural sector may 
influence biofuel policy. The intention for this thesis is not to use the lens of APE to 
simply analyse the agrarian politics of biofuels. Instead, it will be used in a similar 
way to political ecology to identify key concepts within the literature that are useful in 
analysing the agro-fuel alliance within the biofuel energy system. 
One of the common approaches that agrarian political economists have taken in 
analysing agrarian politics is to examine historical events that have had influence on 
different countries’ agricultural sectors, in order to assess current government policy 
(e.g. Krueger, 1996; Rozelle and Swinnen, 2009; Mehl, 2009; Rao, 2009; Pechlaner, 
2010). Bernstein (2010) argues that the historical facet of a country’s agrarian policy 
is important to analyse as it enhances understanding of the problems that the 
government wants to overcome and how these problems have created winners and 
losers between different actors involved in the sector prior to the policy 
implementation. For example, Rozelle and Swinnen (2009) study agrarian reform 
policy in China and the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, when farmers in both 
countries received equal benefit from the government regardless of their yield 
performance. They highlight how this caused problems of low agricultural output in 
both countries but with very different outcomes in the two cases.  Where China’s 
policy successfully led the country to overcome rural poverty, the Soviet Union’s 
policy ultimately failed and led to the dissolution of the country. Although low 
agricultural output had been a problem for both governments, farmers in the two 
countries perceived this in different ways. Farmers in China considered the 
government problem as their problem due to the famine that struck them prior to the 
reforms, whereas the Soviet Union farmers had lived contently with the pre-reform 
system and were against the reform. In this way, the lens of agrarian political 
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economy is able to examine the way the antecedents to policy reform create different 
actor perceptions and conditions that help to explain the success or failure of a 
policy.  
Although historical analysis is important to understand the past agrarian policies for 
countries that implement biofuel policies, there are also the concepts of 
‘appropriation’ and ‘substitution’ developed by agrarian political economists such as 
Goodman et al. (1987) which are highly relevant in examining biofuel policy. They 
developed these concepts as part of an analytical framework for interpreting 
agricultural industrialization implemented in developed countries, such as the US 
and the UK. According to Goodman et al. (1987), ‘appropriation’ means that farmers 
who are independent and able to produce any crops they choose become part of 
agro-industrialization and their output becomes an industrial input, which inevitably 
makes them dependent on the large agro-industry. Meanwhile, ‘substitution’ refers to 
the repurposing of agricultural outputs, which used to be directly consumed as food, 
to become industrial input where the food is processed into goods with different 
value than just food - such as biofuel. Based on these concepts, agrarian political 
economists such as Friedmann (1995) and Gillon (2016) argue that agricultural 
products have been revalued not merely as food to feed the people but also as 
derivative products with higher added value such as biofuel.  
Besides the concepts that have been discussed thus far, APE also offers a basis for 
understanding the power relations between farmers, industries and state actors in 
the agricultural sector. Agricultural economists such as Johan Swinnen (2010) argue 
that rapid economic development is actually incentivising politicization in the 
agricultural sector. This is happening as the relations between farmers and 
politicians have created a political symbiosis whereby the farmers and politicians 
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need each other but with different motivations. The latter supports the former in order 
to gain political power while the former expects the latter to pass favourable 
economic policies for them when they hold office. Thus, Swinnen (2010) claims that 
farmers are the subjects of politicization as they comprise large groups in society, 
making them significant voters for politicians during election campaigns.  
As the agricultural sector is industrialized, government political interests shift from 
farmers as part of agricultural labour force to the whole agricultural sector as part of 
the country’s economy (Goodman et al., 1987). This shift of interest happened due to 
farmers increasing wealth, suggesting that industrialization of the agricultural sector 
may actually benefit them as they are no longer positioned merely as political 
commodities by certain government elites. However, Swinnen (2010) asserts that in 
the industrialized agricultural countries, farmers still seek government support 
especially when the economic situation is unfavourable towards them such as when 
there is a decrease in agricultural market price. Similarly, governments are likely to 
focus on the agricultural sector if it loses its competitive advantage which could harm 
farmers’ welfare. This suggests that politicization in the agricultural sector, where 
farmers are the political commodity, is still happening despite being wealthy from 
industrialization.  
Despite receiving benefits from the processes of agricultural industrialization, 
Goodman et al. (1987) suggest that farmers’ economic share at national scale in 
developed countries (i.e. in terms of economic output such as gross domestic 
product - GDP) is actually decreasing due to the decrease in employment within the 
sector. They highlighted the effect of automatization and mechanization which 
caused employment in the agricultural sector to shift towards other economic sectors 
and reduce the number of rural farmers. This could also mean that agro 
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industrialization is benefiting farmers who are land owners as a reduction in 
agricultural employment means that landless farmers have shifted into other sectors. 
Thus, agricultural industrialization has increased the production of land-owner 
farmers and made them wealthier despite the overall economic share of the 
agricultural sector in that respective country being reduced (Bernstein, 2010).   
Nonetheless, Swinnen’s (2010) study suggests that agricultural industrialization has 
ultimately benefited large agro industries as they include farmers’ outputs as part of 
their wider industrial chain. This gives them more economic benefit and eventually 
increases their economic share at national level. This increase in economic share 
also increases large agro-industries influence on national macro-economic 
performance and creates vested interests within the government to support large 
agro companies, rather than individual farmers in the agricultural sector. Thus, in the 
industrialized agricultural countries, large agro industries tend to have stronger 
political bargaining power than farmers as they have a bigger economic share at 
national level.  
These key concepts and insights from agrarian political economy are combined with 
those from political ecology in order to develop the analysis in this thesis. In the next 
section, I put forward a framework for my analysis using the concepts I have 
introduced thus far before going on to discuss the relevant literature specifically 
examining biofuels and agro-fuel alliances.  
2.4. Reframing Agro-Fuel Alliances within Political Ecology and Agrarian 
Political Economy 
Based on the review of the political ecology and agrarian political economy literature, 
political ecology tends to focus on the power relations between actors across 
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different scales and the way they influence government politics. By contrast, APE 
focuses on the dynamics of agricultural outputs and the power relations within and 
arising from agrarian transformations. Both lines of scholarship share the common 
concepts of power relations and the interplay of politics and markets, which are 
useful in analysing the agro-fuel alliance within the biofuel energy system. Picture 
2.1 summarizes the key concepts of interest here as well as showing the 
intersections across both bodies of literature that are relevant to the current study on 
biofuels and agro-fuel alliances. There are two main themes relating to the politics of 
biofuels that will be discussed in this section; these are the power of large industries 
and the relationship between such industries and state actors. This section will 
examine these particular themes as a focus for analysis of the agro-fuel alliance 
within the biofuel energy system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2.1 
The Intersect between Political Ecology and Agrarian Political Economy in 
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Political Ecology 
- Impact of policy at 
micro level 
- Multi-level 
governance 
- Disproportionate 
benefit 
- Conflict between 
actors 
Agrarian Political 
Economy 
- Agrarian 
transformation  
- Colonialism impact 
- Agricultural 
production 
- Farmers as 
political 
commodities 
 
Politics in Biofuel 
- History of agrarian reform 
- Market politics 
- Power of large capital 
- State - large industry 
relation 
 
Source: Author Produced 
53 
 
2.4.1. Power of Large Agro Industries in the Biofuels Energy System 
Multiple studies using different lenses of political ecology and agrarian political 
economy have shown the way large agro companies have successfully capitalized 
on biofuel policy (e.g. Hollander, 2011; Lima et al., 2011; Wilkinson and Herrera, 
2011; Pye, 2011; Varkkey, 2012; Pichler, 2015). For example, Wilkinson and 
Herrera’s (2011) study found that sugar industries in Brazil were consolidating their 
business at a time when demand for bioethanol as a substitute for gasoline was 
increasing rapidly in the early 2000s. Similarly, Pye (2011) found that palm oil 
companies in Indonesia increased their production markedly to fulfil demand from 
biodiesel industries in overseas markets, particularly the EU and US markets. 
Gillon’s (2010) study has also uncovered a similar situation in Brazil, with US corn 
agro industries consolidating to fill domestic demand for biofuel. These studies all 
suggest that agro industries were active in ensuring they took advantage of the 
increasing demand for biofuel either domestically or overseas. These actions 
contributed to ensuring a close mutual relationship between large agro industries 
and the biofuel sector.  
This creates questions concerning precisely how agro-fuel alliances formed and the 
implications for power relations between stakeholders within the biofuel energy 
system. Oliviera et al. (2017) argue that fulfilling market demand for biofuel is seen 
as a profitable endeavour for agro industries. Moreover, Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 
(2009) also assert that biofuel policy implementation is attracting private agro 
industries to expand in the sector. Studies on biofuel policy implementation 
conducted in Brazil (Wilkinson and Hererra, 2011) and the US (Gillon, 2010, 2016) 
confirmed that biofuel policy implementation in both countries has caused the well-
established sugarcane and corn industries (in the respective countries) to profit from 
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the policy by either being the biofuel industries main supplier or directly investing in 
the industry. Their research has shown the way an agro-fuel alliance formed at the 
onset of the implementation of the biofuel policy in the respective countries. 
Moreover, they have also shown that biofuel policy implementation in both Brazil and 
the US has intuitively created a market expansion opportunity for well-established 
agro-industries, such as sugar (in Brazil) and corn (in the US). These studies 
suggest the tendency for agro-fuel alliances to be formed as a mutually profitable 
relationship between large agro industries and biofuel industries.  
Such alliances have not been without critique, with analysts such as Mol (2010) 
asserting that biofuel production should not only benefit large agro industries, but 
also small scale agro industries, which include economically poor communities 
involved in the production of biofuels such as subsistence farmers and rural small- 
scale plantations and refineries. Other proponents of biofuels (e.g. Kuemmel et al., 
1998; Huber, 2008; Silitonga et al., 2011) have asserted the benefits of planting 
biofuel feedstock crops for rural farmers as long as they are not supplanting edible 
crops and/or are planted as side crops so as not to create issues of food security.  
Such research implies that agro-fuel alliances have a potential to share the 
economic profit from biofuel policies with small rural scale agro industries. As such, 
some agricultural political economists and political ecologists (e.g. Ariza-Montobbio 
et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2015; Afiff, 2014; Fatimah, 2015) highlight how developing 
countries such as India and Indonesia are trying to develop their biofuel industries by 
relying on small scale rural agro industries to feed the biofuel industries with the 
intention of sharing the benefit of this innovation and resolving issues of rural 
poverty. Furthermore, they also argue that these developing countries are 
encouraging their rural communities to establish plantations by utilizing non-edible 
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crops such as jatropha and castor where these crops are planted with the sole 
purpose of being feedstock for biofuel industries.  
Studies on biofuel policy in some developing countries such as India and Tanzania 
have suggested that small scale agro industries that plant biofuel feedstock crops 
could profit from biofuel policy implementation. Kumar et al.’s (2015) research on 
India’s biofuel policy provides evidence that rural small scale agro industries can be 
successfully developed with the sole purpose of feeding the biofuel industry. 
Moreover, Eijck and Romijn’s (2006) study of Tanzania’s biofuel policy suggests that 
implementation of the policy can become a profit opportunity for rural scale agro 
industries.  
However, Amir et al.’s (2008) and Fatimah’s (2014) research on Indonesia’s biofuel 
policy shows evidence that domestic biofuel companies refuse to buy jatropha 
produced by rural small scale agro industries for their biofuel input material despite 
government support for utilizing such crops. Varkkey’s (2012) study provides further 
support for this finding as she found that Indonesia’s biofuel manufacturers preferred 
to be supplied by well-established palm oil companies. Demand for crude palm oil 
(CPO) kept increasing even after the implementation of the biofuel policy suggesting 
a continuing reliance on CPO to meet demand from biofuel industries, both 
domestically and overseas. Although Eijk and Romijin’s (2006) study suggested that 
biofuel policy could create a profit opportunity for small scale agro industries, the 
jatropha case in Indonesia has shown that agro-fuel alliances do not necessarily 
arise for small scale rural agro industries that produce biofuel feedstock crops. Thus, 
there are likely other factors at play in driving agro-fuel alliances still to be 
determined.     
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Biofuel studies that examine the use of non-edible crops as biofuel feedstock have 
suggested that not all agro industries can supply biofuel companies despite the 
crops being planted specifically for them (e.g. Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; Afiff, 
2014). Previous studies on Indonesian biofuel policies show that biofuel companies 
are reluctant to use jatropha as their feedstock because it is too expensive as an 
input material (Amir et al., 2008; Fatimah, 2015). In contrast, Afiff (2014) argues that 
crude palm oil (CPO) is potentially a cheaper input material for the biofuel industry 
due to its low price.  
According to Hamilton-Hart’s (2015) study, palm oil industries in the South East 
Asian region are large companies with plantation bases in Indonesia and Malaysia, 
marking the region as a global supplier of palm oil. In contrast, jatropha plantations 
were just newly establish on a small scale in Indonesia (Afiff, 2014). Similarly, 
Wilkinson and Herrera’s (2011) study has reported that large soybean agro 
industries in Brazil are starting to control the domestic biodiesel market, despite the 
government’s attempts in directing biodiesel companies to use castor oil planted by 
small scale farmers. Based on the studies of biofuel feedstock crops in Indonesia 
and Brazil, it may be said that that well-established large scale agro companies tend 
to have a competitive advantage over rural scale plantations dedicated to supplying 
biofuel companies.  
The Indian biofuel policy provides evidence that only large capital plantations can 
feed the biofuel industries. Kumar et al. (2015) assert that large agro industries, such 
as corn in the US and sugarcane in Brazil, did not exist on the same scale prior to 
biofuel policy implementation in the respective country. This suggests that any agro 
industries producing biofuel feedstock crops should have the same opportunity in 
terms of benefitting from biofuel companies. Nevertheless, Ariza-Montobbio et al.’s 
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(2010) research has shown a similar pattern with Indonesia where large capital 
plantations have advantages over small-scale rural plantations. Their research found 
that biofuel companies only wanted to be supplied by jatropha plantations with strong 
capital since only these plantations could supply the industries with the amounts they 
needed at affordable prices. Thus, Ariza-Montobbio et al.’s (2010) study confirmed 
that a well-established agro-industry is not the primary factor that makes agro-
industry able to capitalize on government biofuel policy. Instead, it is the amount of 
capital that agro plantations have that becomes the primary factor encouraging the 
biofuel industry to bond with agro plantations. To be more precise, it is large capital 
agro-industry that can capitalize and benefit from biofuel policy implementation, not 
small scale industry.  
These previous research studies suggest that large agro industries are likely to have 
advantages within the market that enable them to more easily profit from biofuel 
policy implementation, even where attempts are made to support small-scale 
suppliers. The studies from Indonesia and Brazil have shown that an agro-fuel 
alliance is only emerging with well-established agro industries that have significant 
capital. Moreover, analysis of the Indian government’s biofuel policy shows that even 
in the absence of well-established agro industries prior to policy implementation, the 
agro-fuel alliance only forms between biofuel industries and large agro-industries. 
This is suggestive of the power of large capital within the biofuel energy system and 
the limits of government policy in this market.  
Most of the studies on biofuels discussing the power of large capital in the biofuel 
energy system are focused on large agro industries and their advantages within the 
biofuel policy/industry complex. Within these studies, the large agro companies 
seem to possess all the power and the role of the biofuel companies is neglected, 
58 
 
with agro-fuel alliances appearing as seemingly inevitable. Nevertheless, as 
confirmed through biofuel studies in developing countries such as India and 
Indonesia, biofuel industries appear to be established independently from large agro 
companies. This suggests that the agro-fuel alliances that form are not happening 
inevitably but through political processes, involving multiple actors, including 
government, biofuel industries and the agricultural sector. Thus, it is important to 
discuss all of these entities and their roles within the biofuel energy system to 
provide an understanding of the politics of biofuels.   
2.4.2. The Role of Governmental Interests in Constituting the Agro-Fuel 
Alliance  
The previous subsection has discussed the power of the large capital agro industries 
and the research that highlights their role in creating an agro-fuel alliance in biofuel 
markets. However, the studies on biofuel politics that have been discussed 
previously (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; Mol, 2007; Oliviera et 
al., 2017) also suggest that there is a tendency for state actors, notably the central 
government authority in a country, to support large industries, giving these actors a 
notable role in creating agro-fuel alliances. This subsection will discuss research that 
attempts to explain how and why governments have an interest in supporting large 
industries in ways which contribute to the emergence of agro-fuel alliances in biofuel 
markets.  
Based on the discussion earlier in the chapter, several large industries involving 
edible crops are associated with the biofuel energy system, with a few non-edible 
crops, such as jatropha and castor, also involved. However, this thesis will only focus 
its analysis on agro industries associated with edible crops rather than non-edible 
crops, since research on biofuel policy case studies using non-edible crops (e.g. 
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Amir et al., 2008; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Afiff, 2014; Fatimah, 2015) has 
suggested that their dynamic as biofuel feedstock is limited by the existence of well-
established edible crop agro industries. Thus, examining agro-fuel relations within 
edible crop industries is likely to be more productive as well as relevant within this 
research because biofuel industries in many countries, including Indonesia as the 
subject of this research, are mainly using such crops as their feedstock.    
There are two key aspects relating to governmental policies in the agricultural sector 
that biofuel industries need to thrive. The first, and the most important, aspect that 
biofuel companies need is the specific material products required to feed their 
particular biofuel industry. Mol (2010) explains that there are two types of biofuel 
widely for sale within the biofuel market - biodiesel and bioethanol. These types of 
biofuel are made from different crops; biodiesel is made from oilseed crops (such as 
palm oil, soy bean, jatropha and rapeseed), while bioethanol is made from sugar 
content crops such as sugarcane and corn (Kumar et al., 2015). Mol (2010) further 
highlights how biofuel production has a tendency to follow the types of fuel mostly 
used in any given country. For instance, as gasoline is widely used in both the US 
and Brazil, their biofuel industries focus on production of bioethanol, while EU 
countries, such as France and Germany, tend to focus on biodiesel production since 
gasoline is less commonly used than diesel. This suggests that biofuel industries in 
the respective countries would need particular feedstocks supplied by agro industries 
in accordance with their specific fuel market demands. 
This leads to the second aspect that biofuel industries require, which is the 
availability and reliability of the appropriate feedstock material. Biofuel industries rely 
on raw materials from crops such as sugarcane, corn, soybean, palm oil and 
rapeseed but these crops are also used for a number of other purposes including for 
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human food products and animal feed (Bailis and Baka, 2011). Mol (2007) argues 
that the use of food crops for biofuel industry purposes is, partly, due to these crops 
already being available and abundantly produced before the growing interest in 
biofuels emerged. Mol’s later (2010) research confirmed that biofuel industries in 
multiple countries tend to rely mainly on one type of food crop for their feedstock. For 
example, in the US corn is dominant and in Brazil sugarcane is the primary 
feedstock to produce bioethanol, while in Germany and Malaysia rapeseed and palm 
oil respectively are relied on to produce biodiesel (ibid.).  
Agrarian political economists and political ecologists such as Daugverne and Neville 
(2010) highlight how large agro industries producing crops that can be used to feed 
biofuel industries, had already established their presence a long time before the 
governments in the respective countries implemented their biofuel policies. Such 
research confirms Mol’s arguments regarding the tendencies for biofuel industries to 
focus on crops that are already well established and widely available for their 
feedstocks, rather than using feedstocks specifically grown for biofuels. This is 
suggestive of the advantages that these large agro industries possessed when 
biofuel policies were introduced and of the connections to historical agrarian policies. 
Agrarian political economists (e.g. Goodman et al., 1987; Krueger, 1995; Swinnen, 
2010; Bernstein; 2010) have shown that agrarian reform, particularly in developed 
countries, has made the agricultural sector in general become heavily industrialized. 
Moreover, the industrialization of this sector not only happened in developed 
countries but also in developing countries, such as within the palm oil industries in 
Malaysia and Indonesia (Hamilton-Hart, 2015) and the sugarcane industries in Brazil 
(Wilkinson and Hererra, 2011).  
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Krueger (1995) argues that agricultural industrialization is often perceived as 
necessary by governments to increase a country’s economic growth creating political 
interests in supporting such transformations. Her argument is supported by 
Swinnen’s (2010) study which focuses on the ways governments have initiated 
policies designed to support agricultural industrialisation, for example, by providing 
subsidies. Government policy encouraging industrialization in the agricultural sector 
has in some cases led to increased economic growth for the country and beneficial 
outcomes for the respective government.  
However, industrialization of the agricultural sector in both developed and developing 
countries has also seen negative impacts related to the rise of agro corporatism, 
particularly at the second half of the 20th century. For example, Friedman (1993) 
highlights some of the negative implications of the US government’s policies on 
global food production in the post-World War II period. The US government 
attempted to strengthen its hegemony over other countries through the export of 
affordable food, creating opportunities for US agro companies to expand and profit. 
Friedmann (1993) argues that this policy saw US farmers become appropriated and 
subsumed within the structure of large agro industries in order to support 
increasingly high demand for food. This is what Goodman et al. (1987) argue can be 
seen as appropriation and substitution, where farmers are co-opted into positions 
that require them to buy machinery and fertilizers from large agro companies and sell 
their output to the companies, which the companies then process and sell overseas. 
As a result, agro industrialization in the US has caused food production to increase 
rapidly and cheaply, benefitting the government and consolidating the US’s position 
as a global food supplier but with negative consequences for others involved in 
agricultural production. 
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For example, Friedmann (1993) argues that these processes of agricultural 
development have created dependencies in some developing countries on food or 
agricultural supplies from the US. Krueger (1995) further highlights how increases in 
the supply of food have caused these commodities to become very cheap in the 
commodity market reducing farmers’ incomes in both developed and developing 
countries. Farmers in developing countries are unable to compete against cheap 
imported food that floods their domestic markets, while farmers in developed 
countries suffer a decrease in their income since they cannot increase the price of 
the food commodity they produce due to their appropriation by large agro companies 
and subsequent loss of control over setting prices for their outputs (Goodman et al., 
1987).   
Another negative consequence for agro industrialization, particularly in developing 
contries, would be a social justice problem on the marginalization of native farmers. 
For example, the Indonesian government policy to reclassify 90% of the country’s 
forested area as state forest since late 1960’s has deprived the indigineous farmers 
livelihoods, since the government forbid them to conduct their traditional slash and 
burn agriculture as it is considered as environmentally destructive (Nomura, 2009). 
The forest reclassification policy means that the government has an authority to 
convert forest to developed logging and agriculture industry, whilst alienating the 
natives from their ancestral land in this process. However, the economic benefit from 
the forest conversion was largely received by migrant citizens, Indonesian people 
whom participated in the government resettlement program, which made them 
wealthy, particularly those working in the plantation or receiving the government land 
to estabilished smallholding (Nomura, 2009; Obidzinsky et al. 2012). This condition 
has further disfrenchased native farmers, which often becomes the catalyst of 
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horizontal conflict between the two communities (Peluzo, 2008). The negative impact 
of agro industrialization has not only occurred in Indonesia, but also in other 
developing countries such as India (Arizo-Montobbio et al. 2010) and Brazil 
(Fernandez et al. 2010), where large plantation existence has further marginalized 
poor native farmers living in the plantation areas. 
Despite these problems created, in part, through government support for agricultural 
industrialization and the development of large agro industries, Swinnen’s (2010) 
research suggests that farmers continue to have a significant political position that 
cannot being ignored by governments. Thus, there remains a need for governments 
around the world to attempt to address problems created in this sector. The rise in 
demand for biofuels was for many governments viewed, then, as having potential to 
revive farming sectors and address rising rural poverty.   
However, ultimately, as discussed above, the development of biofuels has in reality 
tended to benefit large existing agro industries (Oliviera et al., 2017). Precisely 
because of agricultural industrialisation and the appropriation of farming sectors by 
large agro companies, farmers have little direct bargaining power with biofuel 
industries. Instead, they sell their outputs to large agro companies, which hold the 
power to negotiate prices and generate profit (Goodman et al., 1987). Even though 
studies show that farmers do gain some benefits from biofuel production and related 
policies (e.g. Gilon, 2010, 2016; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Castellanos-Navarrete 
and Jansen, 2015; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2009; Varkkey, 2012), the vast 
majority of benefits continue to be retained by the large agro companies. The history 
of global agricultural industrialization and the role of governments in promoting this is 
important, then, in understanding the power dynamics within the contemporary 
64 
 
biofuel complex and the challenges of more recent policies designed to address rural 
poverty and benefit farmers directly.  
 
2.5. Concluding Thought 
Based on the discussion in this literature review chapter, it can be concluded that 
there is a strong connection between the large agro and biofuel industries. Large 
agro companies have the advantage of producing large amounts of the feedstock 
material needed by the biofuel industries, which has enabled them to capitalize on 
biofuel policy. Furthermore, the literature also suggests that historical alliances 
between government policy and large agro industries has been influential in the 
development of biofuel markets and production processes.  
Although previous studies (e.g. Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Oliviera et al., 2017; 
Gillon, 2010, 2016) have discussed the role of the government in causing the 
creation of agro-fuel alliances, most of these studies have set their focus on the way 
agro companies have been able to take advantage of biofuel policies and identified 
this as the key factor in the creation of agro-fuel alliances. Conversely, there is 
insufficient debate on the politics behind the biofuel industries and their role in the 
establishment of the agro-fuel alliance. This is because most of the studies focusing 
on this area consider biofuel industries either as part of large agro companies or as 
dependents of these companies (i.e. feedstock suppliers), undermining the 
possibility of there being politics behind biofuel industrialization. A key contribution of 
this thesis is to address this gap in the literature and examine the other side of the 
agro-fuel alliance by looking at biofuel industries and their relationship with agro 
industries.   
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Although there are two types of biofuel sold in the market (Mol, 2010), the discussion 
of biofuel policy via country case studies has mostly focused on one type of biofuel 
either bioethanol or biodiesel (e.g. Fernandes et al., 2010; Holander, 2011; Pye, 
2011; Gillon, 2016), with a few exceptions such as Wilkinson and Herrera (2011) and 
Kumar et al (2015). Even within these exceptions, Kumar et al.’s (2015) study of 
India’s biofuel policy focused on the social justice impacts for rural people and 
particularly rural food security issues. Meanwhile, Wilkinson and Herrera’s (2011) 
study provided a comprehensive discussion on the power of large agro industries 
within Brazil’s bioethanol policy, with some insight on the politics of crops for its 
biodiesel policy. Yet, this study is still focused on the power of large agro industries 
over biofuel policies and the impacts on the livelihoods of the small farmers, while 
the political dynamics of biofuel companies in Brazil are insufficiently addressed.  
The existence of biodiesel and bioethanol in the biofuel market and the requirements 
for two different types of crops to produce them indicates a different method and 
industrial characteristic between them that could potentially be politicized by certain 
actors involved in the biofuel complex. However, little attention has been given to 
study of the politics of crops used for producing these different forms of biofuel (i.e. 
bioethanol and biodiesel) other than revealing the profound effects on the livelihoods 
of certain communities affected by the existence of plantations. Indeed, Oliviera et al. 
(2017) highlight the need for further biofuel policy studies that focus on the political 
economy of crops in relation to biofuel production. This is a further important gap in 
the current literature that will be addressed through this thesis.  
With these two key knowledge gaps identified, I argue that the Indonesian biofuel 
case study provides an opportunity to generate insights that can address them. 
Research on Indonesia, in particular, has this far focused predominantly on the 
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impact of biofuel policies on rural or indigenous peoples’ livelihoods (e.g. Obidzinsky 
et al., 2012; Fatimah, 2015; Amir et al., 2008; Pichler, 2015). The small amount of 
research that there is addressing questions relevant to understanding the politics of 
crops that could be used to produce bioethanol and biodiesel is focused on jatropha 
(e.g. Afiff, 2014; Fatimah, 2015), and does not address processes of biofuel 
industrialization or underlying politics. The research and analysis in this thesis will 
bring an alternative focus on the politics of crops more broadly beyond jatropha, 
particularly looking at the importance of palm oil and sugar cane in the Indonesian 
context - and the politics of the biofuel industries as a neglected element of the agro-
fuel alliance.    
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Chapter Three 
Methods and Methodology:  
Designing the Research for the Indonesian Biofuel Case Study  
 
This chapter explains the methodology, data, and analytic approach used in 
completing the research. The research aims to conduct an in-depth study of the 
political construction of biofuel policy in Indonesia, examining how underlying politics 
shaped and reshaped its trajectory. It uses a qualitative approach as a means to 
better understand the way that the policy has been enacted, contested, and 
reconfigured in practice. The following methods were applied: document analysis; 
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, including government officials in 
different tiers (central, provincial and municipal/district), industry representatives and 
NGOs/academics; and a field study drawing on the researcher’s first-hand 
experiences working within Indonesia’s policy environment.   
This chapter is comprised of six sections followed by a conclusion. The first section 
discusses the research location to provide a geographical perspective of the area 
visited for conducting interviews with the respondents as well as for field study 
observations. The second section focuses on the design and selection of the 
methodology for the research. The third section discusses the research strategy, 
including the processes for data collection and also includes discussion about 
selecting the data sources. The fourth section discusses the interview process as it 
is the most complicated part in conducting this research; it discusses the problems in 
gaining access and undertaking interviews as well as the strategies used to 
overcome this. The fifth section discusses the field study where field observations 
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were conducted to gain more insight into biofuel policy implementation on the 
ground. The last section discusses the data analysis and the writing stage of the 
thesis.     
 
3.1. Research Location 
In this field research, I went to five different cities in Indonesia namely, Jakarta, 
Pekan Baru, Dumai, Medan and Yogyakarta (Picture 3.1). These cities were 
selected due to the necessity to reach relevant respondents as well as in an attempt 
to visit biodiesel factories. The different places chosen posed their own challenges 
due to the relatively short period for the field research (3 months). However, many of 
the respondents lived and worked in Jakarta or its surrounding areas, meaning that I 
spent most of the research period in Jakarta with one week to visit the other four 
cities to undertake interviews and visit sites for field observations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All the offices of the government ministries are located in Jakarta which was 
advantageous as more than half of the respondents were central government 
Pekanbaru 
Medan 
Dumai 
Picture 3.1 
Map of Indonesia’s Provinces 
Source: Adopted from www.wikimedia.org which has been personally modified  
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officials. Besides government officials, many non-government respondents including 
those identified as R1, R8, R15, R19 and R20 also reside in Jakarta. These 
respondents represented NGOs and palm oil, biodiesel and fossil fuel companies, 
and, in total, along with central government officials, composed two thirds of the total 
respondents in this research.  
Key challenges related familiarity with the research setting were less of an issue for 
this project as Jakarta is my home town, which means that I know the area very well 
and this reduced the need for a local guide. I was also aware of particular difficulties 
in navigating the city such as traffic jams, which are notorious in Jakarta, and was 
able to use such knowledge to inform decisions about research design, including the  
decision to spend at least two months in the city to complete this aspect of the 
research. I live in the suburbs while most of the respondents’ offices are located in 
the centre of Jakarta. Moreover, their offices are not located in the same area nor 
within walking distance of one another. This made conducting more than one 
interview in one day unfeasible, as I did not know how much time was needed to 
travel between respondents. Thus, I decided to do one interview per day since it also 
provided adequate time for me to reflect on the finished interview on the same day 
that it took place. 
  
3.2. Methodology and Research Design 
3.2.1. Selection of Methodology  
Researchers have applied both quantitative and qualitative methods when 
researching the politics of biofuels. Quantitative analyses have been used 
particularly when the biofuel study is focusing on greenhouse gas emissions being 
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sequestered (Cherubini et al., 2009; Fargione et al., 2008), the effectiveness of a 
particular crop as biofuel feedstock (Foidl et al., 1996; Achten et al., 2010), and the 
effectiveness of using a particular crop as biofuel feedstock in relation to storing 
greenhouse gases (Silitonga et al., 2011). Qualitative analysis has also been used 
extensively by researchers, particularly to examine the impact of biofuel 
industrialization on problems concerning the environment and social justice (e.g. 
Fernandes et al., 2010; Daugverne and Neville, 2010; Arizo-Montobbio et al., 2010). 
Of most relevance for present purposes, qualitative methods have also been 
favoured for studies focusing on biofuel policy and politics (e.g. Oliviera et al., 2017; 
Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Holander, 2011).   
In the context of Indonesia, both methodological approaches have been used to 
investigate the biofuel policy issue. However, most of this research is concentrated 
around the issue of socio-environmental impacts relating to the increase in demand 
for biofuel feedstocks, such as land use changes, forest fires, endangered wildlife 
(Tata et al., 2013; Masimin, 2013; Nair, 2015) and major disruption for those living in 
feedstock areas (Obidzinsky et al., 2012). There are also some Indonesian 
researchers who have used qualitative methods to evaluate biofuel policy and 
politics (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Afiff, 2014; Fatimah, 2015). Thus, although both 
quantitative and qualitative methods can be applied to questions about biofuel 
development, a qualitative approach has generally been favoured when focusing on 
aspects of policy and politics.  
The application of qualitative methods to investigate policy and underlying politics is 
particularly appropriate because the approach offers flexibility to explore emergent 
themes and areas of interest for the research (Charmaz, 2006). For example, 
qualitative interview methods enable researchers to ask open questions to extract 
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more detailed information about the situation, instead of just testing a predetermined 
hypothesis (Carter and Little, 2007). Interview methods are thus particularly useful 
for exploring the construction of biofuel policy, and giving insight into different actors’ 
understandings, motivations and perspectives (Marquardt, 2017). Thus, it enables 
the researcher to understand the problem thoroughly and holistically as required for 
a case study concerning Indonesia’s biofuel policy (Farber, 2006).  
3.2.2. Research Design  
This research was designed as a case study, using Indonesia’s biofuel policy as the 
research subject. Battacherjee (2012) asserts that a case study is useful in contexts 
where the focus is on the intensive study of certain events. Case studies tend to 
employ multiple methods and forms of data, ranging from interviews and policy 
documents, to observations. Using a case study design was useful for this research 
as it gave flexibility for the researcher to refine the research focus throughout the 
research period, being attentive to emergent issues and important lines of enquiry 
relevant to the broader research questions (ibid). This proved particularly important 
for this research as my focus shifted from to trying to understand the outcome of the 
policy to looking at the political and policy process that produced the outcomes, 
whilst applying ideas and insights from political economy.  
I began my analysis by looking at the historical context for agricultural policy in 
Indonesia to understand the extent to which this shaped contemporary biofuel policy. 
This method is commonly utilised by agrarian political economists whose studies 
have shown that current agrarian practices are deeply affected by past agrarian 
policy (Krueger, 1996; Rozelle and Swinnen, 2009; Mehl, 2009; Rao, 2009; 
Pechlaner, 2010). For this part of the research, I used policy documents related to 
the agrarian policies for the main crops used in developing Indonesia’s biofuel 
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industry, namely sugarcane and palm oil. I combined these secondary sources with 
other documentary data from media interviews with key stakeholders in biofuel 
development, government reports and previous research1 on biofuel policies.  
The analysis in the thesis progressed from an examination of the history of agrarian 
policy onto its effect on the contemporary biofuel industry and market. To investigate 
the contemporary context, I again used a combination of primary and secondary 
data, including interviews and policy reports. For this aspect of the research, I also 
utilised my personal experiences as a government official in Indonesia, which gave 
me understanding of the inner workings and structure of the Indonesian government 
and its policy culture. Before conducting this research, I was working in the Ministry 
of Finance for more than 10 years where my unit was in charge of formulating the 
central government budget policy. Thus, I have been directly involved in policy 
making, as well as the political process of creating the government budget. This 
experience has proven useful to the interpretive work and sharpened the analysis of 
the political process of biofuel policy making.  
Table 3.1 
Overview of PhD Research Design 
    
Research 
questions 
Data needs Data collection 
method 
Data 
analysis 
1. How has the 
longer-term 
history of agrarian 
development and 
policy in 
Indonesia shaped 
modern day 
biofuel 
production? 
Data on the Indonesian 
policy related to the 
development of palm oil 
and sugar cane. This 
would comprise policy 
documents, government 
reports, media and 
research interviews, 
books and previous 
Indonesian research on 
palm oil and sugarcane 
- Interviews with biofuel 
and palm oil industry 
representatives 
 
- Internet data search 
 
- Literature searches 
Abductive 
analysis 
                                                          
1 This research mostly consists of articles published in national journals and thus 
written in the Indonesian language. 
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policies. 
2. How has the 
biofuel industry 
and its market 
structure 
reshaped 
contemporary 
Indonesia’s 
biofuel policies? 
Data on the production 
process and methods for 
creating biofuels. This 
also segregated the 
different types of biofuel - 
bioethanol and biodiesel. 
Data comprised of policy 
documents, government 
reports, media and 
research interviews, 
books and previous 
Indonesian research on 
palm oil and sugarcane 
policies. 
- In depth interviews 
with government 
officials, private 
companies/plantations 
and academics/NGOs 
 
- Internet data search 
 
- Literature searches 
Abductive 
analysis 
3. How are politics 
and political 
processes 
enacted by those 
involved in the 
biofuel energy 
nexus in ways 
that have shaped 
biofuel policy and 
practice in 
particular ways? 
Evidence relating to the 
development of policy 
and regulations that may 
or may not be specific to 
biofuels but have an 
effect on biofuel policy 
implementation. This 
would include existing 
policy documents, 
government reports, and 
media and research 
interviews.    
- In depth interviews 
with government 
officials, private 
companies/plantations 
and academics/NGO’s  
 
- Internet data search 
 
- Personal experience 
and operational 
knowledge 
 
- Field observations 
Abductive 
analysis 
Source: Author produced 
3.3. Research Strategy and Data Collection Method 
This section discusses the strategy for conducting the thesis research particularly 
during the field research stage. An effective strategy was particularly important since 
I only had three months for the field research because of restrictions relating to the 
time period allowed by the scholarship sponsor to retrieve data outside the UK. In 
this section I provide more detail on the different data collection processes for each 
of the methods utilised. This section focuses especially on two data collection 
methods – 1) reflection from my personal experience and 2) collection of secondary 
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data sources in the form of government policy documents, reports, media interviews, 
as well as previous research studies about Indonesia’s agricultural and biofuel 
policy. The interviews, which form the bulk of the research data, will be discussed in 
section 3.4 of this chapter.  
 
3.3.1. The Advantage of Personal Experience  
In conducting this research, I found that my personal experience offered many 
advantages, while also presenting challenges relating to my positionality. The 
utilization of personal experience as part of the research data resonates with 
Polanyi’s (1962) concept of tacit knowledge where he argues that some forms of 
knowledge can only be derived from direct experience and practice. Both the tacit 
and explicit knowledge that I have acquired from immersion in the Indonesian 
governmental system proved in many senses beneficial, not only during the field 
research but also through the analysis and writing phases. In my previous 
occupation, my government unit was in charge of formulating the budget policy for 
central government. I was in charge of overseeing government revenue policy, which 
included tax and non-tax revenue. Thus, my position meant I was directly involved in 
government policy making and as such I am familiar with the political process of 
policy creation.  
Another advantage from my personal experience is the skill to understand policy 
language. Indonesia’s policy language often includes sentences with implicit 
meaning - and this is particularly evident in government policy that relates to the 
disbursement of government funds, such as in subsidy policies. For instance, the 
word “subsidy” is usually referred to as “incentive” in policy documents. Thus, 
75 
 
detailed understanding of what the policy entails is necessary to avoid 
misinterpretation of the policy language. This poses a significant challenge 
particularly when translating the policy into English, as I needed to carefully rephrase 
some words in the policy document to ensure accurate meanings.  
The utilization of personal experience also proved helpful in terms of knowing where 
and how to find relevant policy documents. This is because there are many 
documents with different functions and issues produced by different government 
bodies at different levels. Moreover, I was aware that policy documents always have 
identification numbers; my familiarity with this system made it easier for me to find 
relevant documents.  Thus, with my background knowledge I was able to both 
identify and find the most important and relevant documents for this research.   
However, I found that the greatest advantage of having personal experience as a 
government official was gaining access to respondents. This is because most of the 
respondents in this research are government officials. In this context, I was able to 
use my existing networks to reach the right person to interview. Moreover, in the 
cases where I did not have anyone to contact, I was able to find the relevant 
government office address and phone number on their website. I would then phone 
the number and the phone was usually answered by a secretary of the head of the 
respective office. I would then start from that point, as will be discussed further in a 
later section of this chapter.  
Although my personal experience was a key strength in conducting this research, I 
recognised that there could also be an issue of positionality since I am a government 
employee like most of the respondents. Sultana (2007) asserted that being a native 
researcher in the field study area could potentially lead to unethical conduct when 
collecting data, where different power relations with the respondent could cause the 
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researcher to be too forceful or intimidating when collecting information. In Sultana’s 
(2007) case, she conducted interviews in rural areas of Bangladesh where her 
respondents could regard her as being superior towards them. However, in this 
research, I interviewed people who hold power and authority such as middle ranking 
government officials and directors of companies. Thus, despite being a native 
researcher, it is the respondent that could be intimidating to me if, for example, my 
interview question is of a critical nature and the respondent does not really want to 
answer. In this context, the respondent could actually consider me as a nuisance, 
rather than someone acting in a superior manner. Hence, the respondents in this 
research could be categorized as elites and thus, I followed Mikecz’s (2012) 
suggestions about conducting interviews with elites, as will be discussed in section 
3.4.  
However, being a government official working closely with the way policy was 
formulated for more than a decade meant that it was difficult to detach my own 
positionality from this research (Cook et al., 2005). This was due to the fact that I 
knew and personally witnessed the way politics played a role in the formulation of 
state budget policy. Fortunately, I did not have experience of being directly involved 
with the politics behind biofuel policy formulation which enable me to use personal 
experience with reflexivity instead of using it as the basis for analysis (ibid). While 
this does not remove issues of positionality, it reduces the potential for power 
differentials to have a negative effect on the research, for example respondents 
giving answers that they think I want to hear.  
3.3.2. Utilization of the Internet for Collecting Secondary Data    
This research utilizes policy documents within the analysis. The collection of policy 
documents could pose difficulties as some documents are more than three decades 
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old. Then, I reflected on my personal experience of previously finding old policy 
documents on the internet. I know that there is a unit in every government body that 
has the specific task of uploading policy documents. Moreover, these documents are 
usually freely available to access on the internet. Thus, I realised that I could use the 
internet to find relevant policy documents without having to contact specific 
government bodies. 
However, without knowing the kind of policy documents that are relevant, one could 
easily come to the conclusion that the documents are not available online as they 
cannot be found. Again, my personal experience has aided me to successfully 
retrieve data from the internet. I know that every policy document has a respective 
name which is specific and usually has a lengthy title such as “Keputusan Menteri 
Energi Dan Sumber Daya Mineral Nomor : 0219 K/12/Mem/2010 Tentang Harga 
Indeks Pasar Bahan Bakar Minyak Dan Harga Indeks Pasar Bahan Bakar Nabati 
(Biofuel) Yang Dicampurkan Kedalam Jenls Bahan Bakar Minyak Tertentu” which 
can be translated as “Decree of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources 
Number: 0219 K / 12 / Mem / 2010 Concerning the Price of the Fossil Fuel Market 
Index and the Price of the Biofuel Market Index Mixed With Certain Fossil Fuel”. 
Retrieving this document through the internet requires the intuition of the researcher, 
as some policy documents particularly the newer ones may not need to be written in 
full to find them. However, an older document may require that the title is written in 
full to facilitate access. This suggests that searching for policy documents requires 
intuition along with knowledge about the types of documents related to the specific 
subject.  
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Year
Event or name of the policy 
implemented
Area being regulated by the policy
1971 Presidential Decree Number 43 
1972 Law Number 3
1975 Presidential Instruction Number 9 
Fossil Fuel Subsidy
Allocation of Fossil Fuel Subsidy
1984 Presidential Instruction Number 1 
1995 Law Number 11 
1997 Economic Crisis
2005 Presidential Regulation Number 55
Minister of Finance Regulation Number 92 Imposition of an export tax for palm oil 
products
2006 Presidential Regulation Number 5 Start of the biofuel policy initiative
Presidential Instruction Number 1
Regulates domestic biofuel market  
2007 Law Number 39
Minister of Finance Regulation Number 94 Start of the palm oil downstreaming 
policy
2008
Minister of Finance Regulation Number 9 Biodiesel incorporated into palm oil 
downstreaming policy
2009 Minister of Finance Regulation Number 156 
2010 Minister of Finance Regulation Number 21 
2011 Minister of Finance Regulation Number 130 
Government Regulation Number 52 
2015 The End of Biofuel Subsidy Policy 
Minister of Finance Regulation Number 113
Minister of Finance Regulation Number 114
Source: Author produced
1977- 
onwards
Government disburses subsidy for 
fossil fuel for the first time
Table 3.2
Timeline of Indonesia's Biofuel Programme and Its Associated Policy
Regulating domestic sugar market 
starting the sugar protection policy
Start of transmigration policy, providing 
land to farmers for planting revenue 
crops such as palm oil, starting the 
core estate policy
Directing farmers to plant sugarcane 
crops, strenghtening the protection 
policy
VAT rebate for biofuel transaction in 
domestic market in 2009 
1984 - 
onwards
Government allocates fossil fuel 
subsidy within the national budget for 
the first time
Strengthening core estate policy, 
private stakholders and farmers start to 
dominate palm oil industry
Regulating ethanol distribution in 
Indonesia
Ending of the sugar protection policy, 
farmers starting to abandon the 
sugarcane crop 
Regulating the amount of fuel subsidy 
based on MOPS and ALPHA
President instruction that directs 
Pertamina to be involved with biofuel 
policy
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources 
Regulation Number 51
Amendment of excise tax policy but no 
change to the bioethanol regulation
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources 
Regulation Number 32
Start of the mandatory blending target 
policy
Estabilishment of CPO Supporting 
Fund Agency
Palm oil companies start to fill the CPO 
supporting fund which will be used to 
subsidize domestic biodiesel 
production
Tax and customs incentives for 
utilization of renewable energy source
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources 
Decree Number 219
Start of the policy providing a subsidy 
for the biofuel industry which 
imediately responds by stopping all 
bioethanol production for fuel purposes
Corporate tax reduction or exemption 
incentive
Income tax incentive for investment in 
certain sector and/or regional area
Parliament decided that the biofuel 
subsidy policy should stop
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There are approximately 21 policy documents that I successfully collected from the 
internet (see Table 3.2). Besides policy documents, I also used government reports 
as secondary data. The term ‘government report’, in this research context, refers to a 
document produced by individuals with the purpose of providing a research analysis 
on behalf of a particular government body, where the rights of publication belong to 
the respective government body. Unlike policy documents that have legal 
consequences if not followed, government reports do not have such implications. 
Although it may not have any legal authority, a government report can contain 
valuable information relating to national biofuel production levels and biofuel 
processing methods. Such reports provide vital data components for the thesis. 
There are two types of government reports used in the secondary data for this 
thesis. First, there is the Global Agriculture Information Network (GAIN) Report which 
is an annual report produced by the US Department of Agriculture. This document 
records the development of Indonesia’s biofuel industry and related policy from 2006 
to the present day. Moreover, the primary source for this document is the 
government notably the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, which ensures 
the reliability of the data presented in the document. Secondly, I utilized a number of 
one-off government reports produced by different ministries, including the Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agency of Statistics - and all these documents are also available online (Table 3.3). 
 
 
 
No Name of the Report Produced by Year of the Report
1 Global Agriculture Information Network (GAIN) United States Department of Agriculture 2006-2017
2 Low Carbon Support Programme Ministry of Finance 2013 & 2015
3 Bioenergy Investment Guidelines Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource 2016
4 Summary of the State Budget 1969-2005 Ministry of Finance 2004
5 Tree Crop Estate Statistics of Indonesia (Palm Oil) Ministry of Agriculture 2014 & 2016
6 Tree Crop Estate Statistics of Indonesia (Sugarcane) Ministry of Agriculture 2012
7 Indonesian Sugarcane Statistics Agency of Statistics 2015
8 Financial Notes and the State Budget Ministry of Finance 2008-2010
9 Pocket Book Database Ministry of Finance 2015-2017
Source: Author produced
Table 3.3
List of Government Reports Related to Biofuel Policy
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Another important secondary data source were media interviews and statements 
given by government officials and industry representatives. The media, such as 
newspapers and magazines, are usually able to interview top level figures such as 
the President, Ministers and other important persons. Their quotes provide a source 
of information that has been used in places to strengthen the analysis in this 
research. Media interviews are, of course, not without their issues as those being 
interviews are likely to present a particular version of events and may not express 
things in the same way as they would within a confidential interview setting. Never-
the-less, they can be useful when combined with other sources of data for building 
up a picture of the salient issues and the positions of different actors.  
Lastly, I also incorporated previous research studies on palm oil and sugarcane as 
secondary data sources. These studies can be categorised into three groupings: 
technical issues in producing biofuel; evaluation of Indonesian government policy in 
growing sugarcane and palm oil in the 1970s and 1980s (without any regard to 
biofuel); and the history of colonialism in Indonesia. Some of these studies cut 
across these different categorisations (see Table 3.4). The type of literature utilised 
for this are included as secondary data because the information has formed part of 
my analysis, rather than having relevance to the research topics and aims i.e. they 
do not address issues of policy and politics relating to biofuels, rather they provide 
information relevant to answering my research questions, particularly within chapter 
4 where historical analysis is the focus. Most of these previous research studies are 
written in Indonesian, although certain key parts may be written in English such as 
the abstract. These studies are available in national journals and freely 
downloadable from the internet. I have put all the source materials in the references 
within this thesis. 
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3.4. Strategies, Processes and Challenges when Conducting Interviews  
The primary data in this research is interviews. I conducted the interviews in five 
different cities with respondents ranging from government officials to businessmen. 
In planning the interviews, I made a list of stakeholders who I wanted to interview 
(Boyce and Neale, 2006). Being a government official, I am aware that every 
government ministry has a ministerial regulation about organization and working 
procedures. This ensures that there is an organizational structure for each respective 
ministry and a job description for each official. Moreover, the internet is also a very 
No. Reseach Title Year Author Focus
1 Economies of Scale of Sugarcane 
Cooperatives in East Java Province and 
TheirIinfluencing Factors
2013 Ariningsih, E. Second category
2 Sejarah Kelapa Sawit Indonesia 2017 Supriyono, J. Second category
3 An Economic History of Indonesia 2012 van Zanden et al. Third category
4 The Java Sugar Industry as a Capitalist 
Plantation: A Reappraisal
1992 Knight, G.,R. Second & Third category
5 Indonesia’s Colonial Sugar Industry 2018 Knight, R. Third category
6 Sugarcane Industry and Trade: Lessons 
Learned from the Applied Policies 
During the Colonial Era Up Until This 
Period
2009 Wahyuni et al. Second & Third category
7 The Sugar Industry 1969 Mubyarto Second & Third category
8 Perspektif Pengembangan Industri 
Gula di Indonesia
2006 Indraningsih, K., 
S., and Malian, 
A., H.
Second category
9 Kelapa Sawit: Budidaya, Pemanfaatan 
Hasil dan Limbah, Analisis Usaha dan 
Pemasaran
2012 Fauzi et al. Second category
10 Kelapa Sawit: Upaya Peningkatan 
Produktivitas
1994 Risza, S. Second category
11 Materi Kuliah Pengelolaan Kelapa 
Sawit I
2018 Ma’ruf A. Second category
12 Analisis kebijakan industri gula 
Indonesia
2005 Susila, W., R., 
and Sinaga, B., 
M.
Second category
13 Analisis efisiensi penggunaan masukan 
dan ekonomi skala usaha pada 
usahatani tebu di Jawa Timur
1991 Irawan, B., and 
Hutabarat, B.
Second category
14 Profil Tebu Rakyat di Jawa Timur 1992 Rachmat, M. Second category
Source: Author produced
Table 3.4
Previous Research Studies Used as Data in This Research
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useful tool to search for the names of relevant officials, since almost all government 
units at both central and regional level have their own websites where the 
organizational structure is detailed along with the name and the picture of current 
officials and their respective positions. Thus, by utilizing the relevant policy 
documents and the websites of the respective government offices I was able to 
identify the stakeholders for the in-depth interviews. A summary of the interview 
respondents is presented in Table 3.5.  
 
Code Interviewee Title
Place of 
Interview
Mode of Interview
R1 Head of Aprobi Jakarta One on One
R2 Bappeda Dumai Infrastructure Section Dumai One on One
R3 Bappeda Dumai Development Planning Section Dumai One on One
R4
Bappeda Riau, Head of Division of Planning, Control and
Evaluation of Regional Development Planning Pekanbaru Focus Group Discussion
R5
Bappeda North Sumatra, Head of Subdivision of Maritime and
Natural Resources Medan One on One
R6 Bappenas, Energy Planning Specialist Jakarta One on One
R7 BPDPKS,  Head of Financial Division Jakarta One on One
R8 DEN, Board Member Jakarta One on One
R9 CIFOR, Researcher Bogor One on One
R10 Dinas ESDM Riau, Head of Renewable Energy Division Pekanbaru One on One
R11
Dinas ESDM Riau, Head of Section in Renewable Energy
Division Pekanbaru One on One
R12
PPSDM North Sumatra, Staff Member in Renewable Energy
Division Medan One on One
R13
PPSDM North Sumatra, Head of Section in Renewable Energy
Division Medan One on One
R14
Directorate of Bioenergy, Directorate General of New and
Renewable Energy,  MEMR Jakarta Focus Group Discussion
R15 Executive Chairman of GAPKI Jakarta One on One
R16
Director of Yearly Crops and Fresher, Directorate General of
Plantations, Ministry of Agriculture Jakarta One on One
R17
Head of Division in Directorate of Climate Change Mitigation,
MEF Jakarta One on One
R18 Former Head of Environmental Office of Dumai One on One
R19 Pertamina, Researcher Jakarta One on One
R20 Pertamina, Staff Member in Supply and Distribution Jakarta Email
R21
Cipta Elang Perkasa (Private Palm Oil Company), Public
Relations/Affairs Officer Dumai Phone/email
R22 PTPN IV (State Owned Palm Plantation Company), Supervisor Sei Mangke One on One
R23 University of Gadjah Mada, Deputy of Centre for Energy Studies
Yogyakarta One on One
R24 Ministry of Finance, Head of Section Jakarta One on One
Source: Author produced
Table 3.5
Summary of Interview Respondents
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3.4.1. Interviews with the elites 
Although my personal experience gave me an advantage as regards identifying 
relevant interviewees, interviewing them was undoubtedly the hardest part of the 
data collection in this research. I did not have prior experience of doing interviews, 
particularly interviews involving a mode of conversation between two persons with 
certain purposes (Eyles, 1988; Marshall and Rossman, 2003). Moreover, I view most 
of my respondents as ‘elites’ since they hold positions of power and authority in 
government bodies and companies (Herod, 1999). Thus, interviewing them is 
different in nature to interviewing ordinary people, since they have power to control 
the way the research is conducted - for example they may refuse to be recorded, or 
suddenly cancel the appointment (Valentine, 2005; Mikecz, 2012).  
Most of the respondents are categorized as elites and they can sometimes be 
especially sensitive when discussing information that can cause them discomfort. 
For example, such sensitivity was obvious when I wanted to clarify the statement 
from one respondent who mentioned that land used change was necessary for the 
expansion of palm oil plantations. Since this respondent was a representative of a 
palm oil company, he was irritated when I tried to connect his statement with the 
deforestation associated with palm oil expansion. Thus, to calm the situation, I 
immediately nodded and agreed with his statement and moved on to the next 
question. Another respondent asked me to turn off the recording device. He 
explained that the relationship between the biodiesel industry and palm oil industry 
involved sensitive information that he wanted to share with me, but he refused to be 
quoted. Hence, an uncomfortable situation may occur if a question is too critical or 
the information too sensitive for the respondent. 
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However, I experienced a contrasting situation when I undertook interviews with 
government officials - a critical question would often result in constructive outcomes 
instead of discomfort. This is evident in that some of the government respondents 
clearly stated that I could use all information being recorded, since this research 
could potentially benefit the Indonesian government in formulating its future biofuel 
policy. Some of these respondents even stated that the public should be aware of 
the politics concerning biofuels. Although I found that government respondents were 
usually more open to questions than private stakeholders, they were middle ranking 
officials whilst respondents from private companies were generally the head of an 
association or the business. In this context, the former do not have the authority for 
policy making unlike the latter. Thus, it is also important to understand the position of 
the respondent prior to the interview as this can affect the information it is possible to 
glean (Mikecz, 2012).     
In conducting the interviews, I applied a semi-structured technique. I had a series of 
questions for respondents that included mainly open-ended questions so they could 
speak freely and reflect on their own experiences (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). In this 
way, I could achieve valuable insights from talking with the respondents and many 
important themes emerged during the analysis. I also found that certain respondents 
could provide very interesting information without pausing and thus without 
prompting on questions that I would have covered later in the interview. This is 
common in open-ended research interviewing and it was advantageous in many 
senses as it allowed for a flowing conversation and less formal interview process. 
However, it also created challenges, as I sometimes lost track of what questions had 
and had not been answered. Thus, memorizing key questions was a preferable 
solution alongside accessing the question sheet during the interview. This allowed 
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me to retain an element of control within the interview process and keep the 
interview on track and on topic. 
There are a few other difficulties that emerged when interviewing the elites that can 
be categorized as ranging from minor to major. Minor problems included holding the 
interview in a noisy environment, as well as sudden cancellation of a scheduled 
interview. These minor problems were manageable and anticipated (Kezar, 2003; 
Mikecz, 2012). However, there were still challenges in overcoming some minor 
problems such as when a respondent wanted to have an interview in a crowded 
restaurant during lunch time. The dominant sound recorded was sometimes the 
surrounding noise rather than the respondent’s voice and then the only solution was 
to invest more time in transcribing the recorded interview.  
Other challenges that I categorise as ‘major’ related to lack of any notification for a 
cancelled interview. For example, in a scheduled interview with a high-level official 
from a notable university in Indonesia. I knew the respondent personally which gave 
a sense of familiarity when I contacted this person directly. However, when I arrived 
at the respondent’s office in Yogyakarta  - a one hour flight from my home base in 
Jakarta - the respondent had disappeared without prior notification either through 
email, short text message, or phone call. Although I am aware that respondents have 
the right to decline an interview, I also learned that as a researcher I should prepare 
myself emotionally since a respondent can at any time refuse an interview, even just 
a minute before it commences (Farber, 2006; Mikolajczak et al., 2007). The 
mitigation for this problem is to keep emotionally calm and hide any disappointment 
while trying to find an alternative respondent (Hochschild, 1983). 
 
86 
 
3.4.2. Gaining Access to Respondents  
Failing to meet a respondent is problematic, yet it is sometimes unavoidable as 
previously discussed. However, I realize that my failure to meet a respondent might 
relate to the fact that I somehow ignored the important role of a gatekeeper. 
According to Farber (2006) the gatekeeper is the person who will decide if we can 
reach a respondent or not. Thus, the gatekeeper role cannot be overlooked as 
gatekeepers may have the required influence to connect a respondent with a 
researcher (Seidman, 2013). In terms of interviewing elites in Indonesia, I found that 
it is important to identify the gatekeeper and the closeness of his/her relationship 
with the respondent. In this research, gatekeepers are classified into two types: Type 
1 - gatekeeper is important; and Type 2 - gatekeeper is less important.  
The type 1 gatekeeper is usually the respondent’s secretary or personal assistant. 
During this research, I found that a secretary/personal assistant is close to the 
respondent and his/her daily activity is often associated with the respondent’s daily 
activity. This gatekeeper knows the respondent’s whereabouts, activities, business 
engagements and most importantly any free time. This is important as my position as 
an interviewer is considered insignificant within the respondent’s tight schedule 
(Kezar, 2003). Thus, the interview can only happen if it is scheduled within the 
respondent’s timetable/diary.  
The type 2 gatekeeper can include the colleagues, friends and families of the 
respondent. These people often have the closest personal ties with the respondent, 
such as family members. However, they may not know about the respondent’s daily 
activities and diary schedule, but can provide the respondent’s contact details such 
as an email address or personal phone number. However, I found that contacting a 
respondent directly usually culminated in failure as the respondent may not even 
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reply to my email. Even in cases where respondents replied to my contact and were 
aware of my intention to conduct an interview, it sometimes resulted in their sudden 
lack of availability as in the case of the interviewee discussed above who I contacted 
on a personal (as opposed to professional) basis.   
Since the type 1 gatekeeper is the closest person within the working life of the 
respondent, this is also the person who knows whether the respondent is willing to 
be interviewed. Although, such gatekeepers do not usually have the power to 
influence the respondent’s decision to accept an interview with me, having their 
support is essential since I can ask them about the respondent’s schedule to 
increase the likelihood of an available interview slot (Berg, 1999). I soon realised the 
need to have a flexible schedule to accommodate the respondent’s limited 
availability (Kezar, 2003). However, the gatekeeper can also choose to exert power 
over me by restricting my access to the respondent (Sixsmith et al., 2003). Thus, 
they may be approachable in the beginning, but after a second or third contact, they 
may just ignore my emails, text messages, or phone calls. This was problematic 
since I had no way of knowing who does not want to meet me; it could be the 
respondent, or perhaps the gatekeeper who has failed to schedule a meeting slot.  
3.4.3. The Respondents 
Understanding the gatekeeper role is also related to understanding the respondent, 
as not all respondents have a gatekeeper. Based on the 24 respondents in Table 
3.5, I categorize them into three types based on their occupation (see Table 3.6)   
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Government Officials 
Although Indonesia’s biofuel policy is formulated at national level, interviews with 
regional government officials are necessary to understand their points of view 
Bappeda Dumai Infrastructure Section
Bappeda Dumai Development Planning Section
Bappeda Riau, Head of Division of Planning, Control and Evaluation of Regional Development Planning 
Bappeda North Sumatra, Head of Subdivision of Maritime and Natural Resources
Bappenas, Energy Planning Specialist
BPDPKS,  Head of Financial Division
Dinas ESDM Riau, Head of Renewable Energy Division
Dinas ESDM Riau, Head of Section in Renewable Energy Division
PPSDM North Sumatra, Staff Member in Renewable Energy Division 
PPSDM North Sumatra, Head of Section in Renewable Energy Division 
Directorate of Bioenergy, Director General of New and Renewable Energy,  MEMR
Directorate of Plantations, Ministry of Agriculture, Director of Yearly Crops and Fresher
Head of Division in Directorate of Climate Change Mitigation, MEF
Former Head of Environmental Office of Dumai
Ministry of Finance, Head of Section
Head of Aprobi
Executive Chairman of GAPKI
Pertamina, Researcher 
Pertamina, Staff Member from Supply and Distribution 
Cipta Elang Perkasa (Private Palm Oil Company), Public Relations/Affairs Officer
PTPN IV (State Owned Palm Plantation Company), Supervisor
DEN, Board Member
University of Gadjah Mada, Deputy of Centre for Energy Studies
CIFOR, Researcher
Source: Author produced
Table 3.6
Respondents' Occupations 
1.   Government Officials
2.   Private Stakeholders
3.   NGO, Academics and Others
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regarding biofuel policies. It is also relevant to understand their perspectives on how 
the policy should be implemented. Yet, I did not distinguish government respondents 
based on a scale from national to regional level since I only aimed to interview 
middle ranking officials. All government tiers in Indonesia are structured in at least 
four echelons where the first echelon is the highest in the hierarchy. The reasons for 
selecting the middle ranking echelon as research respondents are detailed below. 
The first factor in selecting middle ranking officials concerns being able to find 
respondents with availability for an interview. Based on my professional experience 
working as a central government official in Indonesia for more than a decade, it is 
highly unlikely that a PhD researcher would be able to obtain a face-to-face interview 
with officials from the first and second echelons of the ministries. They are very busy 
people with full agendas and usually delegate interview requests to their 
subordinates in either the third or fourth echelons. Interviews for research purposes, 
mass media coverage (except for official press conferences) and even interviews 
with international agencies, are undertaken by officials in the third and fourth 
echelons after they have received consent from at least the second echelon within 
the respective ministries. 
Secondly, middle ranking officials are the most likely to have insightful information as 
they usually know the detail of policies, such as constraints in executing policies 
based on the reality ‘on the ground’. In addition, interviews with people from the 
middle echelons offer a realistic possibility of receiving a genuine answer, instead of 
a ‘normative’ one providing there is trust between the researcher and respondent 
(Mikecz, 2012). Moreover, having a personal connection with the respondent, such 
as being a former colleague, increases the likelihood of obtaining information that is 
not published in the media. Despite not being published, the information provided is 
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not considered to be classified, since permission has already been received from the 
respondent.   
However, even without any friends or colleagues within a respondent’s office, I found 
that contacting a high level official, in the first or second echelon, was much easier 
than I assumed. Initially, I needed to send an official letter by email explaining the 
research purpose and how the interviews would be conducted with respective 
government officials. This was followed up promptly with phone calls to the 
respective institution when I would talk to the relevant gatekeeper. In this context, the 
gatekeeper was usually the secretary of the first or second echelon officials when 
their contact numbers were available on the respective ministry websites. In the 
phone call I introduced myself and reminded the gatekeeper that I did not suddenly 
make contact and ask for an interview (as I had previously emailed). I politely 
asserted my intention and developed trust with the gatekeeper and subsequently the 
superior official (Kezar, 2003). I found that this method of approaching elite 
government officials was the most effective way of obtaining an interview – and I had 
a 100% success rate. Moreover, if the respective official was unable to meet for an 
interview, the official usually assigned his/her subordinate instead.  
Approaching provincial and municipal/district government officials is different to 
approaching their central government counterparts. In this context, a direct approach 
supplemented by a permit letter from the regional government issuing authority is 
usually sufficient to establish contact with a respondent. Moreover, having a personal 
contact number for a local government official at any level is recommended. I used 
my friend within the university alumni network and he gave me the personal numbers 
of local government officials whom he knew could assist me during the field 
research. Using these contact numbers, I managed to gain access to and conduct 
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interviews with provincial and municipal government officials without having to go via 
gatekeepers. 
Private Stakeholders    
Gaining access to private stakeholders proved more difficult than accessing 
government officials. This was partly because I did not have contact with anyone 
from the relevant private companies. Moreover, these respondents did not have their 
names and office phone numbers on websites - in contrast to government officials. 
This created difficulties for me in identifying the relevant gatekeepers to approach 
and in establishing contact with respondents. To solve this problem, I applied a 
snowballing method which is a method of approaching a potential respondent by 
asking the current respondent who that person is or how to get in touch with that 
person (Noy, 2007; Becker 1953). Thus, I asked the government officials who I was 
interviewing about contacts within any biodiesel, palm oil and fossil fuel companies. 
This method was effective in terms of making gatekeeper contact and then through 
the gatekeepers I was able to interview the Head of APROBI (Assosiasi Produsen 
Biofuel Indonesia/Indonesia’s biofuel producer association) and the Head of GAPKI 
(Gabungan Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit Indonesia/ Indonesia’s palm oil association). 
However, this method did not always guarantee success in interviewing 
respondents, as there remained challenges in gaining the trust of respondents via 
their gatekeepers (Kezar, 2003; Mikecz, 2012).  
Qualitative researchers (e.g. Zuckerman, 1972; McDowell, 1998; Welch et al., 2002; 
Okumus et al., 2007) argue the importance of the researcher’s ability to present 
him/herself to the respondent in a way that allows them to quickly assess the 
researcher’s credentials, affiliation, eligibility and even credibility before replying to 
the initial contact. Since this research is focused on biofuel policy and politics, I was 
92 
 
promptly acknowledged by the gatekeeper for the Head of APROBI who replied to 
my message and arranged an interview. A minor problem emerged when I contacted 
the gatekeeper for the Head of GAPKI, as the gatekeeper ostensibly suggested that 
the Head of GAPKI was not a suitable respondent for the research. Thus, I had to 
use my verbal communication skills over the phone to explain the relevance of the 
respondent to the research. I also sent my credentials to the gatekeeper by email 
which eventually resolved the problem. 
Nevertheless, there were also failures in arranging interviews, particularly with 
private biodiesel companies and fossil fuel businesses. To make contact with a 
private biodiesel company, I applied the snowballing method using my other 
respondents to recommend a relevant company which they viewed as approachable 
and suitable for interview. Then, I contacted the company via the gatekeeper. 
However, the intended interview culminated in failure as the gatekeeper did not reply 
to any of my attempts at communication.  
Another failure occurred when I attempted to obtain an interview with a fossil fuel 
company – Pertamina - which has a significant role in biofuel policy implementation 
(as discussed in detail in Chapter 6). The company refused to accept my credentials 
stating that the University of Exeter should send the credential documents and they 
should be signed by at least the head of the school or department. This proved 
problematic since I only had one set of research credentials for approaching 
respondents. I interpreted the difficult and awkward terms and conditions imposed by 
the elites in Pertamina as a sign of their refusal to be interviewed. 
Although I failed to conduct an interview with a middle ranking official at Pertamina in 
its Jakarta headquarters, I made a second attempt in Dumai where Pertamina has a 
regional office. I managed to establish contact with someone from Pertamina due to 
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a link between one of my local informants and a middle ranking employee at 
Pertamina’s branch office in Dumai. However, this attempt also resulted in 
disappointment as the official was uncooperative and stated that I should contact the 
company’s headquarters in Jakarta (which had already refused an interview). 
At this point, I realized that I had failed to gain the trust of some potential 
respondents. Although the reason for rejection is still unclear, I believe that the 
research focus might be a contributing factor. Potential respondents may view this 
research as critical of their enterprises and thus they are hesitant to speak to me 
(Mikecz, 2012). I also learned that a gatekeeper is not necessarily a secretary as 
with the government officials; gatekeepers for these private stakeholders can hold 
any position from a personal assistant to a manager. Thus, they may be in a position 
of seniority whereby they can refuse any research which they think is not in the 
interest of their company (Sixsmith, 2003; Mikecz, 2012). 
Interviewing private elite stakeholders in this research is not only about gaining 
access and establishing trust with the gatekeeper, but also about finding the right 
informant. During the field research in Dumai, I discovered that my informant had 
personal connections with some managers in the companies operating in the city 
including Pertamina and some biofuel companies. Thus, he used his personal 
network to contact relevant people who could be potential respondents. Despite 
being unable to obtain an interview with middle officials in Pertamina, he managed to 
arrange an interview for me with a manager from Cipta Elang Perkasa Ltd, a biofuel 
company. Unfortunately, I was running out of time to conduct the field research and 
as such I had to be content with obtaining a written response in the formed of email 
instead of undertaking an in-depth interview (Burns, 2010).   
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Although I experienced a few setbacks with officials from Pertamina, I still managed 
to gain information from this other company official. However, the official was not 
particularly knowledgeable about biofuel politics in Indonesia since his role was not 
directly related to biofuel policy implementation. However, I accepted the information 
provided as it was readily available to me. I was again cognisant of the challenge of 
interviewing elites who can decide what answers to provide and what information 
they are willing to share with the researcher (Kezar, 2003). 
NGO, Academics and Others 
Conducting interviews with respondents from NGOs and academics can be tricky if 
they exhibit features similar to the private stakeholders discussed above. Many of 
these respondents hold more than one position. For instance, the R8 respondent is a 
member of DEN (Dewan Energi Nasional/National Energy Board) and also an 
academic in a private university in Jakarta, as well as having ties with an NGO. 
Conversely, the R9 respondent is a full-time researcher in CIFOR and does not have 
another position elsewhere. Thus, the role of gatekeeper is significant for the former, 
but insignificant for the latter. 
 
To summarise, the problems of gaining access and earning trust vary between each 
respondent and are even different from one research study to another in terms of the 
way to approach a respondent (Mikecz, 2012; Battacherjee, 2012; Tomei, 2014). I 
learnt from this research experience that government elites tend to be much easier 
to approach - with or without having to go through a gatekeeper. This may relate to 
my experience as a government official prior to conducting the research. Moreover, 
the higher the elite’s position in the organizational structure the more likely that the 
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gatekeeper will have a significant role which should neither be ignored nor bypassed. 
However, the most important aspect I learnt when gaining access to respondents 
was the significance of reflection after the interview (Mikecz, 2012). Thus, instead of 
regretting a failed interview attempt, I determined that it is better to evaluate and 
understand what contributed to the failure and modify the next interview schedule 
accordingly.   
3.4.4. The Interview Process 
For the purpose of the interview, I used a semi structured format with open-ended 
questions since it gave flexibility for the respondent to answer the questions based 
on their own experience (Kitchin and Tate, 2000; Battacherjee, 2012). There were 
approximately 10 questions for each respondent and each type of respondent 
received somewhat different questions based on their role and expertise (Appendix 
4). The respondents were generally content to be recorded during the interview and 
not overtly bothered by the recording device.  
Despite the different questions for each type of respondent, the first question was 
always the same - it asked about the respondent’s role in delivering or implementing 
the biofuel policy. After conducting several interviews, I realized that the first 
question also allowed the respondent to explain his/her experience of the biofuel 
policy, which unexpectedly answered other questions that would otherwise have 
been covered later in the interview. In this context, giving the respondent a 
straightforward starting question served to help establish trust with the interviewer 
(Farber, 2006). As a native Indonesian, I understand that a conversation between 
colleagues can often cover a variety of issues. This is similar to the interview 
experience where after the first question, most respondents just talk freely and new 
relevant information can be extracted with greater ease. The open ended nature of 
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the interview led to different lengths of interview for each respondent - ranging from 
40 minutes to 120 minutes. Those who possessed most knowledge about the biofuel 
policy and politics also tended to talk the most.     
Having the respondent talk continuously can also be counterproductive as their 
discussion can sometimes move off topic, which prolongs the interview but with 
irrelevant information being extracted. Again, my understanding of Indonesian 
culture and convention proved important as I was aware that cutting off someone’s 
discussion can be considered rude, so I chose to navigate the discussion by 
introducing interview questions linked to the issue currently being discussed and 
thus aimed to steer the interview back to the relevant topic. Occasionally, the 
respondent would keep talking and drifting away from the topic and it was difficult to 
navigate back to the interview questions. In this context, it was appropriate to halt the 
discussion and assert my position as the interviewer. In summary, I would allow 
respondents to talk off topic, but only for a limited time which proved acceptable to 
them and me. 
There were also circumstances where I had to prepare for the unexpected during an 
interview. For example, one of the respondents, due to his limited time to meet with 
me, had requested a change in interview venue that was desirable for him but 
undesirable for me. The interview location was moved to a restaurant during lunch 
time and the restaurant was very crowded. The loud noise from other restaurant 
guests caused difficulties with staying focused on the topic and also led to a poor 
recording of the discussion which was difficult to transcribe.  
Another example of an unexpected interview circumstance related to a change of 
interview mode. I designed the interview as a one-to-one discussion, yet there were 
a few interviews that unexpectedly became focus group discussions. The style 
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changed from one-to-one interviews into a discussion with several elites at the same 
time and in the same location. This situation arose a few times particularly with 
government stakeholders (see Table 3.3) where the respondent was a middle level 
government official and the respective official would command his/her subordinate to 
attend the meeting with me. Although such a condition could be advantageous as I 
could potentially obtain more information from two respondents, it also created 
difficulties for me particularly regarding who said what in the discussion. Moreover, I 
found it difficult if the one-to-one interview suddenly changed into a group 
discussion, because I struggled to ensure my participants stayed on topic.  
Despite being a native Indonesian, I also encountered a problem with the 
respondents’ language particularly if respondents stated a simple phrase. For 
example, many of my respondents said the phrase “...kan gitu.”, which is directly 
translated as “…this.” This phrase, although it appears simplistic, proved 
problematic. The phrase is a common expression that can indicate an important 
matter, but the person who says it may consider it is something that everybody 
knows, so there is no need to state it explicitly. This was a particular problem when I 
was not aware that the respondent mentioned the phrase during the interview, but 
noticed it during the transcription process. The phrase may be important, but it 
requires extra effort to ‘decode’ it. In this case, reflection from my personal 
experience was very useful to help ‘decipher’ the implicit meaning of the respondent. 
I will discuss this further in the section 3.6.  
3.5. The Field Study 
The final element of my research methodology involved field site observations at 
biodiesel companies, which I undertook when visiting to conduct interviews. The 
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visits were important as they helped develop my understanding (from my field notes 
and research diary) of the efficiency of the biodiesel industry when it joined with the 
palm oil industry (Newbury, 2001). I conducted field observation by seeing each site 
personally and observing the building and its surrounding environment to understand 
its function followed by note taking after returning to my accommodation (Mulhall, 
2002). Observations were undertaken in both Dumai City and Sei Mangke as these 
areas have an industrial zone controlled by the palm oil industry. I will explain my 
observation results in detail for Dumai City since I was able to make a direct 
comparison between two industrial zones, one controlled by a palm oil company and 
the other by local government   
I conducted my observation for seven days in Dumai which I considered would be 
sufficient for this purpose. However, commuting in this city turned out to be 
unpleasant since there was no reliable public transportation system with the locals 
preferring to use a private car as a means of commuting. This proved a major 
challenge for me since I had never visited Dumai before and did not know the area. 
Fortunately, I had a good contact in this city who worked as a Dumai municipal 
government official. My contact person, named Boby as a pseudonym, was a very 
resourceful person and he helped me during the field study by taking me around 
Dumai in his car and he showed me all the places that I wanted to see in this city, 
particularly the industrial zone. He also introduced me to his acquaintance, Pak Agus 
(a pseudonym), who used to be the Head of the Dumai Environmental Office. Being 
a (former) Head meant Pak Agus knew many prominent people within the industries 
that conducted their operations in Dumai which was helpful for my research (despite 
a few set-backs as discussed above). Although my informant’s role was limited to 
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acting only as a guide and liaison, it was very important to me as it helped me to 
muster data from the field observation (Mulhall, 1993 as found in Mulhall, 2002). 
Dumai is a port city where some of the coastal area is privately owned by either oil 
companies such as Pertamina and Chevron, or palm oil companies such as Wilmar. 
These companies own the coastal area with the purpose of establishing their own 
harbour and thus independently conducting export and import activity for the 
extracted goods such as oil, gas and crude palm oil (CPO). There are many palm oil 
industries operating in Dumai including the largest palm oil company in Indonesia, 
Wilmar. Interestingly, I could not find any biodiesel factory which stood independently 
in the city - my observations concluded that all biodiesel companies are inside palm 
oil industrial complexes. These complexes are located inside industrial zones in 
Dumai city, Pelintung and Lubuk Gaung.  
The Pelintung industrial zone (IZ) is located in the south east of Dumai. This IZ is 
owned solely by the Wilmar Group and only companies related to Wilmar can 
operate in this zone. Thus, the IZ is clear of any activity conducted by locals, since 
Wilmar bought the whole area to facilitate the establishment of the zone. Although 
this IZ has a security check point at its main entrance, the locals can go in and out of 
the zone freely. The purpose of the check point is not to scrutinize anyone who 
wants to enter the zone, but to check those who want to exit to prevent theft. My 
informant confirmed that the whole Pelintung area is accessible except for entrance 
to individual facilities inside the zone. 
Conversely, there is a stark difference between Pelintung IZ and Lubuk Gaung IZ. 
Lubuk Gaung IZ is located in the north west of Dumai and it is a more newly 
established zone than Pelintung IZ. It is used by many different companies, mostly 
those related to palm oil. Despite its status as an industrial zone, it is disorganised 
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with palm oil factories scattered between the houses owned by locals. My purpose in 
visiting Lubuk Gaung IZ besides observation was because my informant had a link 
with the general manager of Cipta Elang Perkasa Ltd. - a biodiesel company. There 
is a difference in the way the two industrial zones are managed - Pelintung is 
privately managed, whilst Lubuk Gaung is managed by the regional government. 
However, a similarity is that the palm oil industry is established within an industrial 
complex rather than as a ‘stand-alone’ individual factory. This will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5 (which considers the factors that contribute to the advantages of 
the biodiesel industry using palm oil as feedstock) and Chapter 7 (which considers 
the industrial advantages of an agro-fuel alliance between the palm oil and biodiesel 
industries).   
The third IZ visited, Sei Mangke, has totally different features to the other two IZ. 
This IZ is jointly owned by PTPN (Nusantara Plantation Ltd) III and PTPN IV - both 
are state owned palm plantation companies. Unlike Dumai City which is 
geographically close to the sea, Sei Mangke is located further inland and thus it does 
not have sea access (Picture 3.2). This means the IZ does not have a harbour that 
can serve the factories inside the zone. Thus, there is a stark difference in terms of 
the IZ facilities particularly between those with private palm oil companies operating 
in the area such as Pelintung and Lubuk Gaung and those with state owned palm oil 
companies such as Sei Mangke.     
 
3.6. Data Analysis and Writing Process 
This section explains the data analysis in this thesis and the writing process. 
Analysing qualitative data was the most arduous process in this research because it 
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is a dynamic process which requires intuition, creative thinking and inductive 
reasoning (Basit, 2003). The research employs an abductive analysis as it examines 
biofuel politics by utilizing a variety of data including interview and policy documents. 
Abductive analysis is a creative process for producing a new hypothesis or theory 
based on ‘surprising’ evidence (Peirce, 1931 as found in Timmermans and Tavory, 
2012). This analytical method allows a researcher to use multiple sources of data, 
including his/her own perception, to test the existing theoretical framework and 
enhance current knowledge of the theory (Dubois and Gadde, 2002).  
An abductive analysis to study Indonesia’s biofuel politics requires complex data 
sources as discussed above and the sources are given the same level of importance 
in this research. Using a variety of data allows the researcher to reveal aspects that 
have contributed to biofuel politics but have been neglected in previous research 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002). The research findings are more likely to be accurate and 
convincing if they use multiple types of data instead of just focusing on one data type 
whilst treating other data as secondary sources (Yin, 1994). Another important 
aspect of this analysis is to combine the data and interpret it as a whole to elicit a 
cohesive and solid research answer - and this process began at the transcription and 
translation stage.    
3.6.1. Transcription and Translation Process 
The interviews provided a large data set and unlike the other textual sources needed 
to be processed prior to analysis. I found the transcription a challenging task. The 
challenge involved interpreting what the respondent stated in parts of each 
recording. Indonesians often use simple phrases to explain something whilst 
assuming that everyone will understand what the simple phrases mean. Working as 
a government employee provided tacit knowledge and thus I used my intuition to 
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understand the meaning of phrases (Polanyi, 1962). Understandably, this could 
create bias from my own position as the researcher since the real meaning of the 
phrase might be different to my interpretation. Dey (2003) argues that there is no 
uniform method for qualitative analysis where the researcher can utilise all the data 
obtained in an attempt to answer the research question. Based on his argument, 
utilizing creative thinking and textual data such as government policy documents and 
media interviews is also a valid method to confirm my intuition which reduces the 
likelihood of bias in my interpretation (Polanyi, 1962; Yin, 1994). 
The transcription process is also an arduous activity because it takes at least three 
times longer than the original recording to do the transcription. This requires stamina 
and perseverance as most of the interviews are at least 60 minutes in length. Thus, 
utilization of devices, such as a foot pedal, for transcription increased the efficiency 
of transcribing by significantly reducing the time needed to transcribe one interview.     
Being a native Indonesian also gives me an advantage as I did not need to translate 
all of the data into the research language, English. This also increased my efficiency 
analysing the data, since most of the data collected is in my native Indonesian 
language.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that translation is unnecessary since 
quotations from the data were needed to support and evidence my arguments and 
these quotations had to be translated into English. This influenced my decision to 
translate only the quotations shown in the empirical chapters to save time and 
resources. 
The Indonesian language is a relatively simple language where one uses relevant 
vocabulary to explain something without having to pay attention to structure and 
complicated tenses. This makes the language easy to learn but complicated to 
translate properly. As a native Indonesian, I also understand that it is a common 
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practice for a person to speak using a simple phrase (as discussed) above and talk 
without getting straight to the point. Thus, using a translation programme, whilst 
being helpful in terms of finding the vocabulary for a translated word, is problematic 
as direct translation of the manuscript to English can potentially make the translation 
unreadable for native English readers. To avoid the ‘lost in translation’ problem, 
during the translation process I used my intuition (Polanyi, 1962) to refine what the 
respondent had stated and ensure the broader meaning was communicated, rather 
than focusing on a verbatim translation .  
Table 3.7 
Sample of Interview Translation Process  
 
  Original manuscript in Indonesian Language: 
“Gak masuk akal kalau mencapai 30 juta ton karena produktivitas nasional antara 
3.5- 4 ton CPO per hektar kalau Malaysia sudah menuju 4-5 ton per hektar. Tapi 
kalau melihat angka-angka kebun BUMN sudah mencapai angka 5 ton tapi kebun 
rakyat paling Cuma 2-3 ton per hektar” 
  First direct translation to English using translation programme: 
“It doesn't make sense to reach 30 million tons because the national productivity is 
between 3.5 to 4 tons of CPO per hectare if Malaysia is already headed for 4-5 
tons per hectare. But if you look at the BUMN garden figures, it has reached 5 
tons, but people's gardens are only 2-3 tons per hectare”    
  Refined English translation for quotation purposes: 
“Companies can earn yields up to 5 tons/hectare while smallholders provide just 
2-3 tons/hectare”  
Source: Author Produced 
  
Table 3.7 provides an example of the translation process necessary to ensure that a 
respondent’s statement becomes meaningful. In the first translation stage, I utilize an 
online translation programme which results in information which is difficult to discern 
as some words are confusing and to some extent the translation does not make 
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sense. This shows that using personal knowledge to refine the translation is not only 
important, but also necessary to ensure the translation is legible and meaningful 
(Dey, 2003).  
3.6.2. Coding Process 
Transcribing the interview data is essentially converting it from non-textual data into 
textual data. This makes the process of categorizing data much easier, particularly 
when grouping the recurrent themes - also known as the coding process 
(Battarcherjee, 2012). I utilized NVivo software, which is commonly used for coding 
qualitative data (Basit, 2003). However, during the coding process, I also used other 
software such as MS Excel to construct my codes before moving it into NVivo, as I 
am more familiar with using MS Excel than NVivo.  
For the coding process in this research I followed an approach broadly aligned with 
grounded theory analysis (GTA) (Urquhart, 2017). This method was first developed 
by Glasser and Straus (1967) and they describe it as the discovery of theory 
grounded in data. In this context, GTA relies primarily on transcribed scripts from 
interviews/speeches where a theory will emerge that will either complement or 
challenge the theory existing in the wider literature (Charmaz, 2006; Urquhart, 2017). 
Thus, the coding process aims to extract emerging themes based on the information 
revealed by the respondent (Charmaz, 2006), rather than looking for themes derived 
from existing theory.   
I conducted two stages of coding. The first stage of coding was open coding to 
scrutinize line by line the transcription to obtain the meaning behind the respondents’ 
statements (Charmaz, 2006) (Appendix 2). After finishing the open coding, the 
codes were reclassified into selective codes or analytical codes as a means of 
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regrouping the open code into wider themes. During the second stage of coding, the 
selective codes were reclassified into seven themes (Appendix 3). These themes 
were categorized based on my intuition of what classifications were suitable from the 
smaller themes emerging from the respondents’ statements (Urquhart, 2017).  
I conducted an abductive analysis that used strands from GTA particularly when 
coding the interview data. In this context, the coding process is only part of the 
overall analytical process (Figure 3.1). To ensure the rigour of the thematic interview 
coding, I combined the emerging themes systematically with other data sources such 
as policy documents, government reports and media interviews (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002). This systematic combining of themes was guided by the research question 
being explored in the research.  
 
This is where the analysis became more complicated as I started to match the 
themes emerging during the coding process with other data sources – always guided 
by the research questions. The process is often repeated and iterative as I needed to 
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return to the interview data to confirm the findings from other data sources and vice 
versa. Moreover, since the analysis was guided by the research questions, some of 
themes emerging proved irrelevant and thus I decided to keep an archive for 
potential future research.  
The other textual data such as policy documents and so on, did not need to be 
coded in the same manner as the interview data. It was much easier to find the parts 
relating to the theme of discussion in the documentary data which made detailed 
coding unnecessary. Nonetheless, analysing textual data particularly policy 
documents also requires an in-depth understanding of the wording. Indonesia’s 
policy documents often comprise many articles and clauses that merely refer to other 
articles and clauses in the same document (see Table 3.8). This meant that reading 
the policy documents required careful attention to avoid misinterpretation of the 
policy. Table 3.8 shows an example of a policy document analysis where the 
process of quoting from a part of the policy requires a thorough reading of nearly the 
whole document. Almost every article links to another previous article and I need to 
create a quotation that resembles what the policy entails in a succinct and 
straightforward way 
Table 3.8 
Sample of Policy Document Translation Process 
 
  Original manuscript in Indonesian language: 
Pasal 3 
 
(1) Untuk meningkatkan pemanfaatan Bahan Bakar Lain dalam rangka ketahanan 
energi nasional sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 2, Badan Usaha Pemegang 
lzin Usaha Niaga Bahan Bakar Minyak dan Pengguna Langsung Bahan Bakar 
minyak wajibmenggunakan Rahan Bakar Nabati (Biofuel) sebagai Bahan Bakar 
Lain secara bertahap. 
(2) Pentahapan kewajiban penggunaan Bahan Bakar Nabati (Biofuel) sebagai 
Bahan Bakar Lain sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dilaksanakan sesuai 
dengan ketentuan sebagaimana tercantum dalam Lampiran Peraturan Menteri ini. 
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Pasal 5 
 
Badan Usaha yang melaksanakan Kegiatan Usaha Niaga Bahan Bakar Nabati 
(Biofuel) sebagai Bahan Bakar Lain wajib: 
a. menjamin ketersediaan Bahan Bakar Nabati (Biofuel) sebagai Bahan Bakar Lain 
untuk memenuhi kebutuhan dalam negeri secara berkesinambungan; dan 
b. memanfaatkan dan mengutamakan Bahan Bakar Wabati (Biotuel) dari produksi 
dalam negeri. 
 
Pasal 6 
 
Terhadap Badan Usaha Pemegang ijin Usaha Niaga Bahan Bakar Minyak dan 
Penguna Langsung Bahan Bakar Minyak sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 3 
yang melaksanakan kewajiban pemanfaatan penggunaan Bahan Bakar Nabati 
(Biofuel) sebagai Bahan Bakar Lain secara berkesinambungan dan Badan Usaha 
yang melaksanakan Kegiatan Usaha Niaga Bahan Bakar Nabati (Biofuel) sebagai 
Bahan Bakar Lain sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 5 dapat diberikan insentif 
baik fiskal danlatau non-fiskal sesuai dengan ketentuan peraturan perundang-
undangan. 
  First direct translation to English using translation programme: 
Article 3 
 
“(1) To increase the utilization of Other Fuels in the context of national energy 
security as referred to in Article 2, Business Entities of Oil Fuel Business License 
Holders and Direct Oil Fuel Users must use Biofuel as Fuel  
Others gradually. 
(2) The obligation to use Biofuel as another Fuel as referred to in paragraph (1) 
shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions as contained in the 
Attachment to this Ministerial Regulation. 
 
Article 5 
 
Business entities that carry out Biofuel Business Activities as Other Fuels must: 
a. guarantee the availability of Biofuel as another Fuel to meet domestic needs on 
an ongoing basis; and 
b. utilize and prioritize Biofuel from domestic production. 
 
Article 6 
 
Towards Business Entity Holders of Fuel Business Oil and Direct Oil Fuel Users as 
referred to in Article 3 which carries out the obligation of utilization use of Biofuels 
as Other Fuels on an ongoing basis and the Business Entity that implements it 
Biofuel Business Activities as Materials Other Burns as referred to in Article 5 may 
be granted both fiscal and non-fiscal incentives in accordance with the provisions 
legislation." 
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  Refined English translation for quotation: 
“Fuel companies and direct fuel users, which implemented the mandatory blending 
policy, as well as biofuel companies that supplied biofuel for the former, can all be 
given both fiscal and non-fiscal incentives.” 
(Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources - Regulation Number 32, 2008, Article 6)” 
Source: Author Produced 
 
3.6.3. The Writing Process 
Writing is a means to understand the research findings where the researcher 
includes his/her position within the writing (Richardson, 1998). I found that the 
analytical process continued and became more dynamic as I strived to finish the 
writing of the thesis. Thus, although the writing process was conducted at the end of 
the research, it did not mean that the analytical process had stopped by this stage. In 
fact, both data analysis and thesis writing intersected. Indeed, during the process of 
writing, I often had to reconsider the data analysis and if the argument in the 
discussion needed strengthening I would scrutinize the data again to provide more 
evidence for the argument or provide nuance. 
Moreover, the process of developing the thesis was not sequential with the writing 
conducted in order from the first to the last chapter. Instead, the writing started with a 
review of the literature followed by the empirical chapters with methodology, 
introduction and concluding chapters written at the end. I used this pattern of writing 
as a means to increase my writing efficiency and to sharpen the analysis.   
 
3.7. Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter has explained the methodology and methods used in this research 
study. It has also shown that research is a process as well as a product and it is 
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important for the researcher to reflect on this during the research (England, 1994). 
Conducting qualitative research is not a static process, rather it is a dynamic one that 
requires the researcher to use intuition and creativity to accomplish the research. 
Furthermore, acknowledging the researcher’s position is essential – hence the 
confirmation running through the thesis that I am a native Indonesian and have been 
a government official working within the policy making sphere. There would have 
been a heightened potential for bias in the analysis had I not been reflexive about my 
own positionality. With due attention to these issues, however, I have found my 
background/career experience to be an asset in enhancing my understanding of the 
policies and politics engulfing the biofuel programme in Indonesia. 
In the following chapters, the empirical analysis is the focus. These chapters are 
structured around the research questions (see Table 3.1 above). Chapters 4 and 5 
address questions 1 and 2 respectively, while Chapters 6 and 7 address question 3 
in two parts. The next chapter focuses on the ways that historical policy and wider 
development processes have shaped the current trajectory of Indonesia’s biofuel 
policy.  
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Chapter Four 
The Politics of Crops:  
The Impact of Agrarian Policy on the Biofuel Feedstock Agro-
Industry 
 
This chapter aims to answer the question: how has the longer-term history of 
agrarian development in Indonesia shaped modern day biofuel production? I argue 
that the crops characteristics, together with the agrarian policy implemented by the 
government in the past, has been one of the strongest influences in determining the 
trajectory of the implementation of biofuel policies. Primarily because it underpinned 
the use of biofuel policy as a business expansion opportunity for certain large agro 
companies. The chapter uses the lenses of political ecology and agrarian political 
economy to understand the politics of crops for biofuel feedstock. It focuses on 
examining the dynamic agrarian transformation influenced by colonialism in the 
context of developing countries such as Indonesia. I will focus the analysis on the 
specific crops that the government used in developing domestic biofuel industries – 
these are sugarcane for bioethanol and palm oil for biodiesel. In doing so, I will utilize 
the interview data from field research conducted in 2017 and from secondary 
sources in the form of media interviews, government reports and policy documents, 
as well as working papers and books that focus specifically on Indonesia’s sugar and 
palm oil industries.  
This chapter will be composed of three sections followed by a summary and 
conclusions. The first section analyses the way sugarcane and palm oil were being 
institutionalized under the colonial agrarian policy. The second section analyses the 
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agrarian policies for both sugarcane and palm oil particularly in the period of the 
1970s to 1980s. The agrarian policies in this era are the crucial factors that 
determined the path of industrialization for these crops and eventually shaped the 
conditions for both crops when the government implemented its biofuel policies. This 
section is divided into two subsections explaining the agrarian policies related to 
sugarcane and palm oil respectively. Finally, the third section explains the 
government’s intention in selecting specific crops for its biofuel policies and 
establishes that there is a gap in the wider literature about biofuel policies, 
particularly when combining political ecology and agrarian political economy. The 
chapter concludes by pointing that biofuel industry performance would be largely 
determined by the result of the past agrarian politics which often being overlooked by 
researches on biofuel policy.     
 
4.1. Colonial Policies on Sugarcane and Palm Oil - and the Shaping of 
Understanding about Their Agrarian Characteristics          
Multiple researchers have established the negative implications of colonial 
agricultural policies for many developing countries including land use change, 
environmental degradation, poverty and inefficient agricultural production (Bernstein, 
2010; Bagchi, 2009; Banaji, 2002). By comparison, however, Indonesia had some 
positive outcomes in terms of the colonial development of sugarcane and palm oil, 
particularly with the incorporation of farmers into the production of sugarcane on a 
large scale. Prior to Indonesia’s existence in the 19th century, the Dutch colonial 
government applied a method of growing these revenue crops.   
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The Dutch colonial government developed a sugarcane production method that used 
the native farmers’ land without damaging the environment and whilst maintaining a 
high production yield. Thus, the native farmers could still use their land to plant other 
crops such as rice and vegetables, while the colonial government could increase its 
sugar production2. Moreover, the colonial government also successfully developed 
the palm oil industry through the establishment of large plantations, which made 
Indonesia the largest palm oil producer at that time (Fauzi et al, 2012). However, I 
argue that it was the successes of the colonial policy on sugarcane where farmers 
were able to support a large agro-industry which subsequently influenced Indonesian 
government policy relating to sugarcane and palm oil in the 1970s and 1980s. I then 
argue that the implementation of policies regarding these crops had profound effects 
on biofuel policy implementation decades later. Following insights from agrarian 
political economy, I will show that it is important to understand how colonial policies 
were successful in making sugarcane and palm oil production into booming 
industries in order to be able to contextualise and interpret key elements of the 
contemporary politics of biofuels. 
4.1.1. Sugarcane: The Farmers’ Crop 
The growing demand for sugar in the international market of the 19th century caused 
the Dutch colonial government to industrialize the sugar industry from 1830 onwards, 
by integrating sugarcane plantations owned by native Javanese farmers with sugar 
mills owned by Dutch entrepreneurs under a policy known as the “cultivating system” 
(see also Van Zanden and Marks, 2012; Knight, 1992, 2018). This policy binds the 
native farmers with a 21.5-year lease contract allocating one-third of their land for 
planting sugarcane. Agrarian political economist, Henry Bernstein (2010) argues that 
                                                          
2 During the colonial period, the Java sugar industry was the second largest sugar supplier in the 
world (Knight, 2018) 
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European colonial agrarian policies have caused poverty and famine for native 
farmers without a positive effect on the agricultural production in the colonies. In the 
context of Indonesia, the effect of the “cultivating system” on native Javanese 
farmers was not necessarily different from that in other colonial countries, but the 
policy did successfully increase sugar production in Java Island ten fold by the end 
of the 19th century (Mubyarto, 1969; Knight, 2018). 
The success of the “cultivating system” was related to the way sugarcane was 
planted by the Javanese farmers. Sugarcane is a seasonal crop which takes 
approximately 18 months for one harvest cycle (Mubyarto, 1966). However, the crop 
could be regrown by using the previous season’s stump3, but such a method would 
reduce the sugar content significantly (Knight, 2018). Thus, the first sugarcane 
harvest always yields the highest sugar content and to maintain the high rate of 
production the current plot must be planted with other crops after the harvesting 
season to maintain its fertility (ibid). The “cultivating system” enforced by the Dutch 
colonial government applied this method by requiring one-third of a farmer’s land to 
be planted with sugarcane and after the harvesting season the respective plot could 
be used to plant other crops such as rice or vegetables, while the new sugarcane 
crop was planted on another one-third of the farmer’s land (Mubyarto, 1966). The 
effectiveness of the policy was apparent as it maintained both soil and crop 
productivity and farmers remained the legal owners of their land which reduced the 
need to establish large sugarcane plantations. Moreover, since the land was still 
under their control, farmers could utilize the other two-thirds for planting other crops.  
                                                          
3 This method is called ratooning. 
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However, in reality the sugarcane crop could occupy up to two-thirds of a farmer’s 
land4 and most of the economic benefit went to the private Dutch sugar companies 
(Mubyarto, 1969). Nevertheless, the sugarcane policies imposed by the colonial 
government ensured that farmers and smallholders became the backbone of this 
large and successful industry. So, whilst not the biggest island in Indonesia, its 
production of sugarcane positioned Java as the second largest sugar exporter in the 
world by the beginning of the 20th century (Knight, 2018). Sugarcane cropping, which 
facilitated the rotating of crops within a short growing time, enabled farmers to plant 
sugarcane in their fields on a small scale while maintaining productivity.  
In other countries, such as Brazil, agrarian political economists (e.g. Fernandes et al. 
2010) note the profound effect on farmers of leasing their land to large sugarcane 
plantations, where continuous use of land for planting this crop with use of fertilizers 
degraded the soil quality and meant the farmers were unable to productively use 
their land after the lease period ended. However, the analysis of the Indonesian case 
under colonial government policy reveals a much more positive impact on Java’s 
sugarcane farmers, primarily owing to the different agrarian technique that was 
employed (Knight, 2018). Thus, the Indonesian sugarcane “cultivating system” 
during the colonial period is considered unique in comparison with common practices 
worldwide, where sugarcane is grown continuously on land areas that are either 
owned by sugar plantations or farmers under contract with plantations (Knight, 2018, 
p.9). The analysis of colonial government policy on Java’s sugarcane industry has 
suggested that institutionalizing crop characteristics into the agricultural system, 
particularly the growing method, caused sugarcane productivity to increase and 
                                                          
4 The new sugarcane crop was usually planted in the second one-third plot before the current one-
third plot was harvested, leaving farmers with decreased rice production and at risk of famine.  
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stabilise. This would subsequently influence the Indonesian government’s sugarcane 
policies, as farmers and smallholders were able to supply large industries with 
sufficient yield and with higher efficiency. 
 
4.1.2. Palm Oil: The Dedicated Crop      
Palm oil has a different agrarian policy ‘architecture’ as compared to sugarcane. For 
reasons related, in part, to the nature of the crop, the colonial government 
industrialized this commodity through the establishment of large plantations instead 
of relying on native farming structures and leasing farmers’ land. Palm is a yearly 
crop and it takes three years for the crop to have its first harvest, with an optimal 
harvest achieved after the fifth year and a productivity life span of 25 years (Ma’ruf, 
2018). Ma’ruf (2018) claims that the crop also needs at least 5,000 hectares of land 
area to reach an economy of scale sufficient for palm oil plantations to produce 
crude palm oil (CPO) - which is the principle output of the palm oil industry. This 
means planting palm oil requires considerable effort and capital as maintenance and 
labour costs are inevitable, while streams of revenue will only arise after the third 
year.   
Furthermore, the cost of maintaining palm oil for three years before the first harvest 
could not easily be covered with the income from just one or two harvesting seasons. 
This means that planting palm oil with recognition of the length of crop productivity is 
preferable – and this requires a dedicated area of land to be planted with the crop for 
at least 25 years. As such, it requires a large amount of money in terms of upfront 
costs and loss of the opportunity to plant another crop for at least 25 years. This 
precludes rural farmers from planting palm oil as a revenue crop as they would not 
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get immediate economic benefits due to the long harvesting time, as well as the 
need for dedicated land to optimally benefit from the crop. The cultivation of palm oil 
is therefore only feasible for capital intensive agro industries. For this reason, at the 
beginning of 20th century, the Dutch colonial government established palm oil 
plantations on a large commercial scale instead of implementing similar policies to 
those used with sugarcane.  
They focused on Sumatra Island for palm production as it was less densely 
populated than Java Island making it much easier for the colonial government to 
establish large scale plantations. The plantations being established on Sumatra 
instead of Java Island would influence the industrial performance of palm oil post-
colonialism. This difference in geographical location for palm oil and sugar cane 
production was important for the industries because of events during the Japanese 
invasion and occupation from 1942-1945 followed by the war of independence until 
1949 and domestic political instability (e.g. Islamic state insurgency, the rise of the 
communist party and its attempted coup) until 1967. For the sugar industry, the 
period 1942-1949 had been catastrophic as many sugar mills were burned by the 
Dutch during this period when the Japanese invaded and occupied the island - and 
sugarcane plantations were left unattended or reconverted to rice fields during the 
war of independence against the Dutch and the Allies (Mubyarto, 1969; Wahyuni et 
al, 2009). Conversely, the palm oil industry remained a strong industry as its 
industrial infrastructure remained relatively intact because Sumatra Island was 
largely unaffected by the war, while most of the major conflict happened on Java 
Island. Despite a minor set-back due to the nationalization of palm oil companies 
after the war for independence (Fauzi et al. 2012; Risza, 1994), Indonesia remained 
a dominant palm oil producer.   
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The analysis in this section has built insight into how the material nature of the crops 
themselves has important implications for agrarian techniques i.e. palm oil is a crop 
only suitable for industrial scale plantations, while sugar cane can be highly 
productive for small scale farmers. This, however, is not the only factor in shaping 
production with the particular nature of the Dutch colonial government’s policy on 
sugarcane helping to establish farmers as the backbone of the sugar industry, which 
is not the case elsewhere in the world. Understanding this history of production and 
development, offers insights into subsequent policy developments in the 1970s and 
1980s. Centrally, it is suggested here that the success of the colonial government 
with its sugarcane policy influenced, if not inspired, subsequent Indonesian agrarian 
government policy. In the next section, I turn to focus on the Indonesian 
government’s policy development, showing how it was shaped by these preceding 
events. 
  
4.2. Government Alliances with Farmers: Instigating the Undesirable 
As explained above, between 1942 and 1967 there was a Japanese invasion 
followed by a war for independence and political instability in Indonesia. This caused 
the Java sugar industry to decline but spared the palm oil industry due to its focus on 
Sumatra Island. I will now discuss agrarian policy related to sugarcane and palm oil 
after this crucial period which eventually shaped the implementation of biofuel 
policies in 2006. I will analyse the agrarian policy for each crop separately as each of 
the policies, despite being potentially favourable to indigenous farmers, has created 
a different outcome for the relevant crop and the subsequent biofuel industries.    
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4.2.1. Sugar Commodity Protection Policy: Forging Ineffective Agro-Industry 
During the colonial era, the Dutch government made farmers comply with the 
“cultivating system” policy either willingly or through gentle coercion (see also Van 
Zanden and Marks, 2012; Knight, 1992). The Indonesian government’s agrarian 
policy in the 1950s and 1960s attempted to replicate colonial policy particularly 
regarding the land contract system in order to revive the sugar industry. However, 
the Indonesian government did not have sufficient capacity to enforce the policy as 
the country was still in a period of turmoil following the civil war.  
In this period there was insurgency caused by various groups including the Islamic 
state and the communist party (the latter of which had almost successfully attempted 
a coup). The political instability during this period caused an economic crisis that led 
to a change of President in 1967. Thus, the government was unable to implement 
the sugarcane policy effectively during this period and farmers refused to cooperate 
by planting sugarcane. This refusal reflected dissatisfaction with the situation 
whereby profit from the industry was disproportionately shared between sugar 
companies and farmers (Mubyarto, 1969). The problem of the disproportionate 
benefit during the colonial era would later be a government focus in the 1970s with 
the creation of a protection policy. Essentially, the government attempted to emulate 
the “cultivating system” by using farmers’ land for planting sugarcane, but with some 
modification of the pricing system so that it would significantly benefit the farmers as 
well.  
In implementing the sugar commodity protection policy, the Indonesian government 
issued two regulations. Firstly, there was Presidential Decree Number 43 (1971); this 
regulation provided legal powers for the government to control domestic markets 
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with the purpose of stabilizing domestic sugar prices at a specific level. Secondly, 
there was Presidential Instruction Number 9 (1975) which was the core of the sugar 
commodity protection policy. The regulation stated: 
“To take measures to shift the cultivation of sugarcane from leased land 
towards the farmers’ land but keep the production increase, so that at the 
end of Pelita II5, the entire production of sugarcane is from the farmers’ 
land.”   
(Presidential Instruction Number 9, 1975, First Instruction) 
The excerpt above made clear that the government intended to make farmers the 
backbone of the sugar industry once again. Sugarcane would be planted by farmers 
on their land, thus, eliminating the need to establish large plantations using a land 
lease system. Moreover, The Second Instruction of the regulation stated: 
“To make the farmers’ sugarcane plantations provide high yield, the sugar 
mills shall act as the leader for the farmers by providing farmers with 
technical counselling/guidance for commercial cultivation of sugarcane, 
superior seeds, production facilities, and instructions to get bank loans by 
utilizing the sugar mills’ resources.” 
(Presidential Instruction Number 9, 1975, Second Instruction point b) 
“To protect the sugar cane farmers from the possibility of adverse bondage 
and a market dynamic system, the farmers’ yields sold to sugar mills have 
to be paid at a determined value that is profitable for the farmers.” 
(Presidential Instruction Number 9, 1975, Second Instruction point d) 
                                                          
5 This is the period of presidency which is 5 years.   
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Based on the excerpts above, the government required sugar mills to assist farmers 
in establishing efficient sugarcane plantations. Moreover, the second instruction, the 
most important aspect of the regulation, laid out that the government would ensure 
that farmers received a fair price at the harvesting season which was economically 
beneficial for them. In other words, government would purchase sugar from sugar 
mills at a fair price and require them to do the same when buying farmers’ sugarcane 
yields. Also, to protect the domestic sugar price from market volatility, the 
government would apply import controls by buying sugar from overseas markets, 
where both domestic and imported sugar would be stockpiled and distributed in the 
domestic market. The implementation of these policies successfully incentivised 
farmers to plant more sugarcane in their fields and sugar plantations expanded 
rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Figure 4.1). 
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At this point, the government had successfully re-established the farmers as the 
backbone of Indonesia’s sugar industry; however, the industry was still unable to 
return to its past success in terms of production since the country still needed to 
import sugar to meet its domestic demand (Ministry of Agriculture, 2012; 2015). 
Although the origins of the policy are uncertain - aside from the link with old colonial 
policy - it is likely that the government was influenced by the US post-World War 
agrarian ‘new deal’ policy. Agrarian political economists (e.g. Friedman, 1993; 
Bernstein, 2016) have debated the effectiveness of the US ‘new deal’ policies in 
increasing agricultural productivity through government purchase of farmers’ yields 
at a fair price and with import control. Furthermore, as Friedman (1993) argues, 
there was an attempt by the US to replicate this policy in developing countries as 
part of US foreign policy in order to advance US hegemony over the world food 
market during the Cold War era.  
Political ecologists (e.g. Goodman et al.,1987; Goodman and Redclift, 1989) also 
argue that protectionist policies in the agricultural sector, in the context of the US 
‘new deal’ policy, stimulated a rise in heavy industrialization through the use of 
modern equipment such as tractors which increased production yet reduced labour 
force requirements. However, in the context of Indonesia, the protection policy 
implemented by the government had a different impact from that in the US and other 
developing countries since it did not induce heavy industrialization in the sugar 
industry. Three main consequences resulted from the sugar commodity protection 
policy which controlled the domestic sugar price. These consequences would 
subsequently influence the performance of the bioethanol industry decades later. 
First, Presidential Instruction Number 9 (1975) only regulated the production, 
distribution and marketing of sugar and sugarcane without encouraging farmers and 
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smallholders to use modern technology and methods that could increase their 
production in an efficient way. Several agrarian political economy studies concerning 
Indonesia’s sugar industry have evidenced that the plantations of sugarcane farmers 
still required intensive labour and used the inefficient method of ratooning6 which 
significantly reduced the sugar yield of the crop (e.g. Irawan and Hutabarat, 1991; 
Rachmat, 1992; Susila and Sinaga, 2005; Ariningsih, 2013).  
In his research on Profil Tebu Rakyat di Jawa Timur (Sugarcane Farmers’ Profile in 
East Java), Rachmat (1992) explains that the farmers’ sugarcane yield was priced 
based on its weight instead of sugary content (p.48). This meant farmers did not 
have to bother with the amount of sugar yield in their crops nor any method used to 
increase the yield, as long as the production cost was cheap and the crop was heavy 
enough to earn sufficient profit for them. However, this would be problematic for both 
sugar, and subsequently bioethanol, industries since their output is actually derived 
from the sugary content of sugarcane. Thus, the protection policy imposed by the 
government created incentives in the industrial sugar chain that were not conducive 
to better outputs, since heavier sugarcane does not necessarily mean high sugar 
content within it, despite a heavier weight being desirable for farmers. 
Secondly, the policy had assured both sugarcane farmers and sugar mills that they 
would receive a fair price from the government without any binding contract. This 
win-win condition made sugarcane farmers and sugar mills independent entities 
without the need to be integrated to improve their industrial capacity. This meant 
sugarcane farmers and smallholders still had full control of their land and the 
freedom to plant any crops on their plot that brought benefit to them. Thus, the 
                                                          
6 Although it is considered to be labour effective and considerably cheaper than planting a new crop, 
ratooning also reduces the sugary content within sugarcane (Knight, 2018). 
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protection policy created a dependency on government intervention in the sugar 
sector without actually strengthening the cohesion of the sugar agro-industry. This 
lack of cohesion, in turn, meant it would be problematic for domestic sugar 
production if the government rescinded the protection policy, because farmers would 
be highly sensitive to the dynamics of sugar price changes and they are the 
dominant stakeholder in the sugarcane sector (see Figure 4.1).  
Thirdly, the protection policy became an obstacle for the private sector and limited 
the spread of the sugar industry outside Java Island. Java Island is densely 
populated with limited available land use for sugarcane plantations whereas other 
major islands such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua are sparsely 
populated and have the potential to expand the sugar agro-industry. However, data 
from Indonesia’s sugarcane statistics in 2015 indicate that more than 60% of sugar 
plantations were still located on Java Island in 2013 (Table 4.1); this statistic had 
essentially being influenced by the colonial policy which at least resulted on two 
different impacts.  
Impact 1) Since the colonial government only developed the sugar industry on Java 
Island, farmers here were more likely to accept the planting of sugarcane crops as 
they could pass the knowledge of sugarcane planting through the generations. 
Moreover, most of the sugar mills operating on Java Island are those built during the 
colonial era and still use farmers as their suppliers (GAIN Report, 2008; Low Carbon 
Support Program, 2013). Thus, it was easier for the number of sugarcane farmers to 
grow on Java Island as farmers often gathered in cooperative groups to support 
each other, particularly regarding planting crops for revenue (Rahmat, 1992).  
124 
 
Impact 2) The presidential instruction stipulated that sugar mills were to provide 
assistance to farmers and this would be easier to do on Java Island as there was 
existing infrastructure from the colonial era. This meant that sugar companies 
outside of Java Island required significant investment to establish their production 
capacity, as they would either have to introduce an unfamiliar crop to local farmers or 
establish their own plantations. Since the focus of government sugar protection 
policies was to support small scale farmers by using their land, the establishment of 
private sugarcane plantations became less of a priority. This created little incentive 
for private companies to establish an integrated sugar agro-industry as they would 
require significant investment and the domestic sugar price was controlled by the 
government affecting their capacities to achieve returns.   
 
Interestingly, those private sugar plantations in Indonesia established outside Java 
Island had higher yields than the Javanese smallholders (Table 4.1 red boxes). 
Rachmat (1992) asserts that sugar production quantity depended on factors such as 
the efficiency of sugar mills, the time taken cutting sugarcane, and the time taken to 
bring it to the sugar factories (p.48). The high yield of sugar companies outside Java 
Island implies that they are more efficient at extracting sugar from sugarcane than 
those on Java Island. The data from the Global Agriculture Information Network 
(GAIN) Report (2008) mentions that sugar mills on Java Island still use outdated 
19th century machinery. The higher sugar production outside Java suggests that 
Area (Ha)
Production 
(Ton)
Yield 
(Ton/Ha)
Area (Ha)
Production 
(Ton)
Yield 
(Ton/Ha)
Area (Ha)
Production 
(Ton)
Yield 
(Ton/Ha)
Java Island 252,307 1,321,975 5.2 51,642 289,234 5.6 1,128 5,303 4.7
Outside Java Island 10,689 57,161 5.3 36,414 135,860 3.7 120,496 765,859 6.4
Total 262,996    1,379,136 5.2 88,056      425,094    4.8 121,624    771,162    6.3
Source: Created based on data from Ministry of Agriculture, 2015
Private Plantations
Table 4.1
Composition of Sugarcane Industries Ownership and Production in 2013
Smallholders SOE
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private plantations were more organized, efficient and had the capital necessary to 
invest in machinery necessary to maintain the quality of sugarcane during the 
harvesting season and ensure a high quantity of sugar as an end result.  
Based on the policy impact analysis discussed in this section, it can be suggested 
that though the policy had achieved its purpose to share the benefits of the sugar 
industry with farmers, it has not increased domestic sugar industrial production 
exponentially as expected at national level (Rachmat, 1992). Instead, the country 
continued to rely on sugar imports to fulfil domestic consumption requirements. 
There is an ironic reality concerning the two similar policies implemented at different 
moments in Indonesia’s history. The “cultivating system” during the colonial period 
successfully integrated farmers within the sugar industry network, with farmers 
producing sugarcane in accordance with the expectations of the sugar industry - high 
sugary content sugarcane. Yet, farmers hardly benefited from this colonial policy as 
profits went to the colonial powers. Meanwhile, the protection policies of the 
Indonesian government concerning sugar commodities improved the farmers’ profits 
but created the undesirable consequence of an ineffective sugar agro-industry. 
The analysis provided here also suggests that private sugarcane plantations could 
have been more effective in driving agricultural industrialization than the small scale 
farmers. The ‘red boxes’ in Table 4.1 show higher sugar production for private 
plantations outside Java Island despite having smaller areas than farmers’ 
plantations on Java Island. This indicates that the private plantations are more 
effectively integrated with sugar mills since they were concerned with the quality of 
the harvested sugarcane to increase sugar production. It could also be suggested 
that industrial plantations were more reliable in supporting a large industry, such as 
sugar and subsequently bioethanol, in comparison with farmers and smallholders, 
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since industrial plantations have the purpose of obtaining the highest quality crop for 
the industrial recipient. Agrarian political economists (e.g. Friedman, 1995; 
Goodman, et al., 1987; Bernstein, 2010) argue that governments in developing 
countries used the instrument of protection policies to increase their agricultural 
production and farmers’ increased wealth was expected to follow. However, the 
Indonesian government focused on farmers first in its protection policies to eliminate 
the negative consequences of agricultural industrialization for farmers during the 
colonial era – however, this resulted in disincentivising the agricultural 
industrialization of sugar.  
The consequences of the sugar commodity protection policy emerged when the 
government had to rescind the policy in 1997. Friedman (1995) emphasised the high 
cost of protectionist policies, such as the US ‘new deal’ policy, on government 
budgets. The Indonesian government’s commodity protection policy for sugar was 
expensive but the subsidy allocation for this policy was not the biggest amongst 
government subsidies - the later fuel subsidy had an even greater cost (Ministry of 
Finance, 2004). Nevertheless, the subsidy allocation for the sugar commodity 
protection policy had to be terminated to reduce the government’s budget 
expenditure, as well as being part of an agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) - a precondition to receiving financial aid to overcome the 1997 economic 
crisis (Indraningsih and Malian, 2006). There was a huge consequence for the sugar 
industry as the sugar price regime changed from government control to market 
dynamics. As a result, cheap imported sugar flooded the domestic market as 
domestic sugar was more expensive than imported sugar (Indraningsih and Malian, 
2006; Wahyuni et al., 2009). This would subsequently mean that sugar mills, 
particularly on Java Island, were unable to buy sugarcane from farmers at a fair price 
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and this disincentivised farmers from planting sugarcane which led to a significant 
reduction in domestic sugar production (Figures 4.1 and 4.2).   
 
Nonetheless, private sugarcane plantations maintained their production after the 
rescinding of the protection policy in 1997. This can be deduced from Figure 4.1 (red 
circle) as the area for private plantations remains steady after the crisis period while 
the farmers’ plantation area decreases significantly. This is because private 
plantations still produced sugarcane whilst farmers gave up and replaced sugarcane 
with other crops. The data from the Ministry of Agriculture also shows that during 
implementation of the protection policy, overall sugar production from sugarcane 
farmers was higher than that from private plantations (Figure 4.3 green circle). 
However, this condition is reversed after the government rescinded the Sugar 
Protection Policy (Figure 4.3 red circle), implying that private agro companies, 
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unlike small scale farmers, had the capacity to adapt to the dynamics of the domestic 
sugar market, enabling them to maintain production.   
 
Although the private sugarcane agro-industry seemed to be more resilient to the 
liberal market system, the decades of implementing protection policies hindered the 
growth of private sugarcane plantations in favour of farmers as shown in Figure 4.1. 
This would eventually lead to the poor performance of the sugar agro-industry after 
the 1997 economic crisis, since the government decision to rescind the protection 
policy caused the domestic sugar price to fall and led to a reduction in the demand 
from sugar mills for farmers’ sugarcane - thus reducing sugar production. 
Consequently, farmers, the main sugar mill suppliers, had to revert their fields to 
other revenue crops which resulted in a reduction in the size of sugar plantations 
(see Figure 4.2). As will be seen in Chapter Five the poor industrial performance of 
129 
 
sugar before the commencement of the biofuel policy in 2006 had profound effects 
on the bioethanol industry.  
The analysis of the sugar commodity protection policy has shown that farmers might 
be able to plant a short harvest period crop such as sugarcane to provide a 
feedstock supply for the large-scale sugar industry, but they were not inclined to 
plant sugarcane owing to the disproportionate share of economic benefits they had 
received during the colonial era. This resulted in the need for government 
intervention to assure farmers’ receipt of adequate economic benefits from 
sugarcane production. Nevertheless, the nature of the mechanism for spreading the 
benefits to farmers had the consequence of forming an inefficient agro-industry with 
a mismatch between what farmers produced and what the sugar industry needed. 
The analysis also suggests there is an advantage in having sugarcane plantations 
under a single companies management rather than relying on farmers; the 
advantage being that it easier to achieve greater integration between feedstock 
crops and the sugar mill industry facilitating capacities for adaptation to changes in 
the sugar pricing regime. Nonetheless, the government policy in sugarcane would 
have a contrast result with its palm oil counterpart, despite both have the same goal 
of benefiting the farmers which will be discussed in the next section.  
4.2.2. Palm Oil Core Estate Policy: Engaging Farmers with Industrial Crops  
The relatively intact palm oil industry infrastructure during the period of war and 
political turmoil from 1942 to 1967 was an advantage for the industry on Sumatra 
Island, since it was able to maintain its position as a major global CPO producer with 
its position slightly reduced from first to second place (Risza, 1994; Fauzi et al., 
2012). The Indonesian government recognised the strategic importance of crude 
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palm oil (CPO), which is the main output of the palm oil industry, but also saw that 
the commodity was predominantly controlled by large plantations with private 
companies growing rapidly in the sector (Figure 4.4). Thus, the government 
intended to create policies that would facilitate sharing of the economic benefits of 
the palm oil industry with farmers by implementing PIR-Bun (Perusahaan Inti Rakyat 
Perkebunan/ Core Estate and People Plantation) which will be called the Core 
Estate Policy hereafter (Fauzi et al. 2012).  
 
There are two regulations that significantly impacted the success of the Core Estate 
Policy. Firstly, the government issued Law Number 3 (1972) on Transmigration with 
the intention of spreading the Indonesian population away from the densely 
populated Java Island towards the more sparsely populated large islands such as 
Sumatra and Kalimantan, where the law stated: 
“Transmigrants are entitled to land and/or agricultural land with land rights.” 
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(Article 7) 
“The land given is at least 2 hectares….. and to be used for productive 
means of planting agricultural crops.” 
(Article 7, Explanatory) 
The law stipulated that each migrant should receive two hectares of land to plant 
crops, with a particular focus on commodity crops (as opposed to subsistence). The 
Law of Transmigration essentially created the foundation for the second regulation – 
the Core Estate Policy itself – which was stipulated in Presidential Instruction 
Number 1, 1986 and was harmonized with the Law on Transmigration. The law 
stated in the ‘consideration’ section7 that “this regulation has a purpose to increase 
the production of commodity crops as well as increasing the farmers’ wealth by 
integrating the transmigration policy with the Core Estate Policy”. In this presidential 
instruction document, there are some key statements in the addendum section of the 
policy document that shaped the agrarian policy for the palm oil industry. 
“The core estate pattern is meant to implement plantation development 
using large plantations as the ‘core’ that help and guide the surrounding 
community plantations as ‘plasma’ in a mutually beneficial, intact and 
sustainable system of cooperation.” 
(Addendum 1) 
“Participant farmers obtain a house with their land as ‘plasma’ … the size 
of 2 hectares.” 
(Addendum 3 & 4) 
                                                          
7 All regulations in Indonesia always have their purpose written in the ‘consideration’ part.  
132 
 
The excerpts from the presidential instruction document above give an explanation 
of the Core Estate Policy, as well as detailing the benefits for farmers who want to 
participate in the policy. They give insight into how the government intended the 
development of large plantations as the ‘core’ estate with such plantations also 
owning a palm mill and having the capital resources to help ‘community’ farmers 
establish ‘plasma’ or small-scale palm oil plantations. Moreover, they detail how 
farmers, who were mostly transmigrants, would receive a portion of land that had to 
be planted with the designated cash crop of palm oil (Figure 4.5). Thus, the Core 
Estate Policy meant farmers were to become deeply involved with palm oil agro 
industries. Data from the Ministry of Agriculture shows a sharp increase in 
smallholders’ ownership in the palm oil industry beginning in 1988 (see Figure 4.4). 
 
 
Palm oil 
mills 
Large 
Plantation 
Smallholder
s 
Figure 4.5 
Scheme of Core Estate Policy 
Source: Author Produced, 2019 
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The regulation also provides the legal justification for the plantation company to be 
the ‘core’ plantation as shown in Figure 4.5 as well as regulating the way the 
company finances the farmers. The regulation stated:  
“The companies that can become the ‘core’ plantation are both state and 
private plantation companies”. 
(Addendum 5) 
“Funding for the construction of ‘plasma’ is carried out by ‘core’ companies 
which will then be taken over by government banks and other banks 
approved by the Bank of Indonesia (Central Bank) at the time of 
submission of ownership of the ‘plasma’ estate to participating farmers”. 
(Addendum 6 point a) 
Based on the above excerpts, farmers who had been given land by the government 
would receive assistance from palm oil plantation companies which included 
technical support and funding to establish their smallholdings or ‘plasma’. This would 
ensure the farmers success in growing a palm oil crop while still being able to meet 
their rudimentary needs (which were usually met by planting rice on their land. 
Furthermore, the regulation also set out the farmers obligations should they decide 
to plant palm oil, as stated: 
“Participant farmers are obliged to: 
a. pay for the replacement of the ‘plasma’ plantation costs, for which they 
are given long-term soft credit by the government bank; 
b. carry out the cultivation of the plantation according to the guidance of 
the core company; 
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c. sell their yield to the company on terms and reasonable prices that are 
mutually beneficial.” 
(Addendum 8) 
Although farmers would eventually have to return the cost of establishing their 
‘plasma’, they would not have difficulty in terms of payment since they could repay 
only once their smallholding was ready and was generating sufficient income for 
them. Furthermore, they did not need to find a buyer for their yield since the ‘core’ 
plantation would purchase it at a fair price. This ensured farmers received streams of 
revenue from their ‘plasma’. Thus, the Core Estate Policy has allowed farmers to 
benefit from the palm oil industry – a benefit which was usually enjoyed exclusively 
by large plantations. Nonetheless, the most important part from this policy was the 
way plantation companies benefited from this policy which essentially created a 
mutual symbiosis between them and farmers. The regulation stated: 
“The cost of developing a plasma plantation that is taken over by a 
government bank and other banks approved by the Bank of Indonesia 
consists of: 
1. the cost of developing a ‘plasma’ plantation from the preparation stage 
up to the time of its submission to farmers including interest, whose 
amount is calculated based on unit costs plus overhead costs and 
management services of 15%, which is determined and reviewed annually 
by the Minister of Finance and the State of National Development 
Planning / Chair of BAPPENAS after hearing the opinion of the Minister of 
Agriculture; 
2. the unit cost interest as referred to in number 1 is set at 16% and can 
be reviewed by the government.” 
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Picture 4.2 
Palm Oil Mills 
Picture 4.1 
Palm Oil Fresh Fruit Bunches 
Source: Paspimonitor.or.id, 2018 Source: private documentation, 2017 
(Addendum 6 point d) 
Based on the above excerpt, all expenses for aiding farmers would be returned to 
the plantation companies along with a 15% management fee that becomes the 
company profit.  
Based on the excerpts from both points a and d in addendum 6 and addendum 8, 
the plantation companies received three benefits from the Core Estate Policy. Firstly, 
they could increase their CPO production without the need to expand their 
plantations. Secondly, farmers had to sell their yields - fresh fruit bunches - to palm 
oil companies at a price cheaper than CPO in the international commodity market 
(R22 Personal Interview, May 2017). This was advantageous for palm oil companies 
since farmers essentially became their workers but without any employee-employer 
obligations, such as providing employee benefits and increasing salaries, or facing 
fears of employees going on strike. Thirdly, although plantation companies were 
required to provide assistance, including funding, to their farmers, the regulation 
stipulated that they would receive their money back plus interest and a management 
fee. Thus, the Core Estate Policy became a lucrative opportunity for palm oil 
companies as they could increase CPO production at very little cost, which resulted 
in a rapid increase in palm oil production (Figure 4.6). 
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Agrarian political economists and political ecologists (e.g. Goodman et al., 1987; 
Goodman and Redclift, 1989; Goodman and Watts, 1994) argue that by 
implementing protectionist policies for certain agricultural products, governments in 
developing countries enabled large industrial investment resulting in large scale 
production and ‘appropriation’ of farmers as part of an industrial network. Although 
the Indonesian government did not implement protection policies in the palm oil agro 
industrial sector, the Core Estate Policy alongside the transmigration policy that 
preceded it, followed the same trajectory where farmers become critical within the 
palm oil industrial chain.  
Thus, the government’s Core Estate Policy created a new class of farmers who grew 
only cash crops on their land. However, this did not necessarily mean that 
agricultural industrialization was happening on farmers’ smallholdings. There was a 
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significant yield difference between industrial plantations and farmers’ plantations as 
two respondents stated: 
“Companies could earn yields up to 5 tons/hectare while smallholders are 
just 2-3 tons/hectare.” 
(R22 palm oil company representative, April 2017) 
“Companies regularly do replanting (palm tree), but not smallholders and 
we also utilized agronomics (science of soil management and crop 
production), (high quality) seeds and fertilizers.” 
(R15 palm oil company representative, May 2017) 
Both excerpts above suggest that plantation companies have the capability to 
optimize their yields by applying methods of crop maintenance, while farmers have 
limited capability to do so. This is likely to reflect farmers’ dependence on plantation 
companies in terms of providing technical assistance to manage their smallholdings. 
During this period, plantation companies were also focused on expanding (see 
Figure 4.4 above), suggesting that they were allocating resources to expand their 
own plantations, instead of being fully reliant on palm oil farmers as happened with 
the sugar industry.  
This is also emphasized by the statement by R22 above on the stark difference 
between the yields produced on industrial plantations and farmers’ plantations. His 
statement suggests that palm oil companies had the capacity to perform at industrial 
scale which resulted in higher yields, whilst this is a limitation for smallholders. For 
instance, a palm oil company would have capital to pay more labourers to conduct 
more regular crop maintenance than farmers and smallholders. Thus, it can be 
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surmised that though the Core Estate Policy did successfully support the expansion 
of both palm oil plantations owned by farmers and those owned by large companies, 
it did so without significantly improving farmers’ production capacity. This meant that 
government agrarian policy in the palm oil sector actually strengthened the 
hegemony of large agro industries and positioned farmers as the companies’ 
extensions, since their existence was entirely dependent on the plantation 
companies.  
This can be characterised, then, as appropriation (Goodman et al. 1987), as farmers’ 
were engaged in planting cash crops (in this case palm oil) but without being subject 
to agricultural industrialization, despite their yields becoming part of an industrial 
input. Agricultural industrialization happens as farmers are encouraged to be more 
efficient in their production through utilizing machinery and chemical fertilizers to 
increase their yields for industrial input, instead of being directly consumed as food. 
In the context of Indonesia’s palm oil industry, though the crop itself is characterized 
as an industrial crop, the farming practices were not subject to other processes of 
industrialisation.  
Where companies were able to call on the latest technologies and make investments 
in fertilizers facilitating efficiency in managing palm oil crops, and especially in 
maintaining productivity, farmers and smallholders were not. Farmers and 
smallholders were unable to plant palm oil in an industrial manner, for example using 
high quality seeds, replanting unproductive trees, and applying fertilizer regularly, as 
they did not have the capital to do so. Thus, farmers could earn economic benefit 
from planting palm oil but they were still underperforming in comparison to plantation 
companies. This highlights the greater efficiencies in production that the 
industrialized companies were able to achieve compared to the smallholders, 
139 
 
although it should be recognised that farmers’ engagement did help to increase the 
total production of CPO at the national level.          
The Core Estate Policy implemented by the Indonesian government seems to 
resemble the cultivating system policy of the colonial government with both policies 
relying on farmers to supply large scale industries. Yet, this analysis also suggests 
that it was ultimately impractical for farmers to plant an industrial crop, such as palm 
oil, as their limited capital resources resulted in lower yields than those produced by 
large companies. Despite being successful in sharing the economic benefit of the 
palm oil industry with farmers and smallholders, large plantations have ultimately 
become the real beneficiaries of the Core Estate Policy. The large-scale plantations 
have thrived due to their efficiency and crude palm oil has become cheap and 
abundant. This has important consequences for the development of biofuels, in 
particular the advanced state of the palm oil industry within Indonesia meant it was 
well placed to meet growing demand as biofuels took hold and new demands were 
constituted. The analysis thus far has focused on the historical policy and its different 
policy outcome for sugarcane and palm oil whereby the former becomes an 
unintegrated agro-industry and the latter becomes the opposite. The next section 
discusses the way the outcome of past agrarian policy influences contemporary 
biofuel policy implementation.    
4.3. The Farmers’ Crops: The Government’s Intention to Pursue a Biofuel 
Policy   
On the 2nd of July 2006, the President of Indonesia, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
made a media statement during a cabinet meeting which discussed a biofuel policy 
initiative:  
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“Farmers can return to their land. Dried lands can also be processed. 
Those who only have one or two hectares (of land) can use it to develop 
biofuel raw materials.” 
(Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, July 2nd, 2006, Suara Merdeka Online July 3rd 2006) 
In his statement, the President indicated that the development of the biofuel industry 
should involve farmers and smallholders as feedstock suppliers. Again, a 
government preference for rural farmers and smallholders to be biofuel suppliers 
instead of large agro companies is expressed. A further statement by the President 
identified biofuel as necessary to increase industrial agro capacity, with Indonesia 
rich in crops such as palm oil, jatropha and sugarcane (Banjarmasin Pos, July 3rd 
2006). The statement indicates a government expectation that the biofuel industries 
would use such crops as their feedstock. In this context, sugarcane was to be used 
as bioethanol industry feedstock while palm oil and jatropha were designated for 
biodiesel feedstock.  
The Minister of Industry also made a media statement related to biodiesel feedstock 
crops:   
“To date, the most economical biofuel raw material is jatropha oil, while 
CPO is exported and used cooking oil is also limited.” 
(Fahmi Idris, July 2nd, 2006, Suara Merdeka Online July 3rd 2006) 
In his statement, the Minister of Industry acknowledges CPO, the main output of the 
palm oil industry, as a potential biodiesel feedstock, but his statement also reveals 
some hesitation in involving palm oil (an export commodity) as a feedstock for the 
biodiesel industry. He also asserts that CPO should retain its status as an export 
commodity rather than becoming feedstock for the domestic biofuel industry. His 
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statement is connected to the President’s statement and there is an expectation that 
farmers (not the established large palm oil industry) will form the backbone of a new 
biofuel industry. The latter of these statements also makes reference to jatropha, 
indicating that this was clear that the crop of choice for biodiesel feedstock, while 
sugarcane was to become the preferred crop for use in bioethanol. 
Several commentators have noted that the government decision to select these 
crops appeared to have been influenced by a group of prominent academics 
(engineers) from ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung), a notable university in Indonesia 
(Amir et al., 2008; Afiff, 2014; Fatimah, 2015). These engineers had been working 
with biofuels including conducting an experiment using a car fuelled by pure jatropha 
oil (Sinar Harapan, 29 June 2006). Afiff’s (2014) and Fatimah’s (2015) studies of 
Indonesia’s jatropha initiative demonstrated that these ITB professors had been 
powerful advocates of biofuel production since 2000. They claimed that producing 
jatropha for biofuel feedstock purpose can be conducted by people living in rural and 
remote areas which could help their economy (Afiff, 2014). This is because jatropha 
has more advantages over other type of crops such as drought resilience and can be 
planted in less fertile land using less fertilizer (Amir et al, 2008; Afiff, 2014). Thus, 
these advocates of jatropha framed biofuels as the ‘silver bullet’ to solve the 
government’s problems relating to energy security and economic development, as 
well as creating an opportunity to increase rural farmers’ income and address rural 
poverty providing jatropha is used as feedstock. As Fatimah (2015) asserts:  
“The political instability, due to rise of the national oil price, ‘forced’ the 
national government to include Jatropha in their activities as a silver bullet 
to solve multiple problems through one program.” 
(Fatimah, 2015) 
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As discussed above, the sugarcane agro-industry in Indonesia was dominated by 
farmers and smallholders due to the protection policy on sugar commodities in the 
1970s and 1980s, an approach that was damaged by the rescinding of this policy in 
1997 causing most farmers to revert their farm plots to growing other revenue crops. 
Thus, implementing a biofuel policy focused on particular crops (i.e. sugarcane and 
jatropha) appealed to the government as it would encourage farmers to plant 
sugarcane for bioethanol feedstock and many farmers particularly on Java Island 
were familiar with the crop. Jatropha was an unknown crop for Indonesian farmers, 
however, the advocates of this crop had promoted it during seminars and workshop 
with government officials, as well as through an alumni network which included 
government ministers and political allies of the President. As such, jatropha emerged 
as the rising star where government officials and political elites including the 
President himself, were eager to promote it to farmers as a biofuel crop heralded by 
its advocates (see also Fatimah, 2015). The Indonesian government came to see 
biofuel - and these specific crops - as a solution not only to overcome emergent 
issues of energy insecurity associated with the decline of oil production, but also to 
increase farmers’ welfare by making them a key element (as feedstock suppliers) in 
the biofuel industry. 
The government’s positioning on biofuel production as a panacea for economic and 
welfare problems is not unique (see Chapter Two). Although biofuel proponents (e.g. 
Mol, 2007; Huber, 2008) highlight the prospects of biofuel production to increase the 
income of rural farmers, multiple studies from political ecology and agrarian political 
economy (e.g. Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; Amir et al. 2008; Oliviera et al., 2017; 
Wilkinson and Hererra, 2011) have shown that the biofuel industry around the world 
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tends to rely on large agro-industry as its supplier, rather than rural farmers. In the 
context of Indonesia, several studies (e.g. Amir et al. 2008; Afiff, 2014; Fatimah, 
2015) have detailed the failure of jatropha initiatives with farmers unable to sell 
jatropha to the biofuel industry despite enormous government attempts to promote 
the crop as a biofuel feedstock.  
Multiple studies using the lens of political ecology (e.g. Neville and Daugverne, 
2012Fernandez et al. 2010; Obidzinsky et al., 2012; Holander, 2011) have also 
shown that biofuel policies have often impoverished smallholders and rural farmers, 
and instead created a lucrative business opportunity for large agro companies. Thus, 
the benefits of biofuels have been shown to flow to large companies instead of 
farmers and smallholders. Though existing studies offer some insight into the 
processes shaping this outcome for biofuel industries, there are significant gaps 
within the understanding of how and why the Indonesian government’s attempt to 
ensure farmers were the backbone for the new biofuel industry ultimately failed. In 
particular, the importance of crop selection is a neglected area of analysis that I 
argue had specific significance within the Indonesian context given the historical 
trajectories of agrarian development.  
With the failure of jatropha as an alternative to palm oil, sugarcane and palm oil 
came to be used as feedstock for the bioethanol and biodiesel industries 
respectively, where the former was ‘chosen’ or favoured by the government (as 
above), the latter was favoured by the biodiesel industry. In the context of biodiesel, 
then, there was a contradiction between the government’s intentions and the 
preference of the biofuel industry. Palm oil, which was a crop initially undermined by 
the government as a biodiesel feedstock, became the preferred feedstock for 
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biodiesel producers, rejecting the government’s preference for jatropha. One 
respondent stated this clearly:  
“This (biofuel) industry previously used jathropa as feedstock but could not 
get enough routine volume on an industrial scale and it was expensive 
because farmers bought seeds for 15 to 20 thousand (rupiah) per kilogram 
and farmers sold to the industry at the same price because they wanted to 
get a quick return for their money despite their yield being only 20% at 
most. If a kilo of jatropha seeds is priced at 10 thousand rupiah a kilo, then 
the price will be 40 thousand rupiah/litre for feedstock only, so we can’t 
make a profit.” 
“So, my machine is ready but there is no raw material. I'm looking for used 
cooking oil, but it's also hard to find used cooking oil. The one in front of me 
is palm oil.” 
(R1, Biofuel industry representative, May 2017) 
The excerpt above indicates the disappointment of the respondent concerning 
jatropha. As a biodiesel company owner, he was willingly to follow the government 
direction of using jatropha as the feedstock for his biodiesel factory. However, a 
problem emerged – the price of jatropha was too expensive for his company - 
causing the biodiesel price to become uncompetitive against its fossil fuel rival. Thus, 
he explains the need to find an alternative to replace jatropha to produce biodiesel.  
The Core Estate Policy implemented since the 1980s had made palm oil an 
integrated industry producing CPO efficiently, cheaply and abundantly which 
matched with the expectations of the biodiesel industry for its input material. 
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Moreover, the main objective of players in the biodiesel industry was profitable 
business as various respondents state. 
“We were aware that this (government interest on developing biofuel) was 
an industrial event for entrepreneurs.” 
“When we used palm oil, we could directly supply Pertamina without any 
government intervention. It was all pure business negotiation.”    
(R1, Biofuel industry representative, May 2017) 
“We used CPO as feedstock since we’re aiming for green energy and our 
analysis showed that using CPO is profitable.” 
 (R22, Palm oil industry representative, May 2017) 
The excerpts above imply that the biofuel policy is seen as a business opportunity by 
respondents and using palm oil in their factories would serve their purposes, which 
were to generate profit. This meant that the biodiesel industry would ultimately ignore 
the government’s preference for using farmers’ crops as feedstock because the most 
important aspect for them was finding a feedstock that would make their businesses 
profitable.  
Added to this, the success of palm oil companies to attract biodiesel producers did 
not seem to be replicated for sugarcane production and bioethanol producers. The 
government’s decision to implement a biofuel policy and select sugarcane as the 
primary bioethanol feedstock was expected to re-motivate farmers who used to plant 
sugarcane to plant this crop again to supply the production of bioethanol. However, 
the government used only a market mechanism whereby the increased demand for 
bioethanol was expected to increase the demand for its up-stream product, 
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sugarcane. This has proved to be ineffective since the Sugar Protection Policy in the 
past has made sugar industry as unintegrated industry which influence the market 
performance of this industry and made sugarcane industry unable to fulfil the 
government expectation in developing bioethanol. This would be discuss in depth in 
Chapter 5.  
 
The data from the GAIN Reports in 2010 and 2011 confirm that bioethanol 
production is far below demand and production capacity which indicates that 
bioethanol industries are unable to obtain a sufficient quantity of feedstock to meet 
bioethanol market demand (Table 4.2). The gap between bioethanol demand and 
production would seem to be paradoxical since bioethanol factories are already 
reliant on sugar mills for their feedstock supplies (GAIN Report, 2007) and sugar 
mills have already been supplied by sugarcane farmers. This suggests that the 
implementation of the biofuel policy is insufficient to incentivise farmers to plant 
sugarcane. Such a condition could result from the protection policy implemented in 
the 1970s and 1980s that created industrial disintegration between sugarcane 
farmers and sugar mills. This could also suggest that policy intended to benefit the 
farmers does not necessarily creates positive outcome for the whole agroindustry 
which gives profound effect for the biofuel policy implementation. Thus, there is a 
Capacity Actual
2006 16,000,000,000   3% 480,000,000   10,000,000     300,000          50,000         
2007 17,000,000,000   1% 170,000,000   13,000,000     1,000,000       660,000       
2008 19,000,000,000   1% 190,000,000   243,000,000   1,200,000       1,200,000    
2009 22,000,000,000   1% 220,000,000   273,000,000   1,720,000       1,260,000    
2010 23,000,000,000   3% 690,000,000   273,000,000   N/A 650,000       
Source: Created based on data from GAIN Report, 2010 and 2011 
Table 4.2
FG Bioethanol Consumption  Actual VS Needed (litres)
Domestic Bioethanol Production 
Year
Gasoline 
Consumption 
Targeted 
Blending 
Rate
FG Bioethanol 
Needed 
Actual 
Consumption 
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strong correlation between the outcomes of agrarian policy, for certain crops, as 
implemented in the past and the performance of the biofuel industry that uses the 
respective crop. There are other potential factors contributing to the problems of 
feedstock supply for the bioethanol industries, such as government policies and 
industrial competition within the bioethanol industry; this will be discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
 
4.4. Summary and Conclusion 
Based on the discussion in this chapter, it is evident a key intention of the Indonesian 
government’s agrarian policies for both sugarcane and palm oil has been to increase 
farmers’ wealth. The primary intention of the government’s past agrarian policies has 
thus followed a similar trajectory to its contemporary biofuel policies, prioritising small 
scale farming and particular crops in different ways. In particular, the government 
attempted to promote farmers’ crops of sugarcane and jatropha as feedstock for the 
bioethanol and biodiesel industries respectively. However, I argue that the historical 
agrarian policies on sugarcane and palm oil implemented in the 1970s and 1980s 
have shaped contemporary biofuel policy implementation, seeing it develop in ways 
counter to the government’s expectations and aims. These policies were in turn 
shaped by the history of colonial agrarian policy.  
In the context of bioethanol, the colonial government’s policies on sugar production 
had ensured that farmers would grow the high-quality sugarcane needed by the 
sugar industry. The Indonesian government’s focus in implementing sugar 
commodity protection policies addressed the negative impacts on farmers 
associated within unfair distributions of benefits but failed to understand the method 
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of crop planting and seasonality that made the colonial policy a success. This 
caused inefficiency in the sugar agro-industry where farmers failed to produce 
sugarcane in the necessary quality and quantities, which influenced the associated 
industrial performance of farmer’s crops and subsequently the choices of the 
bioethanol industry. 
In the context of biodiesel, the Dutch colonialists seemed to understand that the 
resources and scale of production associated with smallholders, made them 
unsuitable for the industrial cultivation of palm oil. However, through the Core Estate 
Policy, the Indonesian government again sought to make farmers central to the palm 
oil industry and proportionately share its economic benefits. The Core Estate Policy 
successfully achieved the government’s intention yet resulted in the private palm oil 
plantations gaining hegemony over the commodity, whilst creating farmers as mere 
dependents. The well-established nature of the industry influenced the preference for 
the biodiesel industry to use palm oil as its feedstock, ignoring the government 
promotion of jatropha. Subsequently, biodiesel industries would influenced the 
government’s plans concerning palm oil which will be discuss in depth in Chapter 7. 
Hence, the past agrarian policies for sugarcane and palm oil have culminated in 
different outcomes, particularly regarding their level of industrialization, with major 
implications for their use within biofuel production. The analysis presented in this 
chapter has contributed to our understanding of how historical agrarian policy 
relating to specific crops proves an important aspect in the implementation of biofuel 
policies. This is because agrarian policy implementation in the past has affected the 
performance of these different crops, which has eventually had impacts on the 
performance of the biofuel industries that ran counter to the aims and contemporary 
policy of the Indonesian government. The analysis also suggests a strong correlation 
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between the results of agrarian policy implemented in the past with the current 
performance of biofuel industry.  
Although the historical background of agrarian policy for the respective crops affects 
the performance of biofuel industries, it is still insufficient to fully explain the 
formation of agro-fuel alliances, particularly the way that large agro-companies have 
bonded with biofuel industries. There are factors such as the different industrial 
characteristics of bioethanol and biodiesel, as well as the politics of Indonesia’s 
biofuel market, that shape and reshape biofuel policy implementation and it these 
factors that will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter Five 
The Politics of the Biofuel Market:  
Reshaping Indonesia’s Biofuel Policy 
 
This chapter attempts to answer the question: how has the biofuel industry and its 
market structure reshaped contemporary Indonesia’s biofuel policies? I argue that 
the biofuel industrial and market structure for both bioethanol and biodiesel, 
alongside government policies in the biofuel market, are key factors influencing the 
success or failure of biofuel development in Indonesia. The lenses of political 
ecology and agrarian political economy are used to understand the underlying 
politics of Indonesia’s biofuel market, as well as to increase our understanding of the 
importance of both the market and industrial structure within the further development 
of biofuel systems and biofuel-agro alliances.  
Multiple studies using the lenses of political ecology and agrarian political economy 
have identified biofuel policies as a source of conflict between communities in the 
plantation feedstock area (Peluzo, 2008; Daugverne and Neville, 2010; Obidzinsky 
et al. 2012), or between the plantation companies and the local communities 
(Fernandes et al., 2010; Neville and Daugverne, 2012; Neville, 2015) due to the 
disproportionate benefits each stakeholder receives. Moreover, biofuel policies have 
been identified as a cause of deforestation as a result of land competition to increase 
the production of feedstock for the industry (Fernandes et al., 2010; Varkkey, 2012; 
Lima et al., 2011). However, these previous research studies have only focused on 
the consequences resulting from biofuel policy implementation and pay little attention 
to the processes involved in the biofuel industrial and market structure that shape 
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these outcomes. Although there are studies that show that market competition was 
involved in securing biofuel feedstock such as sugarcane, corn and palm oil and that 
this resulted in an increase in food prices (e.g. Gillon, 2016; Oliviera et al., 2017), 
these studies only focus on biofuel industrial input and provide insufficient 
understanding of the importance of the market structure for biofuel industries. This 
has resulted in limited insights into the importance of market structure and its role in 
shaping the current place of biofuel industries in the Indonesian agro-fuel alliance.  
I will focus my analysis on the bioethanol and biodiesel markets, since the different 
industrial structures of bioethanol and biodiesel mean that each biofuel has its own 
unique market structure. I will also discuss Indonesian government policy and 
regulations relating to the biofuel market as these influenced industrial, as well as 
domestic, market performance for bioethanol and biodiesel. In so doing, I will utilize 
interview data and observational data from the field research conducted in 2017, 
along with data from secondary sources in the form of media interviews, government 
reports and policy documents. The data will be discussed in the context of previous 
research that focuses specifically on the bioethanol and biodiesel industries in 
Indonesia.   
Understanding the biofuel market and its industrial structure is important as many 
case studies on biofuels in other countries have shown that respective government 
attempts to implement such a policy have caused the domestic biofuel industry and 
its market to flourish (Gillon, 2016; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011) and even created 
overseas demand for both biofuel and its feedstock (Pye, 2011; Hollander, 2011). 
However, in the context of Indonesia, biofuel policy implementation has created an 
inverse effect on the domestic biofuel market. This effect is vividly seen in the case 
of bioethanol as both the industry and its market have not grown (see also Table 4.2 
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in Chapter 4, Section 4.3). Moreover, biodiesel has also shown a similar outcome, 
where the industry is growing but the domestic market is not. 
This chapter is composed of three sections. The first section analyses the bioethanol 
market to understand its complexity, particularly as a result of the agrarian policy 
involving its main feedstock, sugarcane (discussed in Chapter 4). The second 
section analyses the biodiesel market to understand the relationship between the 
biodiesel industry and its feedstock supplier - the palm oil companies. It further 
examines the interrelations between palm oil companies and the Indonesian 
government, which I argue became critical in creating a lasting bond between the 
biodiesel industries and palm oil. The final section analyses the contemporary biofuel 
market as a whole and discusses the links between biofuel industries and fuel 
consumers, the government and fossil fuel companies. 
 
5.1. The Fragmented Bioethanol Market     
Agrarian political economists (e.g. Hollander, 2011; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; 
Gillon, 2010) have discussed how government policies that establish targets for 
bioethanol use in domestic markets have created new markets for the respective 
product and seen large industries consolidating their capital to profit from the policy. 
For example, case studies in Brazil (Hollander, 2011; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011) 
and the US (Gillon, 2010) have shown that biofuel policy implementation has 
encouraged large agro companies to consolidate their business in an attempt to 
control the market for bioethanol and its feedstock, eventually creating agro-fuel 
alliances. In these studies, while there is some consideration of the bioethanol 
market structure, this is not discussed in depth since there is already a strong agro-
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industry that provides crops suitable to produce bioethanol. However, in the context 
of Indonesia, the market structure is of greater importance since the feedstock 
industry for bioethanol - sugarcane - is dominated by farmers and smallholders 
(discussed in Chapter 4). As will be discussed further in this section, government 
implementation of the biofuel policy did not encourage bioethanol industries to 
consolidate their business and become the main actors in the bioethanol market with 
its respective feedstock. This highlights additional factors within the bioethanol 
market and its industrial structure that fundamentally impacted the failure of the 
bioethanol industries to consolidate their business to profit from the biofuel policy in 
the Indonesian context.  
The idea of a fragmented market is commonly found in the field of marketing; market 
fragmentation is defined as a diverse market consisting of multiple actors where 
each actor has a variety of needs and wants but cannot influence the market (Winds, 
2011). This means that in a fragmented market, there is no particular buyer who can 
influence the sellers of particular goods to sell their products to the respective buyer. 
For most governments, biofuel policy implementation is expected to consolidate the 
market since such a policy creates a huge demand for bioethanol. For example, in 
the Brazilian case study large sugarcane agro companies focused their business to 
produce bioethanol or to maintain sugar production but also integrate with the 
bioethanol industries (e.g. Hollander, 2011; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011). The 
current analysis has found that in the case of Indonesia, instead of experiencing 
rapid growth, production of bioethanol has experienced stagnation due to the 
fragmented market in both bioethanol and its feedstock markets. This is an area 
overlooked by many agrarian political economists and political ecologists, despite its 
relevance to understanding the success or failure of the respective industry.  
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In the Indonesian case, there are two areas where market fragmentation is occurring 
- thus, significantly hindering the growth of the bioethanol industry. Firstly, there are 
difficulties in obtaining feedstock and, secondly, there is the fact that bioethanol itself 
is produced and marketed as a commodity and not as a fuel. 
5.1.1. The Challenge of Securing Feedstock  
Bioethanol is made from the fermentation of sugary material, where the source of 
this material can be either sugar content crops such as sugarcane, corn and beet or 
carbohydrate content crops such as cassava and sweet potatoes (Patil and Patil, 
2017). The Low Carbon Support Programme (2013) published by the Ministry of 
Finance asserts that the choice to use sugar content crops as bioethanol feedstock 
would be a good option, as the process would be simpler than the carbohydrate one 
which requires a saccharification process before fermenting the sugar obtained to 
produce bioethanol (Figure 5.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distillation Drying Bioethanol  
(Fuel Grade) 
Preparation (peeling, 
milling, adjustment of pH, 
water content, etc) 
Starchy 
crops e.g. 
cassava 
and sweet 
potato   
Liquefaction 
Saccharification 
Fermentation 
Conditioning Sugary crops 
e.g. sugarcane, 
beet, and corn 
Figure 5.1 
Bioethanol Production Process 
 
Source: Low Carbon Support Programme 
(2013) 
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The above figure highlights how sugary crops have greater advantages than starchy 
crops in terms of producing bioethanol, as the former have a shorter production 
process than the latter. Thus, using sugary content crops would be more efficient 
and potentially make the bioethanol product cheaper than if using starchy crops. This 
is because bioethanol factories using sugary crops would require smaller investment 
and have lower operating costs than those using starchy crops. This could explain 
why bioethanol industries in the US and Brazil use corn and sugarcane respectively 
as their feedstock (Gillon, 2016; Hollander, 2011).  
In the context of Indonesia, the government’s decision to select sugarcane as the 
bioethanol feedstock would be considered as a good decision based on Figure 5.1 
and it is a crop well known to local farmers – which means it offers further appeal 
given that one of the government’s intentions for developing biofuel was to use 
farmers as feedstock suppliers. However, analysis in Chapter 4 has shown the 
underlying problems in the sugar agro-industry including Indonesia’s status as a 
sugar importer and the ineffective sugar agro industries resulting from the sugar 
commodity protection policy in the 1970s-1980s. Indeed, there was a considerable 
gap between domestic sugar demand and consumption prior to the implementation 
of the biofuel policy (Figure 5.2). 
Thus, using sugar, the main product of the sugarcane industries, as the raw material 
to produce bioethanol would inevitably escalate this gap and cause conflict between 
food and fuel production. Fortunately, bioethanol production does not necessarily 
have to use sugar from sugarcane processing. Chemical engineers have asserted 
that bioethanol can be produced by using the by-products of the sugar industry such 
as bagasse and molasses since these materials, particularly molasses, still contain 
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significant sugary content (e.g. see Patil and Patil, 2017; Wardhani and Pertiwi, 
2013; Nurdyastuti, 2005; Clifford, 2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 5.1 
Bagasse 
Picture 5.2 
Molasses 
Source: DiscoveryUK, 2018 Source: www.sparetimesupply.com, 2018 
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Molasses is a thick, dark brown juice obtained from raw sugar during the refining 
process, while bagasse is the dry pulpy residue after the extraction of the juice from 
sugar cane (Pictures 5.1 and 5.2). Lavarack’s (2003) study on sugarcane-based 
bioethanol processing methods found that molasses is the material that yields the 
third highest bioethanol outcome (where the highest is the juice followed by sugar) 
(see Figure 5.3). Based on Clifford’s (2018) description of sugarcane-based 
bioethanol processes, processing sugarcane will produce juice along with bagasse 
as a by-product and the juice can be used to produce either bioethanol or sugar 
(Figure 5.3).  
Source: Clifford (2018) 
Figure 5.3 
Sugarcane Processing to Sugar and Bioethanol 
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Wilkinson and Herrera (2011) stated in their study on sugarcane-based bioethanol in 
Brazil that: “The sugarcane sector is still quite fragmented with some 350 mills, 230 
dual purpose and over 100 exclusively for ethanol” (p.177). Based on Figure 5.3, 
mills exclusively producing bioethanol can be considered as those that process 
sugarcane solely to produce bioethanol (as represented by the green-white boxes). 
Establishing a dedicated sugarcane plantation for bioethanol production could be 
highly productive, since it can optimally use all sugary content in sugarcane 
processing - particularly the juice which Lavarack (2003) asserted could yield the 
highest bioethanol result. Meanwhile, dual-purpose mills can be considered as those 
that process sugarcane into sugar and use its by-product molasses to produce 
bioethanol - as represented by the purple-white boxes in Figure 5.3. It could be 
suggested that all sugar mills mentioned in Wilkinson and Herrera’s (2011) study are 
industrially integrated with bioethanol industries and the feedstock market is not 
fragmented, since sugar mills are either producing just bioethanol or producing both 
sugar and molasses where the latter is used by the bioethanol industries as their 
feedstock.  
The bioethanol industry in Indonesia is also supplied by sugar mills as stated in the 
GAIN Report (2006):  
“No ethanol is being produced from corn, sugarcane or sugar 
beets….(bioethanol) plants use molasses from local sugar refineries as 
the raw material.” 
(Global Agriculture Information Network, 2006 page 4) 
The excerpt above suggests that although the bioethanol industry obtains molasses 
from sugar mills, no crops have been planted exclusively to produce bioethanol. This 
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indicates that there is no industrial integration of sugarcane plantations with the 
bioethanol industry in Indonesia. This, I argue, indicates the impact of the agrarian 
policy in the sugarcane sector implemented from the 1970s to the 1990s (discussed 
in Chapter 4), since the policy created an ineffective agro-industry where there was 
no integration between sugarcane farmers, as the major players in the sugar sector, 
and sugar mills. This would become the bioethanol industry’s primary disadvantage 
and also the root of the fragmentation in the bioethanol feedstock market as 
suggested by a local media source in Indonesia: 
“Some sugar factories in Indonesia use molasses for the raw material for 
making bioethanol. But, sugar factories generally sell molasses to 
intermediary traders and producers of acetic acid and monosodium 
glutamate (MSG).”  
(merdeka.com 1 August 2006) 
The excerpt above confirms that there is hardly any industrial integration in the 
bioethanol production line since sugar mills are at liberty to sell their by-product 
(molasses) to any buyers. Molasses is not generally used for direct consumption in 
Indonesia and its main consumers are industries such as the food industry (to 
produce monosodium glutamate - MSG) and the bioethanol industry. Moreover, the 
excerpt also shows that there are various buyers in the molasses market, though 
none of them can influence the sugar mills to sell molasses to a particular actor in 
the process. This is the first fragmented market within the bioethanol system, as 
there is more than one actor who needs molasses for a specific purpose. This also 
means that bioethanol industries need to compete with other consumers of molasses 
in order to secure feedstock for their production process.  
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In a media interview, one official from a state-owned sugarcane plantation company 
stated: 
“Molasses export happens if the overseas price is better than the domestic 
and as long as the local price is the same as the global price, it is 
guaranteed that there will be no export (of molasses).”  
(PTPN IX official, merdeka.com, 1 August 2006). 
Based on the excerpt above, it is suggested that molasses will not be sold overseas 
unless there is a large discrepancy between the domestic and overseas prices. 
However, the data from the BPS-Statistics Indonesia (Table 5.1) suggest otherwise. 
  
Based on the BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2015), molasses is exported abroad in high 
quantity despite having a relatively low value. The import quantity (tonnage) for the 
same product is much lower than the export tonnage, although its import value 
(USD/Ton) is higher than the export value. This shows a fragmented commodity 
market for molasses where sugar mills prefer to sell molasses abroad and the 
domestic bioethanol industry is unable to influence the domestic demand for 
Ton
Value 
(USD/Ton)
Ton
Value 
(USD/Ton)
2005 227,704     85.19        52,861       152.06      295.5
2006 553,278     89.43        47,014       155.29      382.0
2007 525,191     90.78        54,635       147.80      349.9
2008 945,858     76.59        60,056       185.16      358.1
2009 496,342     124.53      80,289       234.64      412.8
2010 468,907     145.76      105,994     188.88      580.9
2011 528,667     116.15      57,028       197.06      691.1
2012 388,112     115.56      102,437     200.25      589.8
Source: Based on the data from the BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2015
Domestic 
Sugar Price 
(USD/Ton)
Table 5.1
Export and Import of Molasses
Export Import
Year
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molasses to prevent sugar mills from exporting it. The main priority for sugar mills is 
price - and the price for sugar is significantly higher than the price for molasses 
(BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2015) which suggests that the mills would rather focus on 
their main output (sugar) and use their by-product (molasses) merely for additional 
revenue.  
This results in a fragmented bioethanol industry where sugarcane farmers and sugar 
mills are at liberty to produce and sell their outputs based on their own private gains. 
Although the statistical data provided by the BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2015) is 
unable to detail the motives behind why the sugar mills export molasses, it provides 
an indication of the severe impact on the unintegrated bioethanol industry. Sugar 
mills are not obliged to supply the bioethanol industry with molasses, and thus, 
prefer to sell molasses to receive a cash revenue. A more thorough investigation is 
essential to understand the decision of the sugar mills to sell their by-product 
overseas rather than supplying the domestic bioethanol industry – however, this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
The analysis in this section has shown that even before the government 
implemented biofuel policies, the molasses market was fragmented due to the 
protection policy for sugar commodities implemented in the 1970s-1990s that 
created an ineffective sugar agro-industry. This meant the domestic bioethanol 
industry faced challenges in securing feedstock and as a consequence had to make 
their production highly efficient to ensure profit from the business. This, however, 
does not necessarily mean that bioethanol production would be cheap, as the data 
from the BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2015) suggest that bioethanol producers would 
need to pay a high price for molasses as they could not access the product from a 
domestic source. This suggests that acquiring customers for bioethanol is a top 
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priority for bioethanol producers rather than producing the product on a large scale 
and then waiting for someone to buy it. Thus, the bioethanol industry will only 
produce and sell its product base on customer demand (in terms of quantity and 
quality). Despite this, bioethanol customers are still unable to bargain on the price 
offered by the bioethanol industry since the industry has to buy expensive raw 
material to produce bioethanol.   
To understand the impact of the difficulties faced by the bioethanol industry in 
securing feedstock (and thus their abilities to align with the intentions of biofuel 
policy), it is important to understand the process of producing bioethanol. In reality 
there were industries needing bioethanol for their production line regardless of the 
implementation of the biofuel policy. This would eventually impact on the bioethanol 
customers’ preference to purchase domestic bioethanol as the product can be use 
both for fuel or non-fuel purpose as will be discussed in the next section. 
5.1.2. Bioethanol as a Commodity: Between Industrial and Fuel Purposes 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.3 show that once a sugary material such as molasses and 
the juice enter the fermentation stage, bioethanol will result. Moreover, in each stage 
of the process of making bioethanol, the material’s chemical property from the 
previous stage does not change other than increasing the purity. The result of the 
fermentation process (see Figure 5.1) is a low concentrate of bioethanol (<40%), 
while the distillation process can increase bioethanol purity up to 99.5% (Nurdyastuti, 
2005; Patil and Patil, 2017). This percentage of bioethanol is often called industrial 
grade ethanol or industrial ethanol (IE) which is commonly used by food industries, 
pharmaceuticals and other industries that need IE in their industrial processes (GAIN 
Report, 2007; Siahaan et al., 2013). Furthermore, the processes to produce 
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bioethanol are relatively easy to conduct at any scale - including home industry (Patil 
and Patil, 2017). 
However, IE is unsuitable for use in an internal combustion engine such as within a 
car or bus since it contains more than 0.5% water which could corrode the vehicle’s 
engine (Nurdyastuti, 2005; Siahaan et al., 2013). Thus, in order to prevent this 
corrosion effect, bioethanol purity should be more than 99.5% which is called fuel 
grade ethanol or fuel ethanol (FE) (Nurdyastuti, 2005; Patil and Patil, 2017). To 
achieve this, another process is undertaken called drying (see Figure 5.1). Patil and 
Patil (2017) assert that this is expensive and requires huge investment by a 
bioethanol producer to build a drying facility. The Head of APBI (Asosiasi 
Perusahaan Bioethanol Indonesia/Indonesian bioethanol companies association) 
also made a media statement regarding the difficulties of producing FE: 
“Those who are able to supply such levels (99.5%) are only large 
companies that have sophisticated factories, not home-scale.”  
(Supriyanto, BBC Indonesia, 28 October 2012)  
The excerpt above shows that FE can only be produced by large bioethanol factories 
as the investment needed to build drying facilities is too expensive for small scale 
refineries8. In summary, there are two types of bioethanol that can be produced by 
large bioethanol factories - industrial grade ethanol (IE) that can also be produced by 
small scale refineries and fuel grade ethanol (FE) that only large bioethanol 
refineries can produce. Moreover, bioethanol factories that already produce IE would 
also be able to produce FE if they installed drying facilities. 
                                                          
8 APBI members are small scale bioethanol producers (As stated by Supriyanto, The Head of APBI, 
interviewed by BBC Indonesia, 28 October 2012). 
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Based on the data from the GAIN Report (2006), there were two bioethanol 
producers in Indonesia that could produce FE and both used molasses as feedstock 
before the government implemented biofuel policies. However, the report also stated 
that the two factories capable of producing FE did not produce it for fuel purposes, 
but for other industries which needed pure ethanol within their production line such 
as the food, pharmaceutical and cigarette industries. This means FE is not 
exclusively used for fuel purposes, since certain industries use high purity bioethanol 
(fuel grade ethanol) as an input material for their products.  
Meanwhile, the data from the Low Carbon Support Programme (2013) mentioned 
that there were 11 bioethanol factories in Indonesia prior to implementation of the 
biofuel policy. This suggests that most of the existing bioethanol factories may not 
have had the drying facilities to purify bioethanol since there was only market 
demand for IE. However, those that could produce FE were producing it to supply 
industries that purchase FE for non-fuel purposes. This means that before the biofuel 
policy there was already demand for fuel grade bioethanol, but for industrial 
purposes. This shows that the bioethanol market was already fragmented before the 
implementation of the biofuel policy, since the bioethanol industry could produce 
ethanol for any consumer who demanded it. Moreover, the data from the Low 
Carbon Support Programme (2013) suggests that there were no industrial 
consumers that dominated the bioethanol market. Thus, the government’s 
implementation of the biofuel policy was expected to increase demand for fuel grade 
bioethanol which could potentially stimulate bioethanol producers to produce FE to 
meet the demand for bioethanol as a fuel.  
However, instead of an increase in the production of bioethanol (FE), the analysis in 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) has shown that FE production for fuel purposes decreased 
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despite the increase in its potential demand. Moreover, the GAIN Report (2010) also 
indicates a reduction in demand for fuel ethanol from biofuel customers (p.3). Thus, 
the implementation of the biofuel policy did not promote consolidation of the 
bioethanol industry and did not increase FE production to meet any increasing 
demand. Instead, it created further competition between industrial consumers 
requiring FE within their production line and those using it for fuel. Moreover, the 
former consumers had more suppliers since they could use any purity level of 
bioethanol (including high purity - 99.95%) as a desirable feedstock. Meanwhile, the 
latter consumers could only use bioethanol with a purity level of 99.95% which is 
produced by just two bioethanol factories. Thus, industrial competition increased 
which was disadvantageous for those using FE for fuel purposes. 
As discussed above, it would be difficult for the bioethanol industry to reduce FE 
prices due to challenges in securing feedstock that prevents the industry from 
production on a mass scale. This is suggested to be a key reason for bioethanol 
companies to produce below their production capacity (as shown in the GAIN 
Report, 2011, p.8) as a means of reducing their expenditure. However, industries 
such as food, pharmaceuticals and cigarettes, need bioethanol (including FE) at any 
cost (high or low) since this cost would be part of their production costs and would 
not create competition for their final product since other companies most likely use 
FE in their own production lines. For example, a pharmaceutical product just has to 
compete with other pharmaceutical products and both producers are likely to use 
bioethanol in their production chains. Nevertheless, there would be difficulties for 
bioethanol consumers who use the product for fuel purposes, since the price of 
bioethanol is compared with the price of fossil fuels, making this a determining factor 
for the FE consumer.  
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Biofuel policy implementation was expected to increase demand for FE and 
stimulate bioethanol producers to consolidate their businesses to meet the biofuel 
industries demand. However, in reality, the bioethanol market, which was already 
fragmented prior to the biofuel policy, remains fragmented, since there is no one 
consumer that dominates the market and causes the bioethanol producers to 
prioritize production for a specific consumer type. Moreover, bioethanol customers 
using FE for transportation purposes will only buy FE if it competes financially with 
the cost of fossil fuels. Meanwhile, bioethanol producers will only want to produce FE 
if buyers are willing to pay their set price. This suggests that biofuel policy 
implementation alone is insufficient to influence bioethanol companies to produce 
bioethanol on a large scale for fuel purposes. Instead, other factors relating to the 
market context for bioethanol must also line up.  
The analysis in this section has shown that bioethanol (FE) is a multi-purpose 
commodity with a fragmented market within its production system. The fragmented 
market for bioethanol feedstock has proved an obstacle for the industry to secure 
molasses to produce bioethanol. As a result, bioethanol producers do not have the 
ability to mass produce FE. Moreover, since fuel grade bioethanol is in high demand 
by fuel and non-fuel consumers, another fragmented market has emerged where no 
consumers are able to significantly influence the bioethanol producers to focus on 
supplying a certain type of consumer. This is due to a price mismatch between 
producer and consumer expectations for fuel ethanol. Consumers of ethanol for fuel 
purposes compare the price of bioethanol with the price of its fossil fuel counterpart, 
whilst producers decide the price based on their actual production costs. The 
fragmented market became a huge barrier as regards achieving the bioethanol 
policy target. Indeed, the production of FE for fuel purposes was stagnant until it 
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finally ceased in 2010 (as will be discussed in depth in Chapter Six). However, the 
fragmentation is only found in the bioethanol market – not the biodiesel market - 
although there is a similarity as regards the implications for the domestic market. 
This will be discussed in Section 5.2 below. 
 
5.2. Biodiesel: The Market for Palm Oil Industries 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the agrarian policy on palm oil crops influenced the 
biodiesel industry’s preference for using this crop as their feedstock, rather than 
jatropha - a crop favoured by the government. Moreover, domestic production of 
palm oil in 2006, when the government started the implementation of biofuel policy, 
exceeded 17 million tons and has continued to increase, whereas domestic 
consumption is stable at approximately 5 million tons per year (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2014; Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2016). This means 
there was a significant surplus of palm oil that could potentially become the 
feedstock for the domestic biodiesel industry. 
Palm oil-based biodiesel is essentially a derivative of crude palm oil (CPO) called 
fatty acid methyl ester (FAME). In Indonesia, CPO is mainly used to produce 
RDBPO (refined deodorized bleach palm olein) or cooking oil. FAME can be 
produced by processing CPO, the by-product of producing cooking oil and the 
cooking oil itself (Figure 5.4). This makes FAME, a palm oil-based biodiesel, a 
product that can be flexibly obtained either directly from CPO or from its derivative 
products.  
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The biodiesel production process suggests that the biodiesel industry would have an 
industrial advantage if it could secure the by-products from producing cooking oil, 
since these products are cheaper than CPO as mentioned by respondent R22: 
“PFAD and stearin prices in the market are approximately 75% of CPO for 
PFAD and 95% of CPO for stearin.” 
(R22, palm oil company representative, May,2017) 
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Unlike bioethanol where producers need to compete just to secure the feedstock 
material, biodiesel producers have the advantage of abundant feedstock without 
having to compete with other industries. As suggested by the excerpt above, a close 
connection with the large palm oil industry was therefore beneficial for the biodiesel 
industry as it could utilize the by-products from producing cooking oil at a much 
cheaper price than CPO. Nevertheless, the palm oil industry did not produce 
biodiesel prior to the government implementing its biofuel policy in 2006. 
Respondent R1 confirmed:  
“There were only three biodiesel companies in 2005 and none of them 
were owned by palm companies.” 
(R1, biofuel producer representative, April 2017)  
The excerpt indicates a lack of industrial integration between biodiesel companies 
and palm oil companies at this time. Instead, producing biodiesel was suggested to 
be against the industrial interests of palm oil producers. The excerpt below is from 
respondent R22 who entered the biodiesel business before he joined the palm oil 
company where he is currently working. He stated that the palm oil company sought 
biodiesel business not as a profitable business opportunity but rather as a means for 
cost efficiency to reduce daily operating costs.  
“In 2006, I started a biodiesel business in collaboration with PTPN IV9”.  
“Biodiesel is produced not for sale but for internal use by a palm oil 
company (PTPN IV) because the HSD (High Speed Diesel) requirements 
for PTPN IV are quite a lot for transportation, generator sets, etc” 
                                                          
9 PTPN IV is a state-owned palm plantation company. 
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(R22 palm oil company representative, May, 2017) 
In this context, the biodiesel factory owned by R22 buys CPO from its palm oil 
company counterpart. In return, R22 sells biodiesel to the respective palm oil 
company and this company uses it as a substitute for fossil diesel within its daily 
operations. Thus, it would seem that there is a degree of industrial integration 
between the biodiesel company and the palm oil industry. However, when the 
international price of CPO significantly increased the palm oil company that 
previously supplied R22’s biodiesel factory ceased his CPO supply and decided to 
sell CPO overseas. The outcome was stated by R22: 
“We produced for a year and suddenly CPO prices increased steadily 
which meant the raw material price exceeded the price of HSD (fossil fuel 
diesel), so it did not make sense to continue business. Thus, we closed 
the factory.” 
(R22, palm oil company representative, May, 2017) 
Based on the excerpt above, it is evident that the palm oil industry had only limited 
interest in the biodiesel industry as they were not industrially integrated. Thus, the 
palm oil company (in the example above) preferred to sell its CPO on the overseas 
market rather than supplying R22’s biodiesel company as the international price for 
CPO rose. Then the respondent’s biodiesel company had to shut down its operation 
since it was unable to buy its feedstock. This suggests that the palm oil industry does 
not consider the biodiesel industry as an opportunity for profitable business 
expansion, but rather a mere customer for its product. 
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The palm oil industry did not consolidate its business with the biodiesel industry 
when the government implemented its biofuel policy in 2006. However, the analysis 
in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) indicates that biodiesel production did increase rapidly 
from 2006 to 2010. Oliviera et al. (2017) assert that the biofuel industry expanded 
rapidly due to government policy interventions such as mandatory blending, 
subsidies and export tariffs. This trajectory is evident as more investment flowed into 
the biodiesel sector, particularly after 2008 when the government issued its policy on 
mandatory blending followed by subsidies in 2010. Furthermore, the palm oil industry 
expansion into biodiesel is not merely happened due to the implementation of these 
policies, but it is because of the government policy to stimulate the production of 
palm oil derivatives, namely Palm Oil Down-Streaming policy, which will be the 
primary discussion in Chapter 7. The government implement the palm oil down-
streaming policy by imposing export tax on CPO and its derivatives. This policy 
creates an opportunity for palm oil industry, particularly large private companies, to 
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connect with biodiesel industry as palm oil based biodiesel is consider as palm oil 
derivatives.     
The abundance of CPO as a biodiesel feedstock led to an increase in its demand to 
produce biodiesel and subsequently increase the number of biodiesel factories in 
less than five years. There were only two factories in 2006 and the number rose to 
22 factories in 2010, whilst production capacity increased from 215 million litres per 
year to 3.9 billion litres over the same timescale (GAIN Report, 2011, p.8). Moreover, 
palm oil companies did eventually enter the biodiesel business as respondent R22 
highlighted: 
“For (biodiesel) companies that don't have access to a refinery, they can't 
just produce biodiesel. Instead, they must buy CPO first so it is expensive. 
That is where palm oil companies like Wilmar, Musim Mas, Sinar Mas 
have an advantage since they can use the by-product of producing 
cooking oil as a biodiesel input material.” 
(R22, palm oil company representative, May, 2017)  
The excerpt above suggests that biodiesel companies would have an advantage if 
they integrated with palm oil companies since they could access the by-product of 
cooking oil production which is much cheaper than CPO. It also suggests that the 
government’s policies, both biofuels and palm oil down-streaming policies, have 
successfully inspired palm oil companies to expand into the biodiesel sector either 
through establishing new biodiesel companies or acquiring the existing ones. This is 
suggested by respondent R15 who stated: 
“We are the CPO Producers’ Association so our role is more as suppliers 
for the biofuel industry. But, the palm oil industry is relatively integrated so 
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that upstream players are basically downstream players where members 
of GAPKI are also members of APROBI10, especially the large ones.”  
(R15, Palm oil company representative, May, 2017) 
The statement from R15, also a member of GAPKI (Gabungan Pengusaha Kelapa 
Sawit Indonesia/Indonesia’s Palm Oil Companies Association), suggests that palm 
oil companies did ultimately develop bonds with biodiesel companies, creating so 
called agro-fuel alliances. Such bonding has proved significantly beneficial for the 
biodiesel industry as indicated during the field observation in the Pelintung Industrial 
Zone (IZ) in Dumai City which is owned solely by Wilmar, the biggest palm oil 
producer in Indonesia. In this IZ, there is a biodiesel company named Wilmar 
Bioenergy Ltd established by the Wilmar Group. Based on this example, there are 
three main factors that significantly contributed to the benefits of the biodiesel 
industry becoming vertically integrated with the palm oil industry.  
First, the IZ formed an industrial complex that is independent in terms of providing 
fuel to power all plants within the facility. Palm dregs, a waste product from 
processed palm fruit, is used to produce electricity for all factories inside the IZ. 
Secondly, there is one harbour that serves all factories inside the IZ for export and 
import activity. This ensured all companies within the zone could become cost 
efficient, since they could immediately export their product as they had a harbour in 
their ‘backyard’. Thirdly, since biodiesel can be produced either directly from CPO, 
from its derivatives, or from by-products of producing cooking oil (see Figure 5.4), a 
biodiesel company that is geographically close to a palm oil company would be able 
to access a variety of suitable feedstocks. This provides a biodiesel factory with the 
                                                          
10 APROBI stand for Asosiasi Producen Biofuel Indonesia - Indonesia’s Biofuel Producers 
Association. 
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option to select the cheapest feedstock material. Thus, the respective biodiesel 
company has benefitted from having ties with the parent palm oil company, Wilmar. 
Although the discussion above is based on one palm oil company and one biodiesel 
company, the visit to other industrial zones (discussed in Chapter 3) has revealed 
that private palm oil companies tend to have similar features to the Pelintung IZ 
example. However, there is a stark condition happened as I observed an 
independent biodiesel company which was owned by R22 Respondent. The 
respondent stated that he closed his factory after the price of CPO increased 
significantly in 2008. During the observation, it is revealed that the respondent 
factory is independently build and not integrated within palm oil company industrial 
complex (Picture 5.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 5.3 
Abandoned Biodiesel Facilities 
Source: Researcher owned documentation, 2017 
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The evidence from the field study suggests that palm oil companies’ participation is 
beneficial for supporting the biodiesel industry and subsequently the government 
biofuel policy. This became apparent especially when the price of CPO skyrocketing 
in 2008 (see Figure 5.5) which disadvantageous for biodiesel industry that is not 
integrated with palm oil industry. Indeed, the production of domestic biodiesel has 
significantly increased over less than a decade from the policy initiatives being 
implemented, despite the increasing price of CPO (GAIN Report, 2010; Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources, 2017, Index Mundi, 2018). This significant increase 
in biodiesel production highlights how an integration of biofuel factories with 
plantation companies has been important in developing efficiency and increasing 
biofuel production.  
The analysis of Indonesia’s biodiesel market suggests that the involvement of large 
and integrated agro-industry has been important in the processes of generating a 
burgeoning biodiesel industry. The analysis also shows that because biodiesel - 
unlike bioethanol - is a product that is specifically produced for fuel purposes, this 
eliminates any competition within its market regarding the product being used for 
other industrial purposes. This is the opposite of the bioethanol industry, where 
bioethanol is a commodity also needed by other industries for non-fuel purposes. 
Although the biodiesel industry also faced difficulties due to the increased of the 
price of CPO, the alliances between this industry and the palm oil industry has meant 
the industry could ultimately overcome these challenges.  
The government initiatives to implement mandatory blending and subsidies has 
strengthened biodiesel industry. However, the implementations of palm oil down-
streaming policy, which initially not part of biofuel policy (discussed in Chapter 7), 
have facilitated the eventual bonding between the biodiesel industry and the large-
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scale palm oil industry. This also related with Chapter 4 analysist as palm oil industry 
is a strong and cohesive agro-industry while sugarcane is the opposite. The absence 
of large agro companies within the bioethanol system has hampered the ability of 
bioethanol producers to mass produce their goods, yet, the opposite condition has 
emerged in the context of the biodiesel industry. Thus, it is suggested that the 
existence of large agro industries is not only necessary, but desirable for the 
development of the biofuel industry.  
 
However, the increase in domestic biodiesel production does not match the increase 
in its domestic market, since the domestic biodiesel market is developing relatively 
slowly due to the preference of biodiesel producers to sell their product to the 
overseas rather than the domestic market (Figure 5.6). This is partly because there 
is a growing demand of biodiesel in the overseas market combine with the 
government policy in imposing export tax for CPO that incentivise palm oil industry to 
bond with biodiesel industry (as in depth discussion will be presented in Chapter 7).     
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This is somewhat ironic as one of the reasons the Indonesian government 
implemented the biofuel policy was to reduce dependence on domestic fossil fuel 
(see also Chapter 1). Despite the domestic biodiesel industry flourishing after its 
bonding with palm oil companies (Table 5.2), the industry faced a similar outcome to 
its bioethanol counterpart in that both were unable to meet the biofuel policy targets 
set by the government.  
 
The fragmented bioethanol market explains why the bioethanol programme in 
Indonesia would fail without government policy intervention. However, the biodiesel 
sector should see its domestic market flourish given all the positive factors that 
support the industry such as abundance and cheap feedstock as well as the benefit 
in integrating with palm oil industry as discuss above. This indicates that there are 
other processes, events or phenomena that have shaped the domestic market for 
biodiesel. In the next section I argue for the strategic importance of biofuel 
customers within the biofuel market structure in shaping the poor domestic 
performance of biodiesel.   
 
 
Capacity Actual
2006 18,000         5% 900        215        65          5                 
2007 18,000         2.5% 450        1,709     270        22               
2008 20,000         1% 200        3,138     630        23               
2009 23,000         1% 230        3,528     330        60               
2010 25,000         2.5% 625        3,936     740        220             
2011 25,000         2.5% 625        3,936     1,575     358             
2012 28,000         2.5% 700        4,280     2,200     670             
Source: Created based on data from GAIN Report, 2011, 2013 and 2016 
Table 5.2
Domestic Biodiesel Consumption (million litres)
Year
Diesel 
Consumption 
Targeted 
Blending 
Rate
Biodiesel 
Needed
Domestic Biodiesel 
Production 
Domestic 
Consumption 
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5.3. Regulating the Biofuel Market 
Multiple studies using the lenses of political ecology and agrarian political economy 
have shown how a new market can be created when a government implements a 
biofuel policy (Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Hollander, 2011; Gillon, 2010). These 
studies have shown how internationally government targets for using biofuel in 
transportation at national levels have facilitated an increase in the production of 
biofuels and their feedstocks. However, previous research tends to focus on the 
government targets for biofuel blending and the way to achieve it (e.g. Hollander, 
2011; Gillon, 2010; Pye, 2011), while there is not enough discussion about 
government involvement in regulating the biofuel market.  
In the context of Indonesia, besides establishing the biofuel production target and 
mandatory blending initiative, the government also created a regulation regarding 
who had the right to blend biofuel with fossil fuel. This is stated in the Ministerial of 
Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) Regulation Number 51 (2006): 
“Biofuel companies could sell their product to the final consumer.” 
(Article 12 point 1) 
“Blending fossil fuel with biofuel can only be conducted by a company that 
has a license to sell fossil fuel.” 
(Article 12 point 2) 
These excerpts from the government regulation indicate that biofuel companies can 
sell their product to anyone, but they cannot blend their product with fossil fuels since 
that is the prerogative of the fuel companies. This means that biofuel companies can 
only sell their product as a pure biofuel. However, neither bioethanol nor biodiesel 
can be used in their pure stages within an internal combustion engine (such as those 
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within a car, bus or truck) without risking engine damage due to use of a non-
recommended fuel (as based on the recommendations of the vehicle 
manufacturers). This is highlighted by respondent R22 who stated: 
“Biodiesel cannot be used entirely in vehicle engines and recently the 
Japanese automotive association recommended 7.5% of biodiesel for their 
cars.” 
(R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017)  
“There was a problem of sludge appearing inside the engine when biodiesel 
was tested in a diesel engine with 20% blending (biodiesel proportion 
against fossil fuel).” 
(R9, Member of National Energy Board, May 2017)  
Both excerpts suggest that it is strongly recommended that biodiesel is blended with 
fossil diesel, since a large proportion of biodiesel inside an engine can cause 
damage. Moreover, respondent R22 stated: 
“Technically, engines can use a blend of 20% or even more but only by 
wavering the manufacturer’s warranty. For trucks owned by palm 
companies, they don’t care about the risk of using biodiesel based on the 
manufacturer’s recommendation. They only care about profit since the 
trucks are usually replaced after a couple of years.” 
(R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017) 
Based on the statement by R22, using a large biodiesel percentage - even as high 
as 100% of fuel concentration - would not be a major problem in trucks owned by 
palm oil companies. Such vehicles are used for daily plantation operations including 
carrying fresh palm bunches to palm mills where a portion of the mill’s output, CPO, 
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is bought by a biodiesel company. Palm oil companies can operate more efficiently 
by using a portion of their own output processed by a biodiesel company providing 
that there is a large price discrepancy between fossil fuel and biodiesel. However, 
this also suggests that the implementation of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR) Regulation Number 51 (2006) has limited the biodiesel market 
to only fossil fuel distributors and certain palm oil companies where the latter use 
biodiesel to reduce their operational costs. 
In the context of bioethanol, Wilkinson and Herrera’s research (2011) shows that the 
sales of flex fuel cars11 in Brazil increased exponentially when the oil price 
skyrocketed in the early 2000s. Certain car engines were able to use bioethanol 
without the need to blend it with fossil fuel. Their research also indicates that 
bioethanol has become an alternative fuel to gasoline and diesel since the Brazilian 
government introduced it in the 1970s. This is totally different to Indonesia since the 
country only adopted its biofuel policy in 2006 and vehicle owners are still unfamiliar 
with biofuels, both bioethanol and biodiesel. Moreover, vehicle engines in Indonesia 
are only designed to run on gasoline or diesel. Thus, substituting gasoline with pure 
bioethanol (FE) would pose a risk in terms of damaging a vehicle’s engine. Thus, the 
only effective way to market bioethanol is by blending it with fossil fuel (gasoline). 
That said, MEMR Regulation Number 51 (2006) has effectively limited the customers 
of biofuel producers to fossil fuel companies. There are only four fossil fuel 
companies operating in Indonesia - Shell, Petronas, Total and Pertamina - and all 
but the latter are private companies. However, private fuel companies would have 
difficulties if they wanted to sell blended fuel, since they already have a limited 
market as their fuel stations are mostly located in big cities with dense populations. 
                                                          
11 Car that can use either pure bioethanol or pure fossil fuel. 
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Their limited market has arisen as a consequence of the government’s fossil fuel 
subsidy which started in the 1970s when it appointed Pertamina – the State-Owned 
Enterprise (SOE) - as the sole subsidized fossil fuel distributor domestically (Ministry 
of Finance, 2004). Thus, the domestic fuel market is essentially dominated by this 
SOE and the company has fuel distribution networks in every part of Indonesia. 
Nonetheless, for private fuel companies, selling blended fuel would be a high-risk 
endeavour due to profit uncertainty and the significant investment needed to build a 
blending facility. As such, private fuel companies are not particularly interested in 
getting involved in the government’s biofuel policy.  
Conversely, the government could ‘encourage’ Pertamina to participate in its biofuel 
policy as highlighted in Presidential Instruction Number 1 (2006): 
“To encourage state-owned enterprises in the energy business to use 
biofuel as an alternative fuel.” 
(Instruction 10, Point d)   
Although the excerpt from the government regulation above does not specifically 
mention Pertamina, it is the only SOE for which selling fossil fuel provides a key 
income. Moreover, the word ‘encourage’ can be defined as gentle coercion since the 
government, as the owner of Pertamina, would have the right to make the company 
comply with government policy. Thus, the enactment of Presidential Instruction 
Number 1 (2006) along with MEMR Regulation Number 51 (2006) have essentially 
appointed Pertamina as the sole blender for biofuel producers.  
Pertamina’s position as the only state oil company, with a large domestic fuel 
market, has made it the biggest and the most strategic SOE in Indonesia’s economy. 
The SOE’s huge domestic market could potentially create significant demand for 
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biofuel to be mixed with fossil fuel. This would potentially allow the biofuel industry to 
benefit from selling its product to this SOE since biofuel companies are not allowed 
to mix biofuel with fossil fuel. Moreover, Pertamina is also the only fuel distribution 
company that is assigned by the government to distribute subsidized fossil fuel. This 
means the SOE has the advantage of having the largest proportion of domestic fuel 
customers (compared to private fossil fuel distributors) with the company selling both 
subsidized and non-subsidized fuel. Thus, from the economic perspective, it is more 
efficient for biofuel companies to sell to Pertamina since they do not need to find 
other customers for their product. Biofuel policy implementation is expected to 
increase Pertamina’s demand for biofuels - both bioethanol and biodiesel. Thus, the 
government’s policy to regulate the domestic biofuel market in theory should have 
led to a mutual symbiosis between Pertamina and the biofuel industry.  
However, having Pertamina as the only company with the authority to blend fossil 
fuels is proving to be disadvantageous for the domestic biofuel market as its demand 
is solely determined by a single company. Moreover, Pertamina’s demand for biofuel 
is determined by the price of fossil fuel - the disparity between biofuel and fossil fuel 
prices is the SOE’s primary factor in determining how much biofuel it needs to 
maximize profits. The SOE also benefits as a distributor of subsidized fossil fuel with 
the subsidy already included in the profit margin (see Figure 5.7). This could make 
Pertamina hesitant to blend biofuel with subsidized fossil fuel as explained below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 
Fossil Fuel Subsidized Schemes 
Subsidy = (MOPS + Alpha) – Fuel Retail Price 
 
Source: Based on Presidential Regulation Number 55 (2005) 
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Figure 5.7 indicates that fossil fuel subsidies are determined by two variables. The 
first variable is MOPS (mean oil plats Singapore) which is the price for fossil fuel that 
Pertamina pays to its supplier. This already includes all costs incurred such as 
freight insurance, transportation costs and overheads. The second variable is Alpha 
which is the domestic fuel distribution cost and profit margin for Pertamina. The 
former is the variable that cannot be controlled by the government and is highly 
volatile, while the latter is a figure decided by the government. The Alpha variable 
was legalized through the enactment of a presidential regulation - Presidential 
Regulation Number 55 (2005). The two variables constitute the economic price of 
fuel per litre where the amount of subsidy depends on how much the government 
wants to set as the retail fuel price per litre. Thus, the fossil fuel subsidy scheme in 
the presidential regulation document allowed Pertamina to profit from every drop of 
subsidized fuel distributed in Indonesia despite the volatility of the MOPS variable. 
Such a situation makes Pertamina hesitant to blend biofuel with subsidized fossil fuel 
as stated by respondent R1: 
“Pertamina is basically reluctant to buy biofuel from us and mix it with 
(subsidized) fossil fuel, because it is more profitable if they import fossil 
fuel from overseas. The company couldn’t get a profit margin from selling 
biofuel whereas selling fossil fuel would earn profit from the alpha.” 
(R1, biofuel producer representative, April 2017) 
The excerpt above explains that Pertamina would lose its profit margin by selling a 
blended biofuel. For example, if the company sells subsidized fossil fuel, it will obtain 
a 100% profit margin from Alpha. However, if the company blends subsidized fossil 
fuel with 5% biofuel, the company only gets a 95% profit margin from Alpha. 
Moreover, since the MOPS variable also includes the transportation cost for fossil 
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fuel into Pertamina’s fuel depot, the SOE would have to pay for fuel transportation 
costs if it buys biofuel (as this was not subsidized in the first few years of biofuel 
policy implementation). Thus, mixing biofuel with subsidized fuel will not be profitable 
for Pertamina as the SOE will lose profit from the loss of Alpha and have increased 
operational costs from transporting biofuel to its depot.  
The only profitable biofuel endeavour for Pertamina is through blending biofuel with 
non-subsidized fuel. However, this would significantly limit Pertamina’s demand for 
biofuel since there is a price gap between subsidized and non-subsidized fuel that 
encourages customers to buy the cheaper subsidized fossil fuel. Since Pertamina’s 
decision to buy biofuel depends on the price gap between biofuel and non-
subsidized fossil fuel, it becomes difficult to sell biofuel in the domestic market. In the 
context of bioethanol, the fragmented market for this product has caused a price 
mismatch between Pertamina and the bioethanol producers, where the former wants 
the price to be as cheap as possible and the latter already has a standard set price. 
In the context of biodiesel, the increase in the CPO price (see Figure 5.4) has 
caused the price of biodiesel to increase and the SOE is reluctant to buy expensive 
biodiesel. This is highlighted by respondent R22: 
“We experienced domestic price problems since our feedstock price is 
skyrocketing and this makes biodiesel very expensive. However, for the 
European market the price will not be a problem - because in Europe and 
the USA 1 litre of HSD (high speed diesel) is almost 1 Euro which is Rp. 
13,000 (at that time) thus, it is still competitive there.” 
  (R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017) 
The above statement reveals that the increased price of CPO internationally has 
made biodiesel too expensive for Pertamina to purchase since it would not be 
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competitive even against the domestic non-subsidized fuel price. However, the 
respective price of biodiesel is still competitive in the overseas market, particularly 
Europe, which explains the decision of the biodiesel companies to export their 
product (see Figure 5.6). Although the government eventually decided to implement 
subsequent policies to improve the performance of the domestic biofuel market - i.e. 
mandatory blending and providing a biofuel subsidy - both policies are still failing to 
remedy the market situation. This will be explained in more detail in Chapter 6.  
The government decision to regulate the domestic biofuel market has limited the 
ability of the biofuel industry to sell its product in the domestic market. This is 
because biofuel cannot be used directly inside the engine of a vehicle without posing 
a risk of damage and thus blending it with fossil fuel is necessary. Moreover, the 
government policy of authorising Pertamina as the sole blender of biofuel with fossil 
fuel has created additional problems. The domestic biofuel market has become 
heavily reliant on a single company, whilst the demand for biofuel is determined by 
the price gap between biofuels and fossil fuels. These factors have severely 
undermined the domestic biofuel market, while seeing the biodiesel industry expand 
based on international exports. 
 
5.4. Summary and Conclusion  
The discussion about Indonesia’s biofuel market structure along with its policy 
regulations has increased our understanding of its importance in supporting the 
development of biofuel industries and the emergence of agro-fuel alliances. Current 
literature from political ecology and agrarian political economics has suggested that 
a biofuel industry will thrive when a government implements a biofuel policy and a 
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new market is created increasing demand for the respective product (Wilkinson and 
Herrera, 2011; Hollander, 2011; Pye, 2011; Oliviera, 2017). However, the Indonesian 
biofuel case study has shown that the market structure and industrial structure of 
specific forms of biofuel play an important role in promoting or hindering the 
development of the industry. The evidence from Indonesia has shown that it is 
important to look beyond government policy and understanding the significance of an 
effective and integrated agro-industry to understand the rapid growth of the biofuel 
industry.  
The agrarian policy discussed in Chapter Four has created different consequences 
for the feedstock industries for bioethanol and biodiesel; the former has created an 
ineffective agro-industry, while the latter has experienced the opposite result. The 
analysis has shown how the differences in feedstock production eventually 
influenced the industrial performance of both types of biofuels. For the bioethanol 
industry, the ineffective sugar commodity agro-industry has led to a fragmented 
bioethanol feedstock market. This has created difficulties for the bioethanol industry, 
which has struggled to secure its feedstock and hampered the industry’s ability to 
mass produce bioethanol. This is in contrast to biodiesel, as the strong and 
integrated palm oil agro-industry has provided an advantage to biodiesel producers 
who can obtain feedstock in abundance.  
Taking this further, the analysis in this chapter has shown how the different structure 
of the bioethanol and biodiesel industries has also influenced their respective 
markets. Being positioned as a multipurpose commodity has ensured that bioethanol 
is a product in demand by various industries – not just the fuel industry but also the 
food, pharmaceutical and cigarette industries. Thus, the bioethanol industry prefers 
to supply consumers who do not require compromise on the price of the product, and 
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as a consequence biofuel producers are unable to ensure mass production due to 
constraints in securing feedstock. In contrast, biodiesel is a derivative product of 
palm oil which can flexibly be produced either straight from palm oil or through its 
derivatives. This gives an advantage to the biodiesel companies which can mass 
produce their product and thus widens the market for potential buyers. 
The government’s decision to regulate the biofuel market and authorise Pertamina 
as the sole biofuel-fossil fuel blender has created issues for the domestic biofuel 
market, as the SOE is only willing to buy biofuel if its price is significantly lower than 
its fossil fuel counterpart. This disincentivises the bioethanol industry to produce FE 
to meet domestic demand, as the industry cannot lower its price to meet Pertamina’s 
expectations. Similarly, the biodiesel industry is hesitant to supply the domestic 
market when the overseas market offers a better price than Pertamina. Thus, the 
government’s decision to name Pertamina as the sole biofuel-fossil fuel blender has 
resulted in a lack of growth in the domestic biofuel market.        
The analysis in this chapter has suggested that understanding both the market 
structure and industrial structure for different types of biofuel is important before 
formulating and implementing biofuel policies. Indonesia’s biofuel case study has 
shown that although policies were implemented to control the domestic market, such 
as mandatory blending and subsidies, there was a disregard for the market and 
industrial structures related to the different types of biofuel, culminating in 
unexpected consequences from a policy perspective.  
For bioethanol, the policies worsened the situation and caused the discontinuation of 
the production of fuel grade bioethanol for fuel purposes. For biodiesel, the 
respective policies effectively created a bond between the biodiesel and palm oil 
industries. This gives important insights into part of the story but there is more to be 
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learnt from looking at the underlying politics of Indonesia’s biofuel policy to 
understand why it has not achieved its purpose. Such discussion will bring into view 
consideration of the power relations between the biofuel industry, plantation 
companies, Pertamina and the government. This will be discussed in depth in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Chapter Six 
The Politics of Biofuels:   
A Contested Political Commitment to the Development of Biofuels 
 
This chapter aims to answer the question: How are politics and political processes 
enacted by actors involved in the biofuel energy nexus in ways that have shaped 
biofuel policy and practice? I analyse the way that problems of political will in 
pursuing approaches to biofuel policy and power relations between different actors 
and government departments have led to challenges in formulating biofuel policy and 
ultimately contributed to the reshaping of policy in favour of certain industries, in this 
case the large, private palm oil industry.  
In answering the question above, the analysis is divided in two chapters where 
Chapter 6 focusses on the politics surrounding the failure of the bioethanol program 
and Chapter 7 discusses the politics of palm oil as the ‘winner’ in terms of the 
outcomes of Indonesia’s biofuel policies and politics. The lenses of political ecology 
and agrarian political economy are in this chapter used to understand the power 
relations between different stakeholders involved in the Indonesian biofuel energy 
system. I will focus the analysis on governmental politics and policies and argue that 
these have been a major factor in the constitution of both the failures and successes 
of developing the biofuel industry.  
In this chapter, in addition to my wider data corpus of interviews and documentary 
analysis, I will analyse the data derived from utilizing and reflecting on my personal 
experience as a government employee directly involved in making laws and 
regulations in Indonesia particularly the Law on the State Budget. This experience, 
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despite not being directly related to biofuel policy making, is related to aspects such 
as palm oil industry and energy subsidy policies, as every policy involving 
government funds in Indonesia requires inclusion in the government budget policy. 
Thus, my experience offers useful supplementary data, as I am able to reflect on the 
way regulations are made more generally, particularly the structure and length of the 
processes involved.  
This chapter is composed of three analysis sections. The first section analyses the 
use of fiscal incentives in biofuel policy and the problems related to this that have 
meant the outcomes of the policy are the opposite to those intended. The second 
section discusses how overlapping policies have become a problem for the 
bioethanol industry, in particular, and shows how attempts by the government to 
resolve the emergent problems ultimately escalated the problem contributing to an 
eventual shutdown of this part of the biofuel industry. The third section discusses the 
underlying political economy of biofuel implementation and examines the 
government’s political commitment to developing biofuel, situating it as a contested 
policy. The chapter concludes by arguing that political commitment from the top 
political elite is vital for the growth of the biofuel industry as it gives clear direction for 
government officials in formulating the necessary policies. 
 
6.1. Ineffective Biofuel Policy: Creating Incentives that Disincentivise the 
Biofuel Industry   
In Chapters 4 and 5 I focused on how differing feedstocks and commodity market 
dynamics shaped the biofuel industry with various outcomes for different forms of 
biofuel. For the bioethanol industry, the fragmented market within the bioethanol 
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system created difficulties in the production of bioethanol (FE) at large scale and 
thus made bioethanol companies retract and shrink. Conversely, the biodiesel 
industry was able to grow rapidly due to its cheap and abundant Crude Palm Oil 
(CPO) feedstock, yet its domestic market growth still slowed as most of the biodiesel 
produced was sold to the more lucrative overseas market. In this chapter, I will 
examine in detail the role that politics and policy played in shaping these processes 
with the focus on the bioethanol industry.   
As has been previously discussed in Chapter 5, government policy in regulating the 
biofuel market through implementation of the Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR) Regulation Number 51 (2006) made Pertamina, the state oil 
company, the only buyer of biofuels domestically. Thus, to increase the use of 
biofuel - both bioethanol and biodiesel - in the domestic fuel market, the government 
issued the MEMR Regulation Number 32 (2008) which marked the starting point for 
the mandatory blending policy. Before this policy was implemented, Pertamina only 
blended biofuels with non-subsidized fossil fuel which greatly limited the market for 
biofuels. However, the mandatory blending policy allowed Pertamina to blend biofuel 
with subsidized fossil fuel. The regulation stated: 
“Fuel companies and direct fuel users that implement the mandatory 
blending policy, as well as biofuel companies that supply biofuel for fuel 
companies, can be given both fiscal and non-fiscal incentives.” 
(Ministerial of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation Number 32, 2008, Article 6)    
The excerpt above stated clearly that all three stakeholders involved in the domestic 
fuel market - fossil fuel companies, biofuel companies and fuel consumers - can 
receive incentives from the government. In 2008 the only economic incentives given 
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by the government in the domestic market were fossil fuel subsidies. This subsidy 
policy benefitted both fuel users and Pertamina - the former benefitted from cheap 
fossil fuel prices, while the latter benefitted through increased monetary revenue as 
the government paid fuel subsidies to the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE).  
The implementation of MEMR Regulation Number 32 (2008) can thus be interpreted 
as widening the scope of the current government subsidies to include biofuel, with 
associated positive outcomes for the industry. However, this created problems for 
Pertamina because the government subsidy on fossil fuels had become part of the 
company’s income source and the fossil fuel price was used as a benchmark to 
determine the subsidy amount. Thus, the SOE would lose a portion of its income if it 
chose to buy biofuel; this made it reluctant to purchase supplies from the biofuel 
industry (as discussed in Chapter 5). Added to this, the mandatory blending policy 
was essentially insufficient to make Pertamina comply. As respondent R22 stated: 
“Pertamina is responsible to the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise. 
Meanwhile, the ministry issuing the regulation (mandatory blending target) 
is the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Selling biofuel to 
Pertamina needs to be subsidized since biofuel is more expensive than 
fossil fuel. However, if the biofuel price is more expensive than that of 
fossil fuel, Pertamina will not buy it and the company usually ignores it (the 
mandatory blending target).” 
(R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017)  
Based on the statement above, the respondent claimed that being positioned under 
the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise gave Pertamina the power not to comply with 
the mandatory blending regulations of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 
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particularly if buying fossil fuel was cheaper than biofuel. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that as a state-owned enterprise, Pertamina is only bound by the 
Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise, or that the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources does not have authority to enforce the biofuel policy on Pertamina.  
SOE involvement with the biofuel policy is partly due to the enactment of Presidential 
Regulation Number 5 (2006) and Presidential Instruction Number 1 (2006) - both 
have a stronger authority level than ministerial regulations (see Figure 6.1). 
However, it is MEMR Regulation Number 51 (2006) that involves Pertamina directly 
with the biofuel industry, as this regulation gives the authority to the SOE as a fuel 
blender for blended fuel to be sold in the domestic market (as discussed in Chapter 
5). This ministerial regulation is also a derivative of the respective presidential 
document, meaning that the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources could create 
a policy and force Pertamina to comply with it providing that the policy is supported 
by a higher-level regulation.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Law Number 10/2004 on the Formulation of Regulations 
 
Village Regulation 
 
 
Constitution 
 
Law/Act 
 
Government Regulation 
 
Presidential Regulation 
 
Provincial Government & Ministerial Regulation 
 
District/Municipal Government Regulation 
Figure 6.1 
The Regulation Hierarchy in Indonesia 
RIGID 
FLEXIBLE 
194 
 
Although MEMR 32 (2008) is also a derivative of the respective presidential 
regulation, careful scrutiny of this ministerial policy document has revealed that there 
is no mention within the document of anything that specifically requires the use of the 
fossil fuel subsidy to subsidize biofuel. This creates a loop-hole for Pertamina and 
means that the SOE does not have to use the government subsidy to buy biofuel, as 
the subsidy was originally intended for fossil fuel. There is, thus, no regulation at the 
Ministry level or higher to force Pertamina to use the fossil fuel subsidy to subsidize 
biofuel. Hence, Pertamina could still enjoy the government subsidy without having to 
use it to purchase biofuel.  
Conversely, the biofuel industry, particularly bioethanol companies, would still have 
to compete within the dynamic market regime if they chose to implement the 
government’s mandatory blending policy. Meanwhile, for the biodiesel industry 
complying with the mandatory blending policy would be less profitable than selling its 
product overseas since the domestic market was controlled by Pertamina (as 
discussed in Chapter 5).   
 
Besides the current subsidy policy, there are also other policy incentives given to 
biofuel industries as stipulated in MEMR Regulation Number 32 (2008) (Table 6.1). 
These incentive policies are formulated by the Ministry of Finance given the 
connection to tax, which is under this Ministry’s jurisdiction. Among multiple 
Regulation Name Administering on
Ministerial of Finance Regulation Number 156 (2009) VAT rebate for biofuel transaction in domestic market in 2009 
Ministerial of Finance Regulation Number 21 (2010) Tax and customs incentives for utilization of renewable energy source
Ministerial of Finance Regulation Number 130 (2011) Corporate tax reduction or exemption incentive
Government Regulation Number 52 (2011) Income tax incentive for investment in certain sectors and/or regional areas
Sources: Author documentation
Table 6.1
Fiscal Incentives Provided by the Government
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incentives, only the Minister of Finance (MoF) Regulation Number 156 (2009) is 
solely dedicated to biofuel development, with the other regulations concerning the 
incentives for general investment in Indonesia. However, this fiscal incentive created 
major problems for the biofuel industry as it inadvertently had an adverse impact on 
the industry’s cash flow due to the arduous nature of government bureaucracy in 
Indonesia. As respondent R1 stated: 
“The government gave us many fiscal incentives, but most of them are 
useless. For instance, we can’t use an incentive like value added tax 
(VAT) rebate because it takes 7 months for the restitution process. 
Although we received our tax rebate, we lost some portion of our money 
due to interest expenditure, since we used bank loans as our capital. And 
that is a huge cost for us.” 
“You’re only eligible to apply for it (a VAT rebate) if your company has 
been audited by a public accountant for 3 consecutive years, and there is 
not even one company that has been established for 3 years. Some 
(biofuel) companies are just newly established for 3 months or 6 months, 
so these incentives are worthless. Thus, we refuse them (incentives) since 
it is useless to provide fiscal incentives that we cannot use.”  
(R1, Biofuel companies’ representatives, May 2017)  
According to R1’s first statement, the government had provided fiscal incentives for 
biofuel companies, but these incentives could not be enjoyed by their intended 
recipients, because biofuel companies had to face arduous bureaucracies that 
forced them to wait for several months in order to being refunded. Such a situation 
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happened because the respective regulation needed another regulation to enable its 
timely execution as the regulation stated: 
“The procedures for the administration of taxation are needed to 
implement this Ministerial of Finance Regulation which will be regulated by 
The Director General of Taxes Regulation.” 
(Ministerial of Finance Regulation Number 156, 2009, Article 5) 
Based on the above excerpt, a derivative regulation is required to execute the 
respective MoF Regulation and this process can take months. This confirms the first 
statement from respondent R1 above that disbursement of VAT rebates takes a very 
long time and can negatively impact the finances of a biofuel company. Fiscal 
incentives for the biofuel industry are supposed to help strengthen its capital turn-
over which would subsequently increase biofuel production. However, in reality, the 
incentives have caused the industry to lose money by disrupting its cash flow. 
Moreover, in his second statement R1 also indicates that these incentives would be 
useless anyway as many biofuel companies are unable to access them given the 
auditing requirements to make companies eligible. Thus, there is some policy 
inconsistency evident - there is a mismatch between the purposes of the policy and 
the way to access it that does not meet the expectations or requirements of the 
nascent biofuel industry.  
Meanwhile, the other fiscal incentive policies are essentially formulated for general 
investment in Indonesia, where the biofuel industry could be included providing the 
investment met the terms and conditions stipulated by each policy. These fiscal 
incentives are mainly targeted at attracting new investment into Indonesia meaning 
existing biofuel companies (bioethanol and biodiesel) are again mostly unable to 
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meet the requirements, because they had started their operations before the 
mandatory blending policy was implemented (see Chapter 5). Thus, the fiscal 
incentives provided by the government for the biofuel industry ultimately became 
meaningless, only serving as a supportive policy on paper.  
The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources stipulated that the biofuel industry 
would receive fiscal incentives. Nonetheless, any fiscal incentives given to an 
industry must meet a standard approved by the Ministry of Finance. This means 
there are two government bodies with differing authority, but with roles in 
administering the same policy. On the one hand, officials from the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources are likely to understand the current state of the biofuel 
industry (bioethanol and biodiesel). Yet, they may not understand the requirements 
that private institutions have to meet in order to receive fiscal incentives. On the 
other hand, officials from the Ministry of Finance focus on assessing the level of 
investment that makes a company eligible for fiscal incentives e.g. the amount of 
investment, the number of jobs created, the location and the source of input material. 
Biofuel is just one type of investment that needs to fit the standards of the Ministry of 
Finance to receive fiscal incentives, disregarding factors that are specific to the 
biofuel industry such as its market, industrial structure and previous agricultural 
policies (discussed in previous chapters). As such, problems emerged since officials 
in both units were only focused on their respective tasks and processes without 
seeing the bigger picture for Indonesia’s biofuel industry.  
Thus, it is suggested that both government bodies have their respective authorities in 
designing a policy and neither body wants its authority to be compromised by other 
government bodies. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources has the authority 
to set the target for the biofuel policy, but it cannot design the types of incentive that 
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fit the biofuel industry. The Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, is in charge of 
designing the fiscal incentive policy, but in doing so, it cannot produce too many 
policies that appear to favour a particular industry, since its primary concern is 
general investment and biofuel is just one among many industries. This suggests the 
reason for only one policy solely dedicated to the biofuel industry being issued by the 
respective Ministry (see Table 6.1).   
Current literature using the lenses of political ecology and agrarian political economy 
has shown that requiring mandatory biofuel use within domestic fuel markets has 
been an effective policy instrument promoting the success of the biofuel industry in 
countries such as the US and Brazil (Gillon, 2010; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; 
Oliviera et al., 2017). Although these previous studies did not discuss government 
policy documents meticulously, they do highlight policy success in encouraging 
biofuel companies to increase production in an attempt to achieve government 
targets. They argue that this has been, in part, due to the ways that such 
government policies were able to give certainty to the biofuel industry, offering 
security for investment. In the context of Indonesia’s biofuel policy, however, any 
potential success of the mandatory blending policy remains unrealised as the biofuel 
industry is unable to benefit from such a policy owing largely to ineligibility and 
bureaucratic processes that make it economically unviable. These problems with the 
existing processes associated with the mandatory blending policy and other fiscal 
incentives are well recognised by the industry and a source of frustration. As 
respondent R22 stated: 
“We’re doing this business for profit not for charity. The government should 
give a proper incentive that makes our return faster, economical and so 
on.” 
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(R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017) 
Based on R22’s statement, it is suggested that government incentives must be 
financially beneficial for biofuel companies, since that is the main reason for them to 
enter the biofuel business.  
The apparent inability by the different government ministries to formulate incentives 
that can truly benefit the biofuel industry has, in reality, disincentivised the industry 
as regards strengthening the domestic biofuel market. This is partly because the 
policies are, in practice, not being utilised; the fiscal incentives are not specifically 
crafted for the biofuel sector given their distinctive characteristics and the mandatory 
blending policy is ambivalent towards the biofuel industry, allowing for continued use 
of fossil fuels. This situation makes the government’s political commitment in 
pursuing biofuel policy questionable - the policy has been created and executed, yet 
the government’s actions in terms of implementation and ensuring outcomes are 
inconsistent. This inconsistency within government policy and actions relating to the 
biofuel policy has had serious implications for the bioethanol industry as one part of 
the biofuel industry (and in contrast with the biodiesel industry which will be 
discussed in Chapter 7). This forms the focus of the next section. 
 
6.2.  The Case of Bioethanol: Policy and Politics in the Eventual Shutdown of 
the Bioethanol Industry 
Chapter 5 discussed market competition between different consumers of bioethanol 
that caused a mismatch in the price expectation between Pertamina, as the sole 
consumer of bioethanol and bioethanol (FE) producers. Pertamina expected the 
price of bioethanol to be competitive with its fossil fuel counterpart, while the 
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bioethanol companies could only offer prices based on their production costs. This 
section turns the focus away from markets and onto the roles of policy and politics, 
looking at the ways these shaped and contributed to the demise of bioethanol. 
Moreover, the section also explores some of the concepts from the literature about 
policy governance in order to help explain overlapping policy and policy conflict.  
Fowler and Johnson (2017) argue that energy policy is not the responsibility of a 
single government body and thus, addressing it improperly could create 
consequences for the government itself. This would be the case the biofuel policy in 
Indonesia, particularly the bioethanol programme, as there are two government 
ministries in Indonesia managing different policies on bioethanol. One key issue that 
emerged for the domestic sale of bioethanol was the existence of ‘overlapping’ 
policies between biofuel and excise tax. In what follows, the analysis explains how a 
conflict between these two areas of policy would have severe consequences for 
Indonesia’s bioethanol programme. Moreover, it also shows how the government did 
not intervene by effectively resolving this policy conflict issue. Instead, the 
government introduced another policy - a subsidy for the bioethanol industry - with 
the expectation to resolve any problems entangling the industry. However, instead of 
being a problem solver, this policy worsened the issues to the point where the 
bioethanol industry stopped producing fuel grade bioethanol.  
The first policy of importance in this part of the analysis is a 1995 policy that 
prohibited the sale of alcohol in Indonesia and introduced high tax tariffs on any 
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associated products, such as ethanol. This was stipulated in Law Number 11 on 
Excise (1995)12: 
“Excise is imposed on Excise Goods consisting of: 
a. ethyl alcohol or ethanol, ignoring the ingredients used and the 
manufacturing process; 
b. alcoholic beverages of any percentage, ignoring the ingredients used 
and the manufacturing process, including concentrates containing ethyl 
alcohol; 
c. tobacco products, which include cigarettes, cigars, leaf cigarettes, sliced 
tobacco, and the results of other tobacco processing.” 
(Law Number 11/1995, Article 4) 
From the excerpt above, the Law on Excise (1995) made a very clear statement that 
ethanol regardless of material origin, production method, purpose or purity is subject 
to excise tax. Moreover, this tax is for the consumer, where the buyers of bioethanol 
will have to pay. This law has the following purposes: 
“The tariff imposed is not oriented on (government) revenue aspects, but 
on aspects of production and consumption restrictions for certain goods in 
which their nature or characteristics have a negative impact on health, 
environment, and social order such as liquor where the way to limit it is 
through tariff instruments.” 
(Law Number 11/1995, Explanatory chapter Article 5 point 1) 
From the excerpt above, it is explained that the tax imposed on bioethanol is 
because it is used to make liquor and the government wanted to tax liquor given its 
negative impact on health and social order. Indeed, there are numerous media 
                                                          
12 Although the Law on Excise was amended in 2007, the aspects discussed in this section did not 
change in the amended law with the exception of the tax rate. 
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reports about abuse of ethanol, where it is used as a mixture in a compound to make 
intoxicating drinks and causes fatality to many who consume it. Although the number 
of casualties for etanol abuse before 1995 is uncertain due to difficulties in finding 
such data, a recent media report stated that more than 600 deaths occurred between 
2008 and 2016 due to the consumption of liquor made with an illegal mixture of 
ethanol (Tribunnews.com, 9 April 2018). Moreover, the Global Agriculture 
Information Network (GAIN) Report (2006) also mentions that the food and 
beverages industries, that also include the alcoholic beverages industry, use 
bioethanol with a purity of 99.95%, which is equal to fuel grade bioethanol or fuel 
ethanol (FE). Thus, bioethanol inadvertently became a focus for the government as it 
can be used legally by the liquor industry or illegally by irresponsible individuals. This 
became a justification for the government to regulate and impose excise tax on 
bioethanol.  
The excise tax imposed on bioethanol would serve as a means to increase the price 
of bioethanol, far exceeding the cost of its production, as the law stated: 
 “The tax rate for bioethanol is 250% of the factory sale price or 55% of the 
retail price.”  
(Law Number 11/1995, Article 5)13  
Based on the above excerpt, the consumer would have to pay 3.5 times more for 
bioethanol if it is bought from the bioethanol factory. Conversely, consumers would 
only pay 1.5 times more if the respective bioethanol is sold by the industry that buys 
                                                          
13 The excise law was amended in 2007 and increased the tax rate for bioethanol to 1,150% of factory 
sale price and 80% of retail price. As the law was amended after the government implemented its 
biofuel policy in 2006, it also meant that bioethanol would carry the new tariff which further increased 
its price on the market. 
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the product from the bioethanol factory, providing that the respective product also 
has excise tax imposed such as with cigarettes and liquor. This would mean buying 
bioethanol from the factory would be more expensive than just buying a product that 
contains bioethanol. In the context of fuel grade bioethanol, Pertamina as a 
bioethanol buyer, is categorized as a consumer buying bioethanol straight from the 
factory. This means the SOE, as well as other industries that are categorized as 
direct consumers of bioethanol, could be charged the highest tax rate. 
However, article 9 of this law stipulated the exceptions for bioethanol that could be 
free from the excise tax: 
“Excise exemption can be given for Excise Goods: 
a. used as raw or supplementary materials in making non-excisable 
goods; 
b. for the purposes of scientific research and development; 
c. for the purposes of representatives of foreign countries and their 
officials serving in Indonesia based on the reciprocity principle; 
d. for the needs of foreign workers in international bodies or organizations 
in Indonesia; 
e. carried by passengers, crews of transport facilities, border crossers or 
foreign packages (with certain quantity and price limitations); 
f. used for social purposes; 
g. put in a Bonded Stockpiling Zone.” 
  (Law Number 11/1995, Article 9) 
  Moreover, a point (a) of explanation of this law stated:  
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“Excise clearance facilities based on the provisions in this letter (point a) are 
intended to support growth or industrial development that uses excise 
goods as raw materials or auxiliary materials in the manufacture of finished 
goods which are not excisable goods, both for export and for purposes of 
domestic marketing, such as ethyl alcohol used as a raw material or 
auxiliary material in making ethyl acetate, acetic acid, drugs and so on.” 
(Law Number 11/1995, Explanation of Article 9) 
From these excerpts, it is evident that other industries such as those making ethyl 
acetate, acetic acid and pharmaceuticals are exempt from excise tax; this is clearly 
stated in the law. This means these industries can buy bioethanol (FE) without the 
excise tax. However, Pertamina cannot obtain an exemption as it is not specifically 
stated by the law, as the excise law was made a decade before the implementation 
of the biofuel policy. Such a condition suggests that policy makers at that time were 
unaware that bioethanol could also be used for fuel purposes. This has created a 
disadvantage for the bioethanol industry wanting to sell bioethanol for fuel purposes, 
because Pertamina is reluctant to buy expensive bioethanol, when the blended fuel 
would prove an expensive fuel product for regular fuel customers as compared to 
fossil fuel (pure gasoline) products which are much cheaper.  
When the government implemented its biofuel policy in 2006, the policy regulation 
used was Presidential Regulation Number 5 (2006) which has less legal strength 
than the Law on Excise (see Figure 6.1). This means that biofuel policy regulation 
and subsequent related regulations cannot override excise policy which is higher in 
the regulation hierarchy. Thus, excise law is the regulation with which government 
authorities comply, which undermines biofuel policy.  
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As the second highest in the regulation hierarchy, the Excise Law would be difficult 
to amend. It would require the Indonesian Parliament to sit with the government, with 
both consenting to the proposed amendment. Furthermore, an excise tax exemption 
for bioethanol (FE) for the purpose of blending with fossil fuel, could potentially 
attract an intense debate of pros and cons in the Parliament due to the continued 
prevalence of ethanol abuse in society as described above. Based on my experience 
of law making, such a discussion could take months if not years which would be 
detrimental to the development of the domestic FE industry. This is because the 
bioethanol industry would still be taxed if it produced bioethanol for fuel purposes 
which then disincentives the industry in terms of growth. 
This wider policy context which found biofuel policy (specifically that relating to 
bioethanol) unexpectedly at cross purposes with excise policy, created catastrophic 
impacts for the industry. In particular, small scale bioethanol producers who 
attempted to produce the product for fuel purposes were badly affected by the policy 
conflict. As a member of the Bioethanol Producers Association stated in a media 
interview: 
"We just knew that ethanol (for fuel purposes) is associated with prohibited 
alcohol production, and subject to excise. Thus, we need to obtain 
complicated business licenses. Otherwise, we can be arrested by the 
police and pay a fine.” 
(Setyo Budi, Member of APBI, BBC Indonesia 28 October 2012) 
From the excerpt above, it seems small scale bioethanol producers were not initially 
expecting their product to incur excise tax as they intended to produce bioethanol for 
fuel purposes. However, since small scale bioethanol producers were unable to 
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produce fuel grade ethanol (as discussed in Chapter 5) their product was 
categorized as controlled alcohol production, which meant they needed to obtain a 
special licence just to sell their product.  
The small-scale bioethanol producers already faced problems of limited feedstock 
input and lack of buyers, as Pertamina did not want to buy the non-fuel grade 
bioethanol produced. The conflict between biofuel and excise tax policies was the 
final blow and hundreds of small-scale bioethanol producers shut-down their 
operations (BBC Indonesia, 28 October 2012). Large scale bioethanol producers still 
produce bioethanol (FE), yet they only do so to fulfil the requirements of domestic 
industries that need this product for non-fuel purposes and are thus exempt from the 
tax. Meanwhile, Pertamina’s demand for bioethanol (FE) is very limited due to the 
product being too expensive for the company to make a profit. This suggests that the 
excise tax embedded in the bioethanol (FE) price also disincentives the SOE from 
increasing its demand for the product. 
Surprisingly, during the interviews, none of my respondents from amongst the 
government representatives, particularly those in the Ministry of Finance and Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources, ever spoke about the excise tax being imposed 
on bioethanol for fuel purposes as a problem for biofuel policy implementation. This 
suggests that officials in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources are not aware 
of the excise tax policy mechanism since it is not a key obligation that they 
understand it. Meanwhile, their Ministry of Finance counterparts do not appear to be 
aware that bioethanol can be used for fuel purposes.  
Based on this observation, it is possible to suggest that officials in the respective 
ministries are focused on their own issues rather than comprehending the bigger 
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picture. This is also suggestive of the difficulty of cross government cooperation in 
the policy implementation process, especially if there are different policies 
administered by different government bodies. Both ministries, with their respective 
authorities, are again unable to comprehend the problem and thus resolve it, which, 
in this context, would involve finding a solution for the excise tax being imposed on 
bioethanol.  
However, instead of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources collaborating to find the right solution for the tax imposed on bioethanol, 
the latter just issued another biofuel regulation. This policy was implemented through 
MEMR Decree Number 219 (2010), which regulated the disbursement of the 
government subsidies dedicated to the biofuel industry (Figure 6.2). This policy 
regulation was administered solely by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 
thus minimizing the problems of policy conflict that happened with the other 
incentives given to the biofuel industry and avoiding the problem of tax on 
bioethanol. This policy was expected to help the biofuel industry to thrive, since the 
subsidy covered the difference between the production cost and the sale price which 
included all the taxes imposed on biofuel. Thus, the biofuel industry would be 
expected to make a profit and this would incentivise it to increase production.  
 
Figure 6.2 
Bioethanol Subsidy Schemes 
 
Subsidy = Argus Price (FOB Thailand) * 5% * 788 kg/m3 – Fuel Retail Price 
 
Source: Based on the Ministerial of Energy and Mineral Resources Decree Number 219 (2010) 
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Based on Figure 6.2, the conversion cost for the bioethanol subsidy is the Argus 
Price with an additional profit margin of 5%. The Argus Price publication is “a daily 
report that provides key international insights into the biodiesel, ethanol and 
feedstock markets” (www.argusmedia.com, 2018). Thus, the government would use 
the nearest commodity market in the region that also sells bioethanol (FE) as a 
selling price benchmark for the domestic bioethanol (FE) market. A percentage (5%) 
is added that resembles the production cost and the profit margin for domestic 
bioethanol producers. Moreover, since biofuel is produced from feedstock that is 
measured by weight, a conversion factor is added to convert weight (kilogrammes) to 
volume (litres) which is a fixed amount. However, the conversion cost is a key 
problem for biofuel producers because it is lower than the actual cost of producing 
biofuel. As the Head of APROBI (Asosiasi Produsen Biofuel/Biofuel Producers 
Association) stated in a media interview: 
“Domestic bioethanol production has stopped, because, the subsidy given 
is not enough to cover the production cost of bioethanol.” 
(Paulus Tcakrawan interviewed by Tempo.co, 28 November 2010) 
Based on the above excerpt, the implementation of the biofuel subsidy policy has 
created the adverse consequence of the discontinuation of bioethanol (FE) 
production. The bioethanol industry was dealt a fatal blow as the government 
decision to use the foreign market to benchmark the price for domestic bioethanol 
production did not reflect the true cost for domestic producers of producing 
bioethanol. The foreign bioethanol market did not have the specific aspects that 
negatively impacted the industry in Indonesia such as the agrarian policy on 
feedstock (explained in Chapter 4) and the fragmentation of the domestic bioethanol 
209 
 
market (explained in Chapter 5). The fact that bioethanol production ceased 
indicates that the subsidy that the government allocated to the domestic bioethanol 
industry was insufficient to cover bioethanol (FE) production costs. Since bioethanol 
companies did not want to sell their product at a price below the production cost, 
they chose not to produce fuel grade bioethanol for Pertamina as there was no profit 
in doing so.     
The case of Indonesia’s bioethanol programme and the useless incentives for biofuel 
producers (discussed above) highlight that there has been a contrasting outcome as 
compared to other biofuel case studies discussed in the literature (e.g. Boras Jr et 
al., 2011; Oliviera et al., 2017; Gillon, 2016; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011). This can 
be explained when the political and policy contexts are examined, as they have been 
here. The examination has shown that there is an issue of overlapping policies with 
each administered by different government bodies (Fowler and Johnson, 2017). 
Such an issue has impeded the effectiveness of policy implementation particularly 
for policies that require inter-ministry coordination such as biofuels (Byrne et al., 
2007).  
The analysis further highlights the failure of the government to address the problem 
effectively. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources chose to maintain the 
status quo and decided to implement a subsidy policy for the biofuel industry that 
was expected to be the solution for the entire problem engulfing the development of 
domestic biofuel. However, instead of resolving the problem, the subsidy policy only 
worsened it by providing a subsidy amount that did not cover biofuel production 
costs if producers chose to sell their product to Pertamina. For the biodiesel 
companies, they had another option available – to sell their product overseas due to 
the strong palm oil industry that provided an abundance of feedstock (see Chapter 
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5). However, in contrast, the combination of insufficient government incentives and 
absence of an integrated agro-industry, along with a fragmented bioethanol market 
caused the bioethanol industry to cease production of fuel grade bioethanol for fuel 
purposes, effectively ending the bioethanol programme in Indonesia.  
The Indonesian bioethanol programme indicates the challenges faced by the 
different ministries to comprehensively formulate a policy so that the domestic biofuel 
industry can thrive - and is also suggestive of the complicated underlying political 
economy in Indonesia. Fowler and Johnson (2017) argue the need for different 
government institutions to sit down together and collaborate to resolve their common 
problems. Their research found that the failure of government institutions to do so 
had reduced the policy effectiveness of the US energy policy, where inter-
governmental bodies were in dispute over who had the right to change the electricity 
tariff. The case of bioethanol in Indonesia also highlights problems of policy conflict 
between different government bodies which has resulted in policy failure, rather than 
just policy ineffectiveness. The government officials from the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources were unable to come together to find 
an appropriate solution when formulating the biofuel policy. This suggests that 
collaboration between government bodies could potentially settle policy conflict, 
whilst lack of collaboration and policy ignorance will eventually impact the overall 
outcome of policy implementation.  
The adverse impact of the implementation of subsidies for the biofuel industry has 
further shown the complicated politics behind the construction of biofuel policy. I 
argue that these are, in part, related to the government’s political commitment to 
implementing the policy. This suggests the necessity for political elites such as the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia to intervene, as this involvement of high-level 
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officials could potentially settle the problem - which itself suggests insights regarding 
the underlying politics that have shaped biofuel policy. In the next section I will 
address the wider political context for the developments highlighted thus far and 
examine processes of policy implementation to develop further insight into the issue.   
   
6.3. Uncovering the Politics behind Biofuel Policy 
Thus far, this chapter has discussed the failure of different government bodies to 
harmonize the implementation of biofuel policy. These analyses show the tendency 
of different government ministries to create policies according to their individual 
authority without seeing the bigger picture. Following Fowler and Johnson’s (2017) 
argument, there is a need for cross ministry coordination to resolve the problems that 
arise during policy implementation. In the context of biofuels, Stattman et al (2013) 
conducted a study in Brazil and their research showed that biofuel policy is not a 
policy formulated by a single government body. Instead, it is a comprehensive policy 
where multiple government bodies with different types of authority are involved. As 
such, there is a need to coordinate at national level to ensure each government body 
consistently implements the biofuel policy (Byrne et al., 2007). 
Thus, I will move the analysis to the high-level politics of energy in Indonesia, which 
is represented within a government agency called Dewan Energi Nasional (DEN) or 
the National Energy Board. This government body has tasks stipulated by a 
Presidential regulation as follows: 
“a. design and formulate national energy policies to be implemented by the 
government with parliament’s approval; 
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b. formulate general national energy plans; 
c. formulate steps to overcome crisis conditions and energy emergencies; 
and 
d. supervise energy policy implementation across the intragovernmental 
sector.” 
(Presidential Regulation Number 26/2008, Article 3) 
DEN is led personally by the President of the Republic of Indonesia with members 
ranging from ministers to public stakeholders (see Table 6.2). DEN members are 
appointed and dismissed by the President and members from the stakeholders’ side 
must also have Parliament’s consent before being appointed by the President.  
   
Based on the excerpt from the Presidential Regulation, DEN has authority to 
supervise energy policy during formulation and implementation and when involving 
different government bodies. Moreover, Table 6.2 also shows that both the Minister 
of Finance and the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources are included on the 
board. This suggests that cross ministry coordination is expected when formulating 
Stakeholders
Minister of Finance 8 people representing stakeholders consisting of
Minister of Planning and Development 2 university academics
Minister of Transportation 2 Practitioners in the energy industry
Minister of Industry 1 expert in energy technology 
Minister of Agriculture 1 environmentalist
2 public energy users
Minister of Environment and Forestry
Source: Based on Presidential Regulation Number 26 (2008)
Members
Government
Minister of Research, Technology and 
Higher Education
Table 6.2
Board of Leaders
Structure of the National Energy Board (DEN)
Chairman: President of the Republic of Indonesia
Vice Chairman: Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia
Executive Director: Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources
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energy policy, such as policies relating to biofuels - and any problems emerging 
when formulating such policy should be resolved during DEN meetings.  
The issue of excise tax being imposed on bioethanol for fuel purposes was of 
concern to one DEN member (from the stakeholders’ side) when he made a media 
statement: 
“To encourage the use of bioethanol, it is expected that the Minister of 
Finance will reconsider the excise imposed to use ethanol as fuel.” 
(Syamsir Abduh, Kontan.co.id, 12 October, 2017)  
In this excerpt, the DEN member appeals to the Minister of Finance to urgently 
review the policy on excise tax for bioethanol (FE). However, the respective DEN 
member made his statement in the media on 12 October 2017, but the domestic 
bioethanol industry had already stopped producing bioethanol (FE) for Pertamina 
back in 2010. This suggests that the issue may have been discussed within a DEN 
meeting, but any attempt to address the excise tax on bioethanol (FE) was 
unsuccessful, as there is no obvious action from the government. There is an 
insightful statement by respondent R9: 
“During regular DEN meetings, members of DEN from the government 
side are usually represented by their subordinates who are high ranking 
government officials such as echelon 1 or the minister’s expert staff. As 
representatives of their respective ministers, their decisions are supposed 
to mirror their minister’s decision. However, in a larger forum session 
attended by the ministers, decisions made by their representatives are 
usually changed by their bosses (the respective ministers). Thus, the 
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discussion that already reached a conclusion could go back to zero and 
we must discuss again from the beginning. This situation also happens in 
assembly meetings with the President.” 
(R9, Member of National Energy Board, May 2017) 
According to Presidential Regulation Number 26 (2008), DEN should have an 
assembly meeting led by the President at least twice a year and regular meetings led 
by the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources once every two months. 
Furthermore, to increase their working efficiency, the Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Resources can create a task force which consists of members from the stakeholder 
side with high-level government officials appointed by their respective ministers. 
These government officials are supposed to have the same authority as their 
respective chief in terms of making decisions and collaborating with other members 
to resolve issues around energy policy, such as the ineffective fiscal incentives given 
to the biofuel industry and the tax imposed on bioethanol. However, the statement by 
respondent R9 suggests that consensus reached in meetings with these government 
officials is often annulled or altered in the wider forum attended by Ministers. One 
plausible explanation for this is that every DEN member from the government side 
maintains their own views of a particular issue in accordance with their authority and 
disregards the bigger picture. 
Since DEN is led by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, every dispute 
between members of DEN, particularly the Ministers, is supposed to be settled in the 
meeting led by the President. However, this aim has never been reached as 
Respondent R9 further stated: 
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“Initially, the President said that he would focus on completing RUEN (the 
National Energy General Plan). But, he started to have doubts since there 
were still debatable issues. Thus, we have to review again and he refused 
to sign before everything is clear.” 
(R9, Member of the National Energy Board, May 2017) 
R9’s statement indicates that the President is reluctant to meddle if there is a dispute 
in the formulation of energy policy and he prefers his subordinates (the Ministers) to 
resolve disputes on energy related issues. Thus, it is suggested that the President 
wants his Ministers to compromise and resolve any problems that emerge. Yet, there 
are still problems (as discussed in the earlier section of this chapter) suggesting that 
the Ministers are still attached to their own views of the policy in accordance with 
their authority and with little compromise. This creates a huge problem as political 
elites, such as the President and the Ministers, do not have a strong commitment to 
implementing energy policies, such as the biofuel policy. R9 articulated this in 
another statement in which he questioned the President’s actions rhetorically: 
“That is what happened so far when there were problems; we brought the 
issue to the plenary session with the President. For the President, well, we 
just give him the pros and cons of every option and he will have to make 
the decision. The President can respond either with (presidential) 
instructions or other policy instruments. But, in this democratic system he 
(the President) cannot be authoritarian or perhaps he is just doubtful (in 
making decisions). This can happen due to various reasons. It can be that 
there is conflict of interest with his constituents or he has a political debt 
with his campaign supporters.”  
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(R9, Member of the National Energy Board, May 2017) 
Based on the above excerpt, it is suggested that even the highest political authority 
such as the President can be indecisive in making an executive decision for political 
reasons. This can hinder political efficiency in resolving pressing issues such as the 
biofuel policy problems discussed above. As R9 further stated: 
“Energy affairs are directly related to politics. So, sometimes the policy 
made was good, but implementing it was rather half hearted.” 
“Even though the policy is made, there is a serious problem namely 
leadership commitment in terms of implementation as some inconsistency 
remains in the policy.” 
(R9, Member of the National Energy Board, May 2017) 
The statement by respondent R9 implies that the government’s intention to pursue a 
biofuel policy is a positive response to help resolve Indonesia’s energy security 
issue, but that its implementation is less than effective. He further explains that 
although the government has made policies to develop the domestic biofuel industry, 
some policy inconsistency exists and there is not an effective response to resolve it. 
This suggests that there is insufficient political commitment, particularly from the 
political elites, in developing the biofuel industry - R9 describes it as a lack of 
“leadership commitment”. This relates to the contested political issues evident in 
biofuel policy implementation - there is the intention to develop biofuel, but there is 
no strong commitment to fulfil the intention.  
217 
 
The insufficient political support of the political elites has created negative impacts 
for the government officials who are drafting the policy documents. As respondent 
R11 stated: 
“We need a clear direction in developing biofuel policy and that could 
come from a Government Regulation or Presidential Regulation. If we still 
insist on doing it without support from any of these regulations, we are 
susceptible to claims of criminalization (should the policy fail).”  
(R11, Government officials’ representative, May 2017) 
In the excerpt above, the respondent emphasizes the importance of producing or 
drafting a regulation that is supported by a higher-level regulation, which he implies 
could include a policy document signed by the President. The existence of such a 
document is essential as government officials need to take due care in formulating a 
regulation, particularly if it involves spending government funds for example 
designing a subsidy policy for the biofuel industry. A biofuel policy that regulates the 
mandatory blending target and the subsidy are only regulations at a ministerial level, 
which is lower in hierarchy than a presidential regulation (see Figure 6.1 above). 
This is in contrast to fossil fuel subsidies, as these are stipulated by a presidential 
regulation (Presidential Regulation Number 55, 2005). Creating a biofuel subsidy 
policy without any higher-level regulation to support it could put certain high-ranking 
government officials in a precarious position. This is because there is no justification 
that could support their decision should the policy fail and the government suffer loss 
of public funds; the officials involved in the formulation of the respective policy 
regulation would ultimately bear responsibility for this. 
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A further important point of discussion when seeking to uncover the politics shaping 
biofuel policy is the government’s vested interests in the SOE - Pertamina. The 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources is not only in charge of administering the 
biofuel subsidy policy but is also in charge of administering fossil fuel subsidies. 
However, unlike the biofuel subsidy policy that hampers the industry, the fossil fuel 
subsidy is essentially generating revenue for its recipient - Pertamina - which is the 
reason the SOE is hesitant to buy biofuel to partially substitute subsidized fossil fuel 
(as discussed previously). This is again suggestive of a lack of political will within 
biofuel policy implementation, since the government has failed to address the 
differential implications of subsidy schemes for biofuels and fossil fuels. As R9 
states: 
“There is a perception that there is a desire by some people, let’s just say 
oil "mafias" to disturb this (biofuel business). Because, if the utilization of 
biofuel increases in the domestic market, fossil fuel imports will decrease 
which greatly impacts their business.”    
(R9, Member of the National Energy Board, May 2017) 
The above excerpt provides a clue that there are certain actors involved with the oil 
industry who potentially meddle in the formulation of policy for developing biofuel. 
Interestingly, respondent R1 explained: 
“Biofuel is categorized as oil and gas, so it must be discussed by the oil 
and gas directorate.” 
(R1, Biofuel company representative, May 2017) 
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R1 highlights that biofuel was initially considered as part of the oil and gas policy and 
discussed by officials from the Directorate General of Oil and Gas under the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources. Thus, even within this Ministry biofuel policy 
formulation involves people who are already accustomed to oil policy development. 
The evidence becomes clearer as the regulation states: 
“The price index for oil fuel markets and the price index for the biofuel 
market is set every month by the Director General of Oil and Gas.” 
(Ministerial of Energy and Mineral Resources, Decree Number 219, 2010) 
The excerpt from this ministerial regulation indicates that the biofuel subsidy policy 
was formulated by government officials from the Directorate General of Oil and Gas 
whose main task was regulating the oil business. Moreover, the leader of this unit is 
the person in charge of deciding the price indexes that determine the level of 
government subsidy (see Figure 6.2 and Figure 5.6). Added to this, the same 
person also holds a position as a member of the Board of Commission at Pertamina 
(www.finance.detik.com, 6 May 2010). Thus, there is a potential conflict of interest 
between designing the biofuel and fossil fuel policies. This is not a straightforward 
story about vested interests per se but attests to the deeper roots of incumbency. 
The notion of incumbency can be seen in the literature on energy transition (Geels et 
al., 2017) and socio-technical change (Bijker, 1994) where deployment of a new low 
carbon energy initiative is seen as a threat to the already established fossil based 
energy industry - in this context, biofuels would have a disruptive business effect on 
fossil fuels. Important to this story are the skills and positions of people who have 
worked with(in) the oil industry for many years. Such existing entanglements are not 
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easily shifted or reshaped to the delivery of support for new forms of energy that 
appear to pose a threat to the existing industry.  
Having a double position, such as an elite government official and commissioner of a 
state-owned enterprise, is common practise in Indonesia as stated by two 
government Ministers in media interviews: 
“This government ownership (of the SOE) needs to be represented by the 
government itself. So, if the government has a company, it is common to 
put government officials in this company.” 
(Asman Abnur, Minister of Empowerment of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform in 
an interview with www.industry.co.id, 8 July 2017) 
“In my opinion, for supervising and coaching purposes, there is no harm in 
having a double position (such as for a government official to be an SOE 
commissioner).” 
(Rini Soemarno, Minister of State-Owned Enterprise in an interview with 
www.tribunnews.com, 12 June 2017) 
Mr. Abnur’s statement indicates that appointing high-ranking government officials as 
commissioners of a state-owned enterprise is not just common, but also necessary. 
Moreover, Mrs. Soemarno’s statement resonates with Mr. Abnur’s statement as she 
also emphasizes that there is no conflict of interest for those with a double position, 
as a commissioner’s task is only to supervise and not meddle in the SOE’s 
operations. However, having a double position is also controversial as stated by the 
Head of the Corruption Eradication Commission: 
221 
 
“If you pay attention to the Law on Public Services, actually a government 
official cannot be a company commissioner.”  
(Agus Raharjo in an interview with www.jurnas.com, 17 November 2016) 
The excerpt above suggests that not all political elites in Indonesia agree with double 
positions such as a government official being an SOE commissioner. However, such 
controversies are beyond the scope of this thesis. Although Mrs. Soemarno claims 
that having a double position will not create a conflict of interest, when being in such 
a position it is always plausible that the incumbent may have an interest in creating 
government policy that favours the respective SOE. In the context of biofuel policy, it 
is customary for high ranking government officials from the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources, specifically those in the Directorate General of Oil and Gas, to 
be commissioners for Pertamina or its subsidiary companies. Thus, whilst the double 
position held by certain individuals in this Ministry may not affect Pertamina’s 
company policies, it may affect the policy the government makes in terms of its 
implications for Pertamina.  
Since the above analysis indicates insufficient political commitment from the top 
political elite, particularly in directing the way the subsidy should be disbursed for the 
biofuel industry, favouring Pertamina could prove a preferable situation for those in 
charge of formulating the biofuel subsidy. For Pertamina, the subsidy received will 
become its revenue - the government could tax it and the government as the owner 
of Pertamina could also claim a portion of the revenue as a yearly dividend. This 
means a significant portion of the government’s disbursed funds will return to the 
government budget, while the remainder of the funds will become an asset for 
Pertamina (which is itself a government asset). Conversely, the biofuel companies 
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are owned by private stakeholders and thus a portion of the government subsidies 
will become part of the companies’ revenue; this money will only return to the 
government in the form of taxes, while a significant amount of the subsidy will be 
enjoyed by the companies. Thus, it is more beneficial for government officials to 
formulate a subsidy policy that benefits Pertamina rather than the private biofuel 
industry, as the government would favour its own business entity. 
Even though the biofuel subsidy policy was formulated by people who have ties with 
Pertamina, the government amended the Ministerial of Energy and Mineral 
Resources Decree Number 219 (2010) by issuing the Ministerial of Energy and 
Mineral Resources Decree Number 3053 (2011). This regulation was issued in 
February 2011 and stated:   
“The price index for oil fuel markets is set every month by the Director 
General of Oil and Gas and the price index for the biofuel market is set 
every month by the Director General of New and Renewable Energy and 
Energy Conservation.” 
(Ministerial of Energy and Mineral Resources, Decree Number 3053, 2011) 
The amendment of the ministerial regulation was due to bureaucratic reform in the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources with the establishment of the Directorate 
General of New and Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation (MEMR 
Regulation Number 18, 2010). The regulation amendment, as well as the reform in 
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, was expected to resolve the problem 
of the government under-subsidizing the biofuel industry. However, the respective 
biofuel subsidy scheme did not change until March 2014, when the subsidy scheme 
remained the same for bioethanol but changed for biodiesel. Yet, this change still did 
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not truly favour the biodiesel industry, since the amount of subsidy given would 
depend on the price of fossil fuel instead of the actual cost of producing biodiesel.  
The literature on biofuel governance has examined the way government interests in 
developing biofuel to resolve energy security issues intersects with private sector 
interests in profiting from such a policy (Bailis and Baka, 2011; Oliviera et al., 2017). 
However, the research does not discuss in depth the political processes involved in 
biofuel policy. There are a few exceptions, in particular the study by Stattman et al. 
(2013) on Brazilian biofuel politics. Their study found that the Brazilian government’s 
success in implementing its biofuel policy was due to strong commitment from 
political elites. In the past, there was also political objection to Brazil’s biofuel policy – 
for example, there was reluctance from Brazil’s state-owned oil company and car 
industry, as well as the domestic sugar industry which indicated that not all 
stakeholders supported the biofuel policy. However, Brazil’s political elites were able 
to compel all stakeholders to be on the same side to support the growth of the 
biofuel industry.  
The analysis in this section suggests that the Indonesian government did not follow 
the example of the Brazilian government. Instead of adopting a decisive decision to 
implement a biofuel policy, the President preferred Ministers to compromise and find 
solution to problems that emerged relating to energy issues and biofuel in particular. 
Such a condition created a ‘status quo’ as Ministers preferred to retain their own 
views about the biofuel industry and as such tended not to compromise. This created 
circumstances that caused the government officials in charge of formulating policy to 
favour the fossil fuel business, as they had an existing interest in and understanding 
of this business.  
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As such, it is plausible that a conflict of interest emerged in favour of the fossil fuel 
business where the government officials prefer to formulate a subsidy policy 
beneficial for Pertamina rather than the biofuel industry. Providing a subsidy for 
Pertamina is in the government’s interest as the company is government owned. 
Meanwhile, the biofuel industry is privately owned, which means that providing a 
subsidy to this industry would potentially put the government officials in a precarious 
situation, as there is no support for such a subsidy from a higher-level regulation. 
Strong “leadership commitment” as mentioned by respondent R9 could potentially 
have suppressed the conflict of interest, as those who formulated the biofuel policy 
would need to follow the high-level policy direction.   
   
6.4.  Summary and Conclusion  
Studies using the lens of political ecology have shown that in many developing 
countries, government development policy has become one of the most effective 
instruments in increasing economic growth (Baird and Quastel, 2015; Neuman, 
2001; Smits, 2015; Sovacool, 2010). In terms of biofuel policy development, several 
studies indicated how the industry has thrived due to government policy 
interventions, such as through mandatory blending targets and subsidies (Oliviera et 
al., 2017; Stattman et al., 2013). For example, the study by Stattman et al (2013) 
highlighted the importance of political elites in ensuring biofuel policy success. 
Moreover, other studies using the lens of agrarian political economics have 
confirmed that government policies creating targets for biofuel use in domestic 
markets have caused rapid growth in biofuel production and its feedstock (Wilkinson 
and Herrera, 2011; Gillon, 2016).  
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These previous studies emphasise that government policy is an essential factor 
contributing to rapid growth in domestic biofuel industries. However, the studies are 
mostly focused on the ultimate impact of government policy on the environment and 
groups of people living in that environment (e.g. Fernandes et al., 2010; Baird and 
Quastel, 2015; Neuman, 2001). The underlying politics within the policy-making 
process has been under-explored within these studies - with a few exceptions such 
as Stattman et al. (2013). However, this latter study, despite showing that the 
strategic position of political elites influenced the biofuel policy trajectory, did not 
discuss in-depth the biofuel politics of the elite.  
In this chapter, I have highlighted the underlying political economy behind biofuel 
policy implementation in Indonesia. The government showed its commitment in 
implementing a biofuel policy through the implementation of mandatory blending 
targets and subsidies to increase the growth of the domestic biofuel market. 
However, the underlying politics of Indonesia’s biofuel policy have shown that policy 
and political commitment should not be conflated. Without strong political 
commitment from top elite figures, such as the President, a policy can lack 
effectiveness. In this context, the biofuel policy provided incentives that not only 
failed to stimulate the growth of the industry, but also actually hampered its 
development. To be more precise, although the government implemented its biofuel 
policy, its subsequent actions did not follow the same trajectory to support the policy. 
The biofuel case study of Indonesia has increased our understanding that political 
commitment, particularly from the top political elites, is a key factor for a policy to 
achieve success. This suggests that political elites are the most important actors 
within government policy-making as they have the power and authority to decide the 
trajectory of the policy. Although the case of Indonesia’s biofuel policy cannot be 
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generalized to other countries, it provides a plausible explanation for success or lack 
of success of biofuel policies more widely – that is, commitment from political elites 
and not merely the implementation of a biofuel policy by the respective government.   
The inconclusive biofuel policy in Indonesia created an opportunity for large agro 
industries, notably the palm oil industry, to influence the government’s biofuel 
initiatives. This led to the formation of an agro-fuel alliance between the biodiesel 
industry and the large palm oil industry, which, arguably, eventually shifted the 
trajectory of Indonesia’s biofuel policy towards favouring and becoming dependent 
upon the palm oil industry. This shifting of power that influenced the government 
policy trajectory forms the focus for the next chapter.   
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Chapter Seven 
The Politics of Biofuels: Part II  
The Government, Policy and the Agro-Fuel Alliance  
 
This chapter attempts to further explore how politics and policy issues enacted by 
actors involved in the biofuel energy nexus have consequences for implementation 
and practice. I argue that insufficient political commitment (discussed in the previous 
chapter) in pursuing biofuel policy has contributed to the government excessively 
favouring large agro-industries, particularly multinational agro companies and 
eventually reshaping policy in accordance with the interests of the respective agro 
companies. This situation has changed the trajectory of Indonesia’s biofuel policy. 
The policy that was initially meant to resolve energy security issues, rural poverty, 
and environmental change has become the policy that benefits only large agro 
companies.  
Again using the lenses of political ecology and agrarian political economics as in the 
previous chapter, I will apply data from my interviews, document analysis, and 
observations during field research, as well as my personal experience working as a 
government official involved with government policy implementation related to the 
palm oil industry. I will focus the analysis on the politics and policies of both the palm 
oil and biofuel industries which led to the constitution of agro fuel alliances and the 
shifting of Indonesia’s biofuel policy trajectory. The analysis in this chapter, in 
particular, aims to develop the work of Oliviera et al. (2017), which argues for the 
need to examine the underlying political economy of biofuel politics in order to 
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understand processes that shape the State’s patronage over large agro-industry, as 
well as the resulting socio-ecological problems that have been critiqued by political 
ecologists and agrarian political economists (e.g. Searchinger et al., 2008; Fargione 
et al., 2008; Fernandes et al. 2010; Boras Jr et al., 2011). 
This chapter is composed of three sections. The first section analyses government 
policy concerning the palm oil industry and argues that the policy tends to favour 
large agro palm companies – and thus has underpinned the formation of agro-fuel 
alliances in the biodiesel sector. The second section analyses the dominance of the 
palm oil industry over the biodiesel industry – highlighting that insufficient political 
will, as regards implementing biofuel policy, that has created this condition. The third 
section analyses this dominance in relation to the fall of the CPO price at the end of 
2014, which I argue has paved the way for the palm oil industry to influence the 
government’s biofuel policy.  
There are two key analytical points in this section. Firstly, it will analyse the way the 
palm oil industry took advantage of a lack of  political commitment to the biofuel 
policy and influenced the government in its policy making. Secondly, it will analyse 
the impact of the palm oil industry on the government’s biofuel policy which 
effectively altered Indonesia’s policy to favour palm oil-based biodiesel. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that large agro-industry has the ability to influence government 
policy in accordance with its own interests, particularly if there is weak political 
commitment in implementing the biofuel policy.  
7.1. Forging Agro-Fuel Alliances: Government Interest in the Palm Oil Industry 
This section focuses on the important facet of the biofuel nexus where agro-fuel 
alliances are created – but not because the government is implementing a biofuel 
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policy. Instead, this outcome is due to the government’s intention to develop a 
derivative industry from palm oil which has caused the large palm oil industry to seek 
opportunities in the biofuel sector. This policy, which is known as the Palm Oil Down-
Streaming Policy, would eventually influence the biofuel policy trajectory and alter it 
into a policy heavily influenced by the large palm oil industries.  
Agrarian political economists have shown that large agro industries start to 
consolidate their businesses when the government implements biofuel policies such 
as those in Brazil (White and Dasgupta, 2011) and the US (Gillon, 2010). These 
studies found that agro industries used biofuel policies as a new market opportunity 
leading to agro-fuel alliances. However, Oliviera et al. (2017) go further in their 
analysis, beyond a  focus on the underlying political economy of biofuel policy, and 
instead emphasise that agro-fuel alliances occur as a result of multifaceted 
government policies. Thus, this first section of the chapter will aim to further develop 
Oliviera et al’s (2017) argument that biofuel policy is developed based on corporate 
interests utilising economic power and government concerns about resolving energy 
security problems to advance corporate interests (p.9). In other words, I will not 
discuss the benefits of biofuel policy for large corporations as this has been covered 
in the previous literature (e.g. Hollander, 2011; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Oliviera 
et al., 2017). Instead, I will focus on the underlying political economy that leads the 
government to create a biofuel policy that will eventually benefit large agro 
companies.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the implementation of the Core Estate Policy from the 
1970s led to the palm oil industry becoming an industrial giant, as the policy 
successfully made farmers and smallholders into an extension of private plantations. 
The smallholders’ involvement in the palm oil industry is essentially a mutual 
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relationship as the latter helps the former to establish their plantation and in turn, the 
former supplies fresh palm bunches to the latter to process into crude palm oil 
(CPO). As a result, private palm oil industries can produce CPO in large quantities 
(see also Figure 4.6 in Chapter 4) far exceeding domestic consumption which is 
approximately 5 million tons annually (MEMR, 2016).   
CPO is mainly used to produce cooking oil for the domestic market and its excess 
supply is sold overseas - as respondent R22 stated: 
“The national refinery capacity is around 15 million tons per year. Yet, only 
8 million tons is used to produce cooking oil because domestic demand is 
only 5 million tons and the remainder is exported.” 
(R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017) 
The respondent’s statement reaffirmed the data from the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources by asserting that any excess of cooking oil and CPO produced 
domestically is sold to the overseas market. Meanwhile, the national production of 
CPO has increased from 5.4 million tons in 1998 to 11.8 million tons in 2005 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 2014). Thus, there has been a huge quantity of CPO sold on 
the overseas market since the beginning of the 2000s. However, CPO is still 
considered as a raw material that can be used to support other industries, such as 
food, soap, cosmetics and so on. The product is, therefore, in high demand even 
when its price is relatively high and tends to bounce back if its price decreases 
(Figure 7.1). This ensures that the palm oil industry manages to gain substantial 
profit, particularly when the price of CPO is high.  
231 
 
 
   
Based on analysis of policy documents about the export tax on CPO products, the 
government started to impose tax on this product from 2001. The government 
imposed an export tax on palm oil and its derivative products with a higher tax rate 
for the raw product, such as CPO and fresh palm bunches, and a lower tax rate for 
the processed products, such as cooking oil and olein14 (Table 7.1). The higher tax 
rate imposed on the raw products will discourage palm oil companies from directly 
exporting CPO since this product will become expensive for overseas consumers 
                                                          
14 Palm oil processing yields many derivatives compound where RDBPO (refined, deodorized and 
bleached palm olein) also known as cooking oil along with palm olein are the most common 
derivatives product produced by palm oil industry (Minal, 2014). 
1 Fruits and Fresh Fruit 
Bunches 3%
2 Crude palm oil 3%
3 Crude olein 1%
4 RBD Palm oil 1%
5 RBD Palm olein 1%
Source: Based on Ministerial of Finance Regulation Number 66 (2001)
Table 7.1
Export Tax Rate on Palm Products (%)
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and reduce the prospect that they will buy it. Conversely, the lower tax rate for the 
processed product will make it somewhat expensive for overseas consumers, but 
still competitive enough that they are likely to buy processed CPO products.  
The government’s progressive export tax structure may relate to its intention to 
encourage palm oil industries to process raw products, rather than directly export 
them. However, there is no consideration written in the Ministerial of Finance (MoF) 
Regulation Number 66 (2001), as well as its higher-level regulation, which is Law 
Number 10 (1995) on Customs, about the government’s intention of having a 
progressive export tax structure. Thus, one of the most plausible explanations is that 
the government’s intentions in imposing an export tax on CPO and its derivative 
products was merely to increase government revenue. This soon changed, however, 
as the Law on Customs was amended in 2006 and clearly stated the purpose of 
imposing the export tax: 
“Export duty is imposed on exported goods with the aim to: 
a. guarantee the fulfilment of domestic demand; 
b. preserve natural resources; 
c. anticipate drastic price increases in certain export commodities on the 
international market; or 
d. maintain the stability of the prices of certain domestic commodities.” 
(Law Number 17, 2006, Article 2A) 
The amended Law on Customs suggests that the government’s interest in the palm 
oil industry expanded from a mere source of revenue into a somewhat larger 
scheme. This included prioritizing the domestic demand for CPO which was 
expected to stimulate growth in palm oil derivatives and eventually lead to an 
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increase in economic growth at national level. Thus, with the Law on Customs 
amendment, the government had a clear intention to develop the derivative 
industries related to palm oil – this policy is known as the Palm Oil Down-Streaming 
Policy.  
However, the implementation of the Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy does not 
necessarily mean that the government was already keen for the palm oil industry to 
support the biofuel industry. Indeed, there is no specific consideration within the Law 
on Customs about supporting the biofuel industry, which signifies that the 
government’s main aim was to generally develop all industries needing palm oil as 
their feedstock. Moreover, the Law on Customs offered flexibility because it only 
provided the reason for the government to implement the Palm Oil Down-Streaming 
Policy. The fiscal instrument itself was in the control of the Ministry of Finance 
through the export tax tariff mechanism. This would give flexibility for the government 
to amend the tax tariff structure at any time in accordance with the dynamic of 
economic conditions. The subsequent amendments included changes in the tax 
tariff, increases in the number of taxable goods, and an adjustment related to the 
higher level regulation. 
Thus, when the price of CPO skyrocketed from USD599/MT in January 2007 to 
USD821/MT in August 2007 (Index Mundi, 2018), the Ministry of Finance amended 
the export tax rate through implementation of MoF Regulation Number 94 (2007). 
This regulation significantly changed the export tax structure for CPO and its 
derivative products (Table 7.2) as it harmonized the progressive tax rate in 
accordance with the high price of CPO in the international commodity market. In this 
regulation, palm oil is divided into 13 different products with much more detail than 
the previous regulation. The changes in the tariff structure along with its complexity 
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show that the government could flexibly adjust the export tax to accommodate the 
dynamics of international economic conditions, while also keeping on track with its 
Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy.  
  
It is still unknown why the structure of the export tax rate changed significantly 
between the 2001 and 2007 policies (as shown in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). 
However, it is implied that government officials in the Ministry of Finance, particularly 
those involved with the export tax regulation, were aware of the multifaceted 
products that the palm oil industry could produce. Moreover, the implementation of 
MoF Regulation Number 94 (2007) shows that the government had an increased 
interest in the agro-palm industry. The complexity of this new tax structure suggests 
two possibilities: the government is either aware that the domestic industry needs the 
palm oil derivatives; or the tariff structure changes were applied as a means to 
encourage the palm oil industry to build these derivative industries. Despite the fact 
that this research does not investigate in depth the outcome of the Palm Oil Down-
Products                       Price
<US$550
/ton
<US$650
/ton
<US$750
/ton
<US$850
/ton
>US$850/
ton
1 Fruits and Fresh Fruit 
Bunches 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
2 Crude palm oil 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
3 Crude olein 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
4 Crude stearin 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
5 Crude palm kernel oil 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
6 Crude kernel stearin 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
7 Crude kernel olein 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
8 RBD Palm olein 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
9 RBD Palm kernel olein 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
10 RBD Palm kernel oil 0.0 1.5 4.0 6.5 9.0
11 RBD Palm stearin 0.0 1.5 4.0 6.5 9.0
12 RBD Palm kernel stearin 0.0 1.5 4.0 6.5 9.0
13 RBD Palm oil 0.0 1.5 4.0 6.5 9.0
Source: Based on Ministerial of Finance Regulation Number 94 (2007)
Table 7.2
Export Tax Rate on Palm Products (%)
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Streaming Policy, it is important to note that the government expected that the policy 
would increase economic growth and reduce unemployment due to increased 
investment in establishing factories to produce palm oil derivatives.  
The next amendment to the export tax regulations is important for the biodiesel 
industry since it incorporates biodiesel within CPO derivative products (Table 7.3). 
Interestingly, this MoF regulation was implemented on 7th February 2008 which is 
earlier than the mandatory blending target regulation issued on 26th September 2008 
(MEMR Regulation Number 32, 2008; MoF Regulation Number 9, 2008). This 
suggests that the change in export tax structure in the Palm Oil Down-Streaming 
Policy was not necessarily implemented as a means to support the biofuel policy.  
 
Instead, it is suggested that the amendment in the export tax regulation (see Table 
7.2 and Table 7.3) was due to the lobbying of officials in the Ministry of Finance by 
the biodiesel companies. One respondent stated: 
“APROBI was established in 2006 and this association assisted the 
government in making regulations related to biofuels such as pricing, 
financing, specifications and finally blending in 2008.” 
Products                        Price
<US$550
/ton
<US$650
/ton
<US$750
/ton
<US$850
/ton
<US$1,10
0/ton
<US$1,200
/ton
<US$1,300
/ton
>US$1,300
/ton
1 Fruits and Fresh Fruit 
Bunches 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
2 Crude palm oil 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
3 Crude olein 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
4 Crude stearin 0.0 1.5 4.0 5.5 9.0 13.0 18.0 23.0
5 Crude palm kernel oil 0.0 1.5 4.0 5.5 9.0 13.0 18.0 23.0
6 Crude kernel stearin 0.0 1.5 4.0 5.5 9.0 13.0 18.0 23.0
7 Crude kernel olein 0.0 1.5 4.0 7.5 9.0 13.0 18.0 23.0
8 RBD Palm olein 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
9 RBD Palm kernel olein 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
10 RBD Palm kernel oil 0.0 1.5 4.0 5.5 9.0 13.0 18.0 23.0
11 RBD Palm stearin 0.0 0.5 3.0 4.5 8.0 11.0 16.0 21.0
12 RBD Palm kernel stearin 0.0 0.5 3.0 4.5 8.0 11.0 16.0 21.0
13 RBD Palm oil 0.0 1.5 4.0 5.5 9.0 13.0 18.0 23.0
14 Biofuel 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Source: Based on Ministerial of Finance Regulation Number 9 (2008)
Table 7.3
Export Tax Rate on Palm Products (%)
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 (R1, Biofuel company representative, May 2017)  
Respondent R1 suggested that it was biofuel companies (i.e. APROBI) that initially 
lobbied the government by approaching different Ministries in an attempt to 
encourage the government to create its biofuel policy in accordance with what they 
wanted. This suggests that biofuel companies had also approached government 
officials in the Ministry of Finance, as part of their discussions with the government 
involved financing and specifications for biofuel. However, this also suggests that 
MoF Regulation Number 9 (2008), which includes biodiesel as a palm oil derivative, 
may not be correlated with MEMR Regulation Number 32 (2008), as it is plausible 
that the biofuel companies discussed these matters separately with the respective 
government officials. Thus, despite being beneficial to the biofuel industry, 
particularly the biodiesel industry, MoF Regulation Number 9 (2008) still serves as 
an economic policy for the palm oil industry, rather than being part of the biofuel 
policy. Nevertheless, this MoF regulation would be the crucial government policy that 
led the palm oil industry to enter the biodiesel sector - as respondent R1 also stated: 
“Palm oil companies only entered the biodiesel industry when the 
regulation existed.” 
(R1, Biofuel companies’ representative, May 2017)   
Based on the respondent’s statement, it is suggested that the palm oil industry 
expanded into the biodiesel sector due to the change in the export tax structure 
implemented by the Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy in 2008. This is supported by 
evidence from the GAIN Report (2011, p.8) as it shows the number of biodiesel 
factories increased from 7 in 2007 to 14 in 2008 and that production more than 
doubled in that period. This significant increase in the biodiesel sector indicates that 
palm oil companies had started to expand into the biodiesel business.  
237 
 
The significant increase in the number of biodiesel factories along with their 
production in just a one year period (2008) indicates that a policy implemented 
during the year encouraged the palm oil industry to bond with the biodiesel industry. 
Both the Mandatory Blending Policy and the Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy were 
implemented in 2008. As the former was implemented at the end of 2008 it is 
unlikely that it was sufficient to promote significant biodiesel industry growth in that 
year. Thus, it is likely that the significant growth in the biodiesel industry related to 
policy implementation at the beginning of 2008, as palm oil companies would need 
time to establish biodiesel factories as subsidiary companies. This points to the Palm 
Oil Down-Streaming Policy as the most significant policy as it was implemented at 
the beginning of the year.  
The export tax structure imposed in the MoF regulation (see Table 7.3) also created 
an opportunity for the palm oil industry to profit from the overseas market for biofuel - 
as biodiesel products had a lower rate of export tax compared to other palm oil 
derivatives. As such, overseas biodiesel demand meant the product could be 
exported without the imposition of a high export tax. Thus, palm oil companies 
gained significant benefits from entering the domestic biodiesel sector as they could 
avoid high export taxes while profiting from an overseas market. In this context, it is 
suggested that the agro-fuel alliance was formed due to the palm oil industry’s 
response to the Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy rather than the Mandatory Blending 
Policy. To be more precise, the bonding of the palm oil industry with the biodiesel 
industry was not correlated with the biofuel policy but with wider economic policy. 
The government’s decision to impose export tax on CPO created an irony for 
Indonesia’s biofuel policy. On one hand, the policy had encouraged the palm oil 
industry to bond with the biodiesel industry, which effectively forged an agro-fuel 
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alliance for the biodiesel sector and supported the growth of the industry. On the 
other hand, Indonesia was still unable to meet its biodiesel targets despite the 
bonding with the palm oil industry. This is because, whilst there was an increase in 
domestic biodiesel production, most of the product was exported to benefit the palm 
oil companies.  
The situation in the biodiesel industry effectively saw the large agro-industry bond 
with the biofuel industry, constituting what agrarian political economists have referred 
to as an agro-fuel alliance (e.g. Fernandes et al., 2010; Boras Jr et al., 2011; 
Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Hollander, 2011; Gillon, 2016). Research, conducted in 
Brazil and the USA, has shown that such alliances are essentially formed as a 
response to government initiatives to use biofuel in the domestic fuel market, which 
creates a new market quickly capitalized on by large agro industries. The large agro-
industry already has the advantage of producing crops efficiently and cheaply which 
is essential for producing biofuel (Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Hollander, 2011; 
Gillon, 2016). That being said, the large agro-industry is attempting to profit from the 
government’s biofuel policy either through the mandatory use of biofuel or the 
provision of a subsidy for biofuel products.    
However, Indonesia’s biodiesel case study shows that large agro-industry, notably 
the palm oil industry, was initially not interested in entering the biodiesel sector, since 
the industry did not consider this business as a profitable endeavour, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. I assert that involvement occurred due to two main factors; first the more 
lucrative overseas market for CPO products, partly shaped by domestic policy. 
Second, the government’s interest in encouraging development of the industry’s 
derivative products as part of domestic economic development policy. This created 
an opportunity for the biodiesel industry to lobby the government to include biodiesel 
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as part of the wider scheme in the Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy. Thus, palm oil 
industry involvement with the biofuel business is not driven by the opportunity to 
profit from the biofuel policy - as in other case examples, but to counter the 
government policy whilst still making a profit. In this context, the palm oil industry 
avoids the higher tax rate for exporting CPO, while profiting from the overseas 
biodiesel market. This suggests that government economic policy, concerning the 
potential of a crop to produce biofuel, could be the most influential aspect in the 
forming of agro-fuel alliances, rather than the biofuel policy itself. Thus, this section 
has discuss on the underlying political economy that caused the bonding between 
biodiesel industry with palm oil agro-companies. The next section discuss on the way 
the intersecting policy made palm oil industry became the winner in Indonesia’s 
biofuel policy. Thus, this section has discussed the underlying political economy that 
caused the bonding between the biodiesel industry and palm oil agro-companies. 
The next section discusses the way intersecting policies made the palm oil industry 
the winner in Indonesia’s biofuel development. 
  
7.2. Dominance of the Palm Oil Industry in the Biodiesel Sector 
On one hand, the implementation of the Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy ensured 
CPO availability for the domestic biodiesel industry. On the other hand, the 
government implemented the Mandatory Blending Policy and introduced subsidy 
incentives for the biodiesel industry to sell its product to Pertamina. The 
implementation of both policies is supposed to make the government able to achieve 
its biofuel target policy, especially for biodiesel. However, the underlying politics of 
Indonesia’s biofuel policy (discussed in Chapter 6) revealed the inconsistency of the 
incentive policy for biofuel companies, which negatively impacted both the biodiesel 
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and bioethanol industries, albeit to differing degrees. As discussed, this impact was 
more devastating for bioethanol as the production of fuel grade bioethanol was 
discontinued, whilst the biodiesel industry still had the option of selling its product to 
a lucrative overseas market (as discussed in Chapter 5).  
However, this does not necessarily mean that the biodiesel industry was not affected 
by the adverse impact of the government’s inconsistent biofuel policy. The Head of 
APROBI made the following media statement: 
“Biodiesel producers are currently losing money because the price of 
crude palm oil has skyrocketed to US$1,100 per ton, whilst the biodiesel 
reference price is only around US$1,070 per ton.” 
(The Head of APROBI interviewed by Tempo.co, 28 November 2010)    
The excerpt above shows the resentment of the Head of APROBI toward MEMR 
Decree Number 219 (2010) since the regulation which stipulated a subsidy incentive 
for biofuel producers, had in reality not benefitted biofuel producers since it did not 
cover biodiesel production costs (see also Chapter 6). However, as explained in 
Chapter 5, biodiesel is a derivative product of palm oil that can be produced at any 
stage of CPO manufacture. Derivatives also include stearin and palm fatty acid 
distillate (PFAD) which is a by-product of producing cooking oil and much cheaper 
than CPO.  As such, the Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy created an opportunity for 
both the palm oil and biodiesel industries. The palm oil industry wanted to avoid the 
high export tariff, whilst the biodiesel industry needed the cheap feedstock that the 
palm oil industry produced.  
Based on personal observation from visiting Dumai City during field research in 
2017, many biodiesel industries are located within the palm oil industrial complex. 
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This suggests that the biodiesel industry had linked with the palm oil industry and 
was acting as its subsidiary. As a palm oil subsidiary company, a biodiesel company 
could access the less valuable by-products of the palm oil industry as feedstock to 
produce biodiesel (see also Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5). This meant the respective 
biodiesel company was able to minimize its production costs to allow greater profit 
not only from the overseas market but also the domestic market. The ability to 
reduce production costs significantly also meant the company was able to use the 
government subsidy to cover - and even to profit from – the production of biodiesel. 
This is noted by respondent R22: 
“The conversion cost plus CPO price had actually been more expensive 
than the price of (fossil) diesel. For companies that didn’t have (access to) 
a refinery, this situation would be their end. But, for those who have 
(access to) refineries, the government subsidy is still enough.” 
(R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017) 
The respondent’s statement suggests that the government subsidy that was 
insufficient to cover the production cost of biodiesel was only a problem for 
independent biodiesel companies. This would not be the case for a biodiesel 
company under a palm oil group, since the subsidy may not be enough to create 
profit, but it is sufficient to cover the base cost of producing biodiesel. This suggests 
that being part of a palm oil agro conglomeration was highly advantageous or even 
necessary for a biodiesel company’s success. In addition to this, the route to market 
for biodiesel companies was also affected by policy, leading to a focus on 
international export. This was due to the unfavourable policy should it choose to sell 
its product in the domestic market.  
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The benefits of a biodiesel company being under a palm oil group are not restricted 
to minimizing production costs – another benefit is resilience to bankruptcy. This 
evidence emerged when I linked the information obtained during field research with 
information received from respondent R22 who was a former biodiesel company 
owner. The information from the field research came from the visit to Wilmar 
Bioenergy Indonesia Ltd. - a biodiesel company owned by the Wilmar Group, the 
biggest palm oil company in Indonesia. A local informant contacted an employee of 
the respective company who stated that the company had not produced biodiesel for 
about a year since there was no demand from Pertamina. This implies that this 
biodiesel company is supported by its parent company to ensure its business 
survival (as it did not produce biodiesel for almost a year). Further information came 
from R22 who had to shut down his company due to the inability to produce biodiesel 
for one year (as discussed in Chapter 5). The two pieces of information above 
suggest that palm oil industry involvement with the biodiesel industry is crucial and 
strategic, as the biodiesel company could still exist and operate even without 
producing biodiesel for a long period of time.  
In contrast, an independent biodiesel company would have to use more expensive 
CPO to produce biodiesel, as it is the only type of accessible material. As such, this 
type of company cannot produce biodiesel with a low production cost - unlike a 
company which is a subsidiary of the palm oil industry. Consequently, it is suggested 
that an independent biodiesel company is unable to profit from the low government 
subsidy, although it is still able to sell its product on the overseas market. The 
differential advantages of these two types of manufacturer did not pose real 
problems particularly for the independent biodiesel company, as long as there was 
an available overseas market for biodiesel. However, the situation changed 
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drastically in 2012 as the EU - a major biodiesel export destination - accused 
Indonesia’s biodiesel product of entering the EU as a subsidized good. Respondent 
R1 stated: 
“Indonesia’s biodiesel product was being accused of being a subsidized 
good in the EU which deterred our export to EU countries. But, the most 
devastating effect happened when EU countries also implemented an anti-
dumping policy which made our biodiesel product uncompetitive due to the 
high anti-dumping duties charged on our product and this has effectively 
stopped all of our biodiesel export activity.”   
(R1, Biofuel companies’ representative, May 2017) 
R1’s statement suggests that the biodiesel company was facing difficulties in selling 
its product in the EU, as EU countries changed their policy towards Indonesia’s 
biodiesel and this involved the introduction of an anti-dumping tax. Dumping is the 
practice of exporting a product at a price lower than the price of the same product in 
the home market. This practice, although not regarded as illegal conduct, creates 
severe consequences for the local product in the respective export destination. Thus, 
the government of the export destination country can impose an anti-dumping tax 
with the intention of protecting its local industry from cheap imported goods. The 
EU’s decision to impose this tax on Indonesia’s biodiesel meant that the EU market 
became unprofitable since the respective tax made biodiesel imported from 
Indonesia uncompetitive against the local product. This had a considerable impact 
as the EU was Indonesia’s main export destination for biodiesel products (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2014).  
The situation created a dilemma, particularly for independent biodiesel companies, 
since they had lost their prime lucrative overseas market and selling biodiesel in the 
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domestic market had negative consequences, as the subsidy did not cover their 
production costs. As a consequence, independent biodiesel companies eventually 
shut down their operations as respondent R22 stated: 
“With the low amount of conversion cost (for biodiesel price index), many 
independent biodiesel companies are just shutting down their operations.” 
(R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017) 
The loss of a prime overseas market meant biodiesel companies, especially the 
independent ones, were negatively affected by the implementation of MEMR Decree 
Number 219 (2010) as they were not supported by the successful palm oil industry. 
However, biodiesel companies that had become part of the palm oil agro 
conglomeration were not so adversely affected by this regulation (as explained 
above).  
The Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy had caused the palm oil industry to become 
involved in the biodiesel sector but still did not benefit the government’s biofuel policy 
implementation in achieving the target for domestic biofuel use since the majority of 
biodiesel produced is exported (see Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5). Moreover, the loss of 
the overseas biodiesel prime market effectively undermined independent biodiesel 
companies, which could not survive selling only within the domestic market. Thus, 
the combination of the insufficient political commitment by the government in 
implementing biofuel policy along with the unfavourable overseas market conditions 
served to strengthen the palm oil industry’s supremacy over the biodiesel industry.  
The dominance of the palm oil industry was furthered by events that occurred in 
2014 and 2015 that created an opportunity for the large palm oil industry to influence 
the government and eventually shift the trajectory of the biofuel policy. The 2014 
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event (the CPO price plummets) had tremendous consequences for the domestic 
palm oil industry, which will be discussed in depth in section 7.3. Meanwhile, the 
2015 event (ending the subsidy policy) demonstrated the lack of governmental 
commitment to delivering its biofuel policy. This is noted by one respondent as 
follows: 
“The Parliament has decided that the government must not distribute 
subsidy to private companies. The Parliament argues that the government 
subsidy is supposed to be distributed for the benefit of the people not for 
the benefit of private companies. So, we (the government) have to cancel 
the plan to subsidize biofuel in next year’s budget.” 
(R24, Government official representative, September 2016)  
The statement by R24 highlights the reason that the government stopped the 
subsidy for the biofuel programme. During the budget hearing meeting with the 
Parliament there was disagreement regarding the subsidy beneficiaries. The 
Parliament argued that “government subsidies must only be given to benefit the 
people not private companies” and as such the government rescinded the biofuel 
subsidy policy. However, it is possible to contest this argument because other 
government subsidies, such as the (fossil) fuel subsidy, are given to companies. 
Moreover, people benefit from the subsidy in the form of receiving goods and 
services at an affordable price, when the subsidy is given to the company that 
provides the respective goods/services. The only difference between biofuel 
subsidies and other government subsidies is the recipient - the former is the private 
sector while the latter is a state-owned enterprise.  
Although the Parliament does not have the authority to execute a policy, it has the 
power to force the government to accommodate Parliament’s decision. This led to 
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complicated politics within the Indonesian Parliament regarding its position towards 
the biofuel policy, which may have had its root in the incumbency of the fossil fuel 
business - as happened with the government officials who formulated the biofuel 
subsidy policy discussed in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, it would require a thorough 
investigation to uncover the politics involved, particularly to understand Parliament’s 
motive for the decision, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
The government’s decision to rescind the biofuel subsidy policy further strengthened 
the dominance of the palm oil industry over the biodiesel industry. This is because 
without the subsidy, selling biodiesel in the domestic market was no longer profitable 
even for the biodiesel industry that was bonded with the palm oil industry. Thus, with 
both overseas and domestic markets becoming unprofitable, it is expected that the 
biodiesel industry will collapse as it does not have a means for creating profit. 
However, as previously discussed, a biodiesel company that has become a palm oil 
subsidiary could still exist despite not producing anything. This meant the only 
biofuel industry existing in Indonesia is the biodiesel industry within the palm oil agro 
conglomeration. This has created an opportunity for the palm oil industry to influence 
the government with regard to its biofuel policy as will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
7.3. The Influence of the Palm Oil Industry in the Government’s Biofuel Policy   
Chapter 4 has discussed the effect of past agrarian policy on the palm oil industry, 
which successfully incorporated smallholders and farmers into the industry and 
effectively made them an extension of the palm oil companies. Moreover, the 
agrarian policy implemented in this sector in the 1970s to 1980s has positioned  
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smallholders as the second biggest actor in the palm oil industry - as of 2010 their 
total contribution was approximately one third of the total palm plantation area and 
production (Figure 7.2).  
 
However, smallholders’ considerable involvement with the palm oil industry had both 
positive and negative consequences. For example, when the price of CPO is high 
and increasing, it increases the welfare of these smallholders, but if the price of CPO 
falls it poses the risk of plunging them into poverty. This was mentioned by several 
respondents: 
“The low price of CPO would reduce the price of fresh palm bunches 
(FFB) and this would hit the farmers most since they could only produce 
FFB.” 
(R1, Biofuel companies’ representative, May 2017)  
“The government is concerned to maintain the price of CPO if it is too low 
since it will impact the smallholders whose numbers are significant in this 
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industry. If the CPO price is too low, the price of FFB will be lower and if 
that happens smallholders won’t be able to tend their crops which results 
in lower yields and eventually make them switch to other crops.” 
(R22, Palm oil companies’ representative, May 2017) 
The excerpts above suggest that lower CPO prices lead to a vicious circle for 
farmers. Low CPO prices result in lower income for farmers and as such it reduces 
their ability to keep the crop maintenance cost, which in turn will reduce their yield 
followed by a further decrease in their revenue. As noted by respondent 22, such a 
situation would potentially cause smallholders to switch to other revenue crops. 
However, the analysis in Chapter 4 has shown that a material characteristic of palm 
oil crops is that they need at least three years until the first harvest. This suggests 
that if smallholders decide to switch from palm oil to other crops, they would probably 
be unable to revert their farm plot back to palm oil without support from other actors 
such as private companies.  
Another consequence emerges if farmers switch from planting palm oil to other 
crops. Since farmers produce approximately one third of the total CPO produced in 
Indonesia (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014), smallholders switching their palm 
plantations to other crops would result in a significant reduction in CPO production at 
the national level. Thus, the problem of a low price for CPO is not only a problem for 
large palm oil companies, but also a concern for the government since smallholders 
will be impacted the most.  
This was an issue when a decreasing trend in the international price for CPO meant 
that it finally reached USD693/MT by the end of 2014 and was continuously 
decreasing (Index Mundi, 2019). This price was close to the cost of producing CPO 
as respondent R22 stated: 
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“In my calculation, the minimum price for CPO should be kept at 
USD600/MT. If it’s lower, it will hit smallholders the most.”  
(R22, Palm oil company representative, May 2017) 
The respondent’s statement recommends USD600/MT as the minimum price for 
CPO as both smallholders and large palm oil companies would be affected (with the 
former suffering the greater impact) if the price tips below this. However, the CPO 
price kept decreasing in the first half of 2015 until it reached USD549/MT in August 
2015. The sharp decrease in the CPO price in the international market was primarily 
due to oversupply as the Head of GAPKI (Gabungan Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit 
Indonesia/Indonesia Palm Oil Company Association) stated in the media: 
“The CPO price has decreased due to several factors such as a reduction 
in demand from the main importer destinations such as the EU and the 
Middle East, a decrease in the crude oil price, an increase in the 
production of CPO substitute commodities like soy bean and rapeseed, 
and a mandatory blending programme that is still ineffective. We were 
hoping that the biodiesel programme would increase the price of CPO, but 
the programme is still far from reaching its target.” 
(Joko Supriyono, Statement during International Palm Oil Conference, 26 November 2015)  
The statement by the Head of GAPKI indicates that the lessening demand for CPO 
caused the price to decrease and thus, to reverse the condition, he suggests that 
increasing demand for CPO is the answer. He further emphasises that the biodiesel 
programme is a way to increase the price of CPO in the international market. Thus, 
the palm oil industry sought an opportunity to increase the CPO price by relying on 
the biodiesel industry to increase its production using CPO as feedstock (which 
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would increase CPO demand). Next, I will discuss how the palm oil industry used its 
bargaining position to influence government policy and benefit the industry. 
 
7.3.1. Establishment of the CPO Supporting Fund: An Incentive for the 
Government?  
The fall in the CPO price in 2014 happened at around the same time that the 
government decided not to allocate a subsidy to the biofuel industry in 2015. Thus, 
some large palm oil companies recommended that the government establish a trust 
fund for the palm oil industry. Respondent R1 stated: 
“BPDPKS15 appeared officially as the initiative of the government c.q16. the 
Ministry of Finance, but its formation came from a recommendation by the 
large palm oil companies due to low CPO prices caused by the reduction 
in world demand for CPO. It was hoped that a burgeoning biofuel industry, 
would increase demand for CPO and subsequently increase the price of 
palm oil.”  
“After repeated discussions, the palm oil bosses agreed to form the 
BPDP(KS), and they’re trying to find its hook within the regulations and 
they found it in the Law on Plantations. Everything fits there except for the 
energy issue” 
(R1, Biofuel company representative, May 2017) 
The first excerpt indicates that the large palm oil companies recommended that the 
government create dana perkebunan kelapa sawit (DPKS) or a CPO supporting 
                                                          
15 BPDPKS is acronym of Badan Pengelola Dana Perkebunan Kelapa Sawit or CPO Supporting Fund 
Agency. 
16 c.q. is abbreviation of latin word ‘casu quo’ which means “in which case, if that be the case, in 
particular” (en.wiktionary.org, 2019).. 
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fund. The government also established Badan Pengelola Dana Perkebunan Kelapa 
Sawit (BPDPKS) or the CPO Supporting Fund Agency to manage the fund. The 
respondent further stated that the idea of creating such a fund came from the Law on 
Plantations, which meant that the palm oil industry legitimately utilized another 
regulation to facilitate the government in implementing the industry’s 
recommendation. To be precise, the palm oil industry through its elites 
recommended that the government execute the mandate from the Law on 
Plantations to create the CPO supporting fund as a means to increase the price of 
CPO in the international market by using the fund to finance the government’s 
biofuel policy. In this context, the establishment of the CPO supporting fund would 
seem to be a means of executing government policy instead of a recommendation 
from the palm oil industry.  
The Law on Plantations mentioned by respondent R1 is the original regulation. Part 
of this law regulates the financing of plantations as stated below: 
“(1) Financing of state-owned plantations comes from the central 
government budget. 
(2) Financing of regional government owned plantations comes from the 
regional government budget. 
(3) Financing of privately-owned plantations comes from a fund that 
collects from plantation business actors, financing institutions, 
communities and others. 
(4) Collection of funds from plantation business actors as referred to in 
paragraph (3) is used for human resource development, research and 
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development, plantation promotion, rejuvenation of plantation crops, 
facilities and infrastructure. 
(5) Further provisions regarding the collection of funds from plantation 
business actors, financing institutions and communities as referred to in 
paragraph (4) is regulated in a Government Regulation.” 
(Law Number 39, 2014, Article 93) 
The foundation used as the legal basis for establishing the CPO supporting fund is 
based on Article 93 of the Law on Plantations. Article 93 regulates the financing 
method for plantations where clause three states that private plantations should be 
privately financed either independently or through financing institutions such as 
banks or other legitimate funding sources. However, the Law on Plantations does not 
mention the type of crops to be financed using plantation funds. This inadequacy in 
the Law on Plantations (i.e. failing to mention the crops eligible under the trust fund) 
is quickly rectified through the enactment of Government Regulation Number 24 
(2015) on Collection of Plantation Funds which states: 
“(1) Fund collection is purported to develop sustainable plantations. 
 (2) Fund collection is conducted for strategic plantation commodities. 
 (3) These strategic plantation commodities are palm oil, coconut, rubber, 
coffee, cacao, sugarcane and tobacco.” 
(Government Regulation Number 2, 2015, Article 3)   
The excerpt above shows that the government has created a regulation to define the 
type of crops that can use the plantation fund mechanism, which in this case are 
crops that are considered as strategic to the national interest. Thus, the government 
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has created a fundamental reason to create the CPO supporting fund based on the 
regulation above.  
Moreover, the Law on Plantations also mentions that the use of the plantation 
financing fund is specifically designated for plantation activities that exclude the 
subsidizing of biofuels. This would explain the second comment from respondent R1 
above when he mentions that the legal base for establishing the CPO supporting 
fund is available in the Law on Plantations although the energy related issue is not 
covered. Thus, the government used Government Regulation Number 24 (2015) to 
cover this deficit as the regulation stated: 
 “Funds collected are used for the purposes of: 
a. human resource development for plantations; 
b. research and development of plantations; 
c. promotion of plantations; 
d. rejuvenation of plantations; and 
e. facilities and infrastructure of plantations.” 
(Government Regulation Number 24, 2015, Article 9, Clause 1) 
 “Use of funds collected is included in fulfilling food needs, industrial down-
streaming and utilization of biodiesel.”  
(Government Regulation Number 24, 2015, Article 9, Clause 2) 
The above excerpts indicate that the government created a legal justification for 
specifically using the plantation fund to finance the biodiesel industry. The excerpts 
from Government Regulation Number 24 (2015) Article 3 and Article 9 highlight a 
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serious government commitment to creating a legal base for the use of the plantation 
financing fund, collected from private companies, to finance its biodiesel programme.  
Although the government mentioned several crops that are considered as nationally 
strategic, palm oil is the only crop that has the plantation fund established. This 
suggests that the government is targeting the palm oil plantation fund to support its 
biodiesel programme. This is evident with the issue of Presidential Regulation 
Number 61 (2015) on the Collection and Use of the CPO Supporting Fund as this is 
a derivative regulation from Government Regulation Number 24 (2015). 
Interestingly, Government Regulation Number 24 (2015) and Presidential Regulation 
Number 61 (2015) were signed by the President and came into effect on 18th May 
2015. This was highly unusual since there is normally a brief period of time between 
an issue of a regulation and the issuance of its derivatives. This ‘brief period of time’ 
could be translated as that required to go through the government’s bureaucratic 
processes, which could take several months. This arduous process had previously 
caused problems for biofuel policy incentives, such as the VAT rebate, that rendered 
it useless for the biofuel industry (as discussed in Chapter 6). Moreover, there are 
many clauses within both policy documents that indicate copy and paste statements, 
or where the only change is the word ‘plantation’ to ‘palm oil plantation’. I have 
highlighted some of the most relevant clauses for the analysis in this chapter in 
Table 7.4. It seems that both policy documents were drafted at the same time which 
suggests that the government was focusing its attention on palm oil and not any 
other crops.  
255 
 
 
The fact that both policies were implemented at the same date and had similar 
wording indicates the strong political will of the top political elites, notably the 
President, to implement the palm oil plantation fund or dana perkebunan kelapa 
sawit also known as the CPO supporting fund. Moreover, the government through 
the Ministry of Finance issued MoF Regulation Number 113 (2015), which is a 
regulation to manage the collection of the CPO supporting fund by establishing 
BPDPKS or the CPO Supporting Fund Agency. This regulation was put into effect on 
10th June 2015 less than a month after the implementation of the previous two 
regulations. Thus, there are three regulations that the government issued to create 
the legal base, as well as the mechanism for managing the fund, with all of them 
formulated and implemented within a period of less than one month.  
The speed in developing the whole legal basis from Government Regulation Number 
24 (2015) to MoF Regulation Number 113 (2015) shows the effectiveness of the 
influence of the top political elite when implementing a policy. This also suggests that 
Government Regulation Number 24 (2015) Presidential Regulation Number 61 (2015)
“The Plantation Fund is intended to encourage the
development of the sustainable plantation.”
“The CPO supporting fund (CSF) is intended to encourage
the development of the sustainable palm oil plantation.”
(Article 3, Clause 1) (Article 2, Clause 1)
“The Fund is collected from plantation companies, financing
agencies, public fund, and others.”
“The fund is collected from palm oil companies, financing
agencies, public funds, and others.”
(Article 4) (Article 2, Clause 2)
“Funds collected from plantation companies come from
export levies, for plantation commodities, and subscription
fees.”
“Funds collected from palm oil companies come from
export levies, for the CPO product and its derivatives, and
subscription fees.”
(Article 5, Clause 1) (Article 3, Clause 1)
“Funds collected are used for the purposes of: “Funds collected are used for the purposes of:
a. human resource development for plantations; a. human resource development for palm oil plantations;
b. research and development of plantations; b. research and development of palm oil plantations;
c. promotion of plantations; c. promotion of palm oil plantations;
d. rejuvenation of  plantations; and d. rejuvenation of palm oil plantations; and
e. facilities and infrastructure of  plantations.” e. facilities and infrastructure of palm oil plantations.”
(Article 9, Clause 1) (Article 11, Clause 1)
“Use of funds collected include fulfilling food needs,
industrial down streaming and utilization of biofuel.” 
“Use of funds collected include fulfilling food needs, palm
oil industrial down streaming, and utilization of biodiesel.” 
(Article 9, Clause 2b) (Article 11, Clause 2)
Sources: Author created
Table 7.4
Comparison of Two Policy Documents that Regulate the Plantation Fund Establishment
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the top political elites are the most important figures to intervene in policy 
implementation in Indonesia. The involvement of these political figures in the 
creation of the CPO supporting fund eradicated the government red tape usually 
witnessed in policy creation. The regulations detailed above also suggest that the 
government took seriously the palm oil industry recommendation to establish a CPO 
supporting fund.  
Government actions suggest that money was needed to finance the biofuel 
programme and these funds could not be allocated from the government budget due 
to political reasons (as discussed in Chapter 6 and in the earlier section of this 
chapter). Thus, it could be argued that the palm oil industry indicated a way for the 
government to fund its biofuel programme without resorting to government funds and 
which could also be implemented legally. This also suggests that the CPO 
supporting fund became the incentive for the government to speed up the process of 
creating the relevant regulations. Thus, instead of having large agro companies 
benefiting from biofuel policy implementation such as those in the US (Gillon, 2010) 
and Brazil (Hollander, 2011; White and Dasgupta, 2011), establishment of the CPO 
supporting fund has positioned the Indonesian government as the benefactor for its 
own biofuel policy. However, it does not mean that the palm oil industry suffers a 
loss, as the CPO supporting fund is the policy recommended by the industry to 
benefit them. To understand how the CPO supporting fund benefits the palm oil 
industry, I will discuss how the fund is collected and its impact on the palm oil 
industry in the next subsection. 
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7.3.2. The Price of the CPO Supporting Fund: Government Patronage for the 
Palm Oil Industry    
The establishment of the CPO supporting fund has created a mutual relationship 
between the government and the large palm oil industry. Oliviera et al. (2017) assert 
that biofuel policy creates state-corporate alliances in cases where the government 
needs large corporations’ support in solving energy security problems. This, in turn, 
creates new markets for the corporation to capitalize on and profit from. Their 
research compares the reality of biofuel policy implementation in Brazil, the USA and 
the EU where such patterns exist and exposes the negative consequences. For 
example, deforestation, workers and farmers exploitation, as well as closures of 
small-scale biofuel producers in favour of large corporate activity to produce biofuel 
at large scale. All of these negative consequences became the paradox of biofuel 
production as it was originally promoted as a green energy source and one that 
would be beneficial for farmers. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s case study shows a 
different way in which biofuel policy implementation has been used by large agro 
industries in accordance with their benefits - this forms the focus of the following 
section.     
The CPO Supporting Fund Agency (hereafter called BPDPKS) collects money for 
the CPO supporting fund by imposing a tax levy on top of the export tax charged to 
palm oil companies that conduct export activity (Table 7.5). Thus, palm oil 
companies need to pay a levy if they want to export their CPO and derivatives 
regardless of the current price of CPO in the international market. Although the levy 
and export tax are essentially government levies, they serve different purposes. The 
funds collected from the export tax will go into the government budget and can be 
spent in accordance with the government’s budgetary plan. However, the funds 
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collected from the levy can only be used for the purposes stipulated in Presidential 
Regulation Number 61 (2015, Article 11). 
 
The BPDPKS 2017 Annual Report (p.6) indicates that the funds collected from palm 
oil companies contributed more than 95% of the total funds collected in 2016 and 
2017 where 21.1% and 79.0% respectively were spent from the collected fund for 
subsidizing biodiesel (Table 7.6). These amounts comprise more than 90% of the 
agency’s total expenditure across both years. Thus, it can be said that the 
government collected money from palm oil companies to fund its biodiesel 
programme. Since, BPDPKS is a government body, which is not meant to profit from 
its activity, any surplus or deficit is to be reported to the government before BPDPKS 
can use the funds for the next year’s activities. The government could now fund the 
biodiesel programme without the need to spend any public funds, since the money 
collected from the palm oil companies is more than enough to cover the cost of the 
biodiesel subsidy.  
>US$750
/ton
>US$800
/ton
>US$850
/ton
>US$900/
ton
>US$950/t
on
>US$1,000
/ton
>US$1,050
/ton
>US$1,1
00/ton
>US$1,1
50/ton
>US$1,2
00/ton
>US$1,2
50/ton
1 Fruits, kernel and empty shell
2 CPO and CPKO
3 Cooking oil and stearin (prior 
to refinery)
4 Oil and stearin from kernel 
(prior to refinery) and PFAD
5 Other PFAD 
6 Cooking oil (after refinery)
7 Process CPO dan stearin 
(after refinery)
8 Cooking oil in branded pack ≤ 
20kg
9 Biodiesel 
Tax Rate > 0
Tax Rate = 0
Source: Based on MoF Regulation Number 140 (2016) and MoF Regulation 114 (2015)
Table 7.5
Levy and Export Tax on Palm Products
Products                        Price
Levy 
(USD)
Export Tax (%)
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Although the new policy scheme seems to benefit biodiesel companies at the 
expense of the palm oil industry, it actually benefits biodiesel companies with ties to 
palm oil companies as two respondents stated: 
“The establishment of BDPKS is only benefiting palm oil companies that 
are also engaged in biodiesel, as pure biodiesel companies have all been 
shut down.” 
(R22, Palm oil company representative, May 2017) 
“The subsidy has been helpful (for the company), although it came from 
palm oil producers and exporters.”   
(R21, Biodiesel company representative, May 2017) 
The analysis in the earlier section of this chapter showed that independent biodiesel 
companies had shut down their operations due to the combined effect of MEMR 
Decree Number 219 (2010) and the changing policy in the EU (Indonesia’s prime 
biodiesel market). Thus, the only biodiesel companies that still operate are those that 
2016** 2017***
- Income from palm oil companies levy 2,915,076         3,473,661         
- Other income 122,099            117,179            
Total 3,037,175         3,590,840         
- Incentive for biodiesel production 641,741            2,840,184         
- Other expenditure 43,158              61,597              
Total 684,899            2,901,782         
2,352,276         689,058            
*) For the period end in 31 March
**) 9 months of operation 
***) 1 year of operation
Source: Based on BPDPKS Annual Report of 2017
Income
Expenditure
Surplus
Table 7.6
BPDPKS Summary of Financial Statement of 2016 and 2017*
(Milion of Rupiah)
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have become the palm oil subsidiary company. With the implementation of the CPO 
supporting fund, palm oil companies essentially pay the price difference between the 
cost of biodiesel production and the fossil fuel market to biodiesel producers, which 
are in effect subsidiary companies. To be more precise, the palm oil companies are 
subsidizing their own biodiesel companies and legitimizing their action by involving 
the government through the establishment of CPO supporting fund.  
The creation of the CPO supporting fund meant that large palm oil companies gained 
a double benefit - economically and politically. From the economic perspective, 
subsidizing biodiesel companies increased palm oil demand from the respective 
industry, which also increased the price of CPO in the international market. 
Respondent R7 stated: 
“What is most important for this policy is not the effect on biodiesel 
production, but what comes after with the price of CPO as the price 
rebounded.” 
(R7, Government official representative, April 2017) 
According to R7’s statement, the new policy successfully increased demand for palm 
oil and subsequently increased the price of CPO. Moreover, Figure 7.3 (red arrow) 
also shows that the price of CPO in the international market was rebounding - with 
the CPO price showing an increasing trend following its lowest price in November 
2015. The increase in the CPO price at the beginning of 2016 suggested that the 
palm oil industry’s decision to pay the government levy to subsidize the biodiesel 
industry had been an economically strategic action. Biodiesel industry demand for 
CPO increased and this subsequently increased the price of CPO. This would 
eventually lead to an increase in the revenues of palm oil companies. Thus, by 
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subsidizing its own subsidiary companies, the palm oil industry managed to benefit 
from the increased price of CPO on the international market. 
 
From the political perspective, the establishment of BPDPKS increased the palm oil 
industry’s prestige within the government. As such, the government became the 
patron of the palm oil industry, particularly as regards its lobbying of countries that 
established trade barriers that impacted Indonesia’s palm oil or biodiesel trade. 
Respondent R1 stated this succinctly: 
“APROBI along with the government c.q the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Trade and the Directorate General of EBTKE of the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources are trying to lobby EU countries to ensure 
that no subsidies are introduced for Indonesia’s biodiesel products that 
enter their markets.” 
(R1, Representative of biodiesel company, May 2017) 
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Furthermore, as smallholders are the second biggest contributor to the palm oil 
industry, it is necessary to prevent the CPO price from continuously decreasing to 
protect them. Thus, government support for the palm oil industry was driven by the 
pretext of protecting smallholders and their interests. As the Coordinating Minister of 
Maritime Affairs stated in the media: 
“I am strongly defending this palm oil (industry) because it concerns the 
fate of the small people. The President also speaks out strongly on this 
matter.” 
(Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, Speech in front of the media, 27 March 2019) 
The excerpt above is part of the speech by the Coordinating Minister of Maritime 
Affairs in response to the European Commission verdict to forbid the use of palm oil-
based biodiesel because it causes deforestation (www.wartakota.tribunnews.com, 
29 March 2019). This recent event gives a strong indication of the Indonesian 
government’s support for the palm oil industry, particularly when policies in other 
countries negatively impact the industry.  
Government patronage towards the palm oil industry can be justified as a means of 
defending the interests of smallholders and workers in plantation companies, 
because the impact of a low CPO price would hit smallholders the most. Also, large 
palm oil plantations employ hundreds of thousands of workers and the industry’s 
demise would mean increased national unemployment. Thus, government 
intervention in lobbying countries that establish trade barriers impacting either palm 
oil or palm oil-based biodiesel is important as means to secure the future of 
Indonesia’s palm oil industry. However, it is large palm oil companies that reap the 
benefit of government actions lobbying foreign markets to relax their policies towards 
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palm oil and palm oil-based biodiesel products from Indonesia, as they are the ones 
who gain the most from the increasing price of CPO.    
The establishment of the CPO supporting fund has indicated how the palm oil 
industry overcame the government’s insufficient political commitment towards the 
biofuel policy. On the one hand, palm oil companies were concerned by the sharp 
decrease in the price of CPO which reduced their profits. On the other hand, the 
heavily politicised biofuel sector rendered the government unable to implement its 
biofuel policy efficiently. This enabled the palm oil industry to propose that the 
government create the CPO supporting fund and use it to fund the biodiesel 
programme. The government viewed the CPO supporting fund as the answer to its 
burdensome biofuel problems as the palm oil companies would finance the fund. 
This meant the palm oil industry supported the government’s biodiesel programme 
financially without recourse to the government’s budget. For the palm oil industry, the 
act of financing the government’s biodiesel programme meant sacrificing a small 
amount of profit but increased the price of CPO, which increased their own profits 
with the additional bonus of government patronage for the industry.  
Furthermore, the government now relies on the palm oil industry to support its biofuel 
policy - this is not only limited to the bonding of the palm oil and biodiesel industries, 
but also relates to the financing of the policy through the establishment of the CPO 
supporting fund. As such, the palm oil industry has become profoundly involved with 
the government’s biofuel policy, with the industry aiding the government to establish 
the CPO supporting fund to create a sustainable palm oil plantation as its 
justification. Castan-Broto (2018) highlights the use of government funds for low 
carbon delivery projects that provide sustainable benefits such as providing energy 
access to marginal communities and carbon emission reduction. Legally, the CPO 
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supporting fund is a government fund purported to create sustainable palm oil 
production which potentially reduces carbon emissions and is beneficial for small 
rural farmers. However, the fund is hardly considered as a green financial fund since 
the majority is used to fuel biodiesel companies within the palm oil industry. Indeed, 
the palm oil industry is a key stakeholder with an interest in the fund as it both 
contributes to and benefits from the fund.  
With the establishment of the CPO supporting fund, Indonesia’s biofuel policy has, in 
reality, twisted into a palm oil biodiesel policy, since it is only biodiesel companies 
that have ties with the palm oil industry that are still in operation. This situation arose 
due to a multi-faceted policy traceable back to Indonesia’s past agrarian policy in the 
1970s. Oliviera et al. (2017) argue that agro-fuel alliances occur as a result of 
complex political economics in countries that implement biofuel policies. This is 
reflected in the Indonesian biofuel policy as its implementation was influenced by 
crop-related politics even before the government decided on the policy. This factor 
along with insufficient political commitment in policy implementation has led the palm 
oil industry to become the champion of Indonesia’s biofuel policy.  
    
7.4. Summary and Conclusion  
Several case studies have shown that agro-fuel alliances can form due to the 
responses of industrial actors towards the government’s intention to resolve energy 
security issues through the implementation of biofuel policies (Gillon 2010; Wilkinson 
and Herrera, 2011; Oliviera et al., 2017). These analyses have shown that industrial 
actors profit from governments’ biofuel policies, such as mandatory blending targets 
and subsidies. Indonesia’s biofuel politics (as presented in this chapter) have given a 
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new insight into the emergence of agro-fuel alliances – showing that they can also 
arise from the implementation of government policies in the agro-industry sector to 
promote the development of a derivative industry related to a certain crop. 
The analysis presented in this chapter has shown the way the government’s interest 
in developing the palm oil derivatives industry has intersected with biofuel policy, 
resulting in an opportunity for the palm oil industry to profit from biofuel policy 
implementation. To be more precise, government interests in developing a palm oil-
based industry has allowed the industry to capitalize on government policy through 
integrating the biodiesel industry into its business conglomeration. Nevertheless, the 
agro-fuel alliances consolidated through the Palm Oil Down-Streaming Policy have 
also created a vicious circle for the government. On one hand, the government 
needed to finance its biofuel programme, but did not want to use public funds. On 
the other hand, palm oil companies have an interest in increasing the CPO price and 
recognised that an increase in demand for palm oil-based biodiesel would mean an 
increase in demand for CPO, followed by an increase in the price of CPO.  
Subsidizing the government biofuel policy through the CPO supporting fund would  
also create government dependence on the palm oil industry to pay for its biofuel 
program. In exchange the palm oil industry could claim government patronage over 
the industry essentially creating ‘state – corporate alliances’ (Oliviera et al., 2017, 
p.9) 
The analysis in this chapter has also shown the importance of understanding the 
political economy of biofuels as this fundamentally influenced the government when 
implementing its policy. Agro-fuel alliances do not merely emerge due to the flexible 
usage of crops produced by large agro-industry as argued by agrarian political 
economists (e.g. Gillon, 2010, 2016; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; White and 
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Dasgupta, 2011), but are part of a multi-faceted political processes as suggested by 
Oliviera et al. (2017). The bonding of the biodiesel industry with the palm oil industry 
occurred not as a means of business consolidation to profit from biofuel policy, but 
as a counter response to government policies on both biofuel and palm oil.  
The lack of concerted political commitment to biofuel policy - owing in part to 
incumbency associated with fossil fuels - ultimately gave large industrial actors the 
ability to reshape government policy in accordance with their own interests. In 
particular, it created an opportunity for the palm oil industry to influence government 
biofuel policy and achieve its own ends, that is to increase the price of CPO. Thus, it 
is suggested that strong and consistent political commitment, particularly from the 
top political elites, is required to effectively implement biofuel policy designed to 
address core policy problems of environmental degradation, rural poverty, and 
energy security. In this case, ultimately the policy has over taken by economic 
interests and the motives of market actors focused on profiting from biofuel with little 
care about achieving policy objectives.  
The Indonesian case study on biofuel has shown that an agro-fuel alliance does not 
necessarily occur due to the opportunity for profit that large agro-industry seeks 
when the government implements a biofuel policy. Instead, the underlying political 
economy of biofuel was the main driver for biofuel companies bonding with large 
agro industries. The politics of biofuel have not only promoted unsatisfactory policy 
implementation, but also created an opportunity for the large palm oil industry to 
intervene and influence contemporary biofuel policy. Furthermore, government 
politics around biofuels have allowed large agro industries to influence government 
policy and even receive government support. Oliviera et al. (2017) argue the 
importance of critically examining the underlying political economy of biofuel to 
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understand which aspects can be transformed to increase the sustainability of 
biofuel production. In the case of Indonesia, I have further argued that commitment 
from political elites was essential for the effective implementation of a strong biofuel 
policy - because without strong political will the policy is likely to only serve the 
agenda of large agro companies. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
Prior to this thesis, there has been some limited research on biofuel policies in 
Indonesia (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Afiif, 2014; Fatimah, 2015). However, these studies 
address only two aspects of Indonesia’s biofuel policy: the government’s initial 
intention for developing a biofuel industry; and the failure of the jatropha initiative in 
biofuel policy implementation. Although these previous studies discussed the cause 
of the failure of jatropha, they only examined how the jatropha crop emerged as the 
focus of biofuel policy and the inability of jatropha farmers to supply the biofuel 
industry, they did not extend their analyses to the historical and political-economic 
dynamics that underpin the trajectory of Indonesia’s biofuel policy development.  
Outside of the Indonesian context, most biofuel studies using the lens of political 
ecology are only focused on the socio-ecological impact of agro-fuel alliances within 
the biofuel energy system (e.g. Searchinger et al., 2008; Fargione et al., 2008; 
Fernandez et al., 2010; Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; Obidzinsky et al., 2012). 
Meanwhile, those studies using the lens of agrarian political economy have tended to 
look at the way the large agro-industries have benefitted from specific biofuel 
policies, which have ultimately become the foundation for agro-fuel alliances (e.g. 
Boras Jr et al., 2011; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011; Gillon, 2010, 2016; Oliviera et al., 
2017). Most of these studies, with the exception of Oliviera et al. (2017), do not delve 
further into discussion of the underlying political economy that shapes the ways 
governments formulate biofuel policy and (un)intentionally support the formation of 
agro-fuel alliances.  
269 
 
Oliviera et al. (2017) assert that the formation of agro-fuel alliances is synonymous 
with mutual relationships between governments, large agro-industries and biofuel 
companies. Similar to other studies, they highlight how governments intent on 
resolving domestic energy security issues implement policies that enable the 
industrial actors in agriculture and biofuel to benefit from newly created markets. 
Furthermore, they also examine why certain agro-industries come to dominate 
biofuel markets and eventually influence governmental biofuel policy - this is core to 
the research and analysis within this research. However, they do not focus on the 
history of policy and politics in shaping contemporary biofuel policy – as addressed 
in Chapter 2 - and thus, limit the emphasis placed on the role of biofuel companies 
compared to agro industries within attempts to understand the alliance. Thus, this 
research thesis has addressed the dynamic of political economy in Indonesia’s 
biofuel policy. The underlying politics of biofuels are undoubtedly influenced by the 
past politics of crops which reshape contemporary biofuel policy. The situation is 
also exacerbated by insufficient political commitment that eventually paved the way 
for the large palm oil industry to have hegemony over biofuel policy. 
The politics of biofuels in this research has increased our understanding of the 
underlying political economy of biofuels which needed to be expanded within political 
ecology and agrarian political economy literature. As most of political ecology 
literature focuses on the environmental and social impacts of biofuel production on a 
large scale, this research addresses the multifaceted nature of Indonesia’s economic 
policy that caused the government to endorse biofuel production on a large scale 
and rely on the large agro-palm industry to support the biofuel industry. This could 
potentially create what Oliviera et al. (2017) describe as ‘political ecological blind 
spots’ since government reliance on large agro-industry to support its biofuel policy 
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has been the cause of the negative environmental and social outcomes associated 
with the production of its feedstock. Through the lens of agrarian political economy, it 
is also revealed that the history of the agrarian policy for certain crops can shape 
and reshape the biofuel policy implemented decades later. Thus, this research had 
used a combination of both literatures to understand the politics of biofuel in 
Indonesia, its actors and the intersections between different interests that eventually 
twisted the policy.      
This final chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the key 
findings from each empirical chapter and how they synthesize and contribute to the 
existing body of knowledge. The second section reflects on the limitations of this 
research, as well as potential research areas that could be addressed in the future to 
complement this research. The third section, discusses the possible implications for 
policy and practice.  Given this study is about Indonesia’s biofuel policy and has 
been sponsored by the Indonesian government, I consider some more applied 
recommendations for the problems that have been identified in this research. 
 
8.1. The Politicization of Biofuels: From Crop Politics to Agro-Fuel Alliances   
This analysis began with a look at the beginnings of Indonesian government policy 
on biofuels. The research highlighted how initially biofuel policy was viewed as a 
means to solving problems of energy security and rural poverty by encouraging 
farmers and smallholders to plant sugarcane for developing bioethanol and jatropha 
for developing biodiesel (Amir et al., 2008; Afiff, 2014; Fatimah, 2015). Such early 
policy attempts were to culminate in failure and ultimately Indonesia’s biofuel policy 
became one that largely facilitated the interests of large palm oil companies.  
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Although this research has focused on Indonesia as a case study, the emergence of 
alliances between large agro-industry and biofuel producers has been seen in many 
countries that implemented biofuel policies, including Brazil, the USA and the EU 
(Oliviera et al., 2017). Using the lens of political ecology and agrarian political 
economy together, this analysis of Indonesia’s biofuel policy offers an alternative 
perspective on the emergence of agro-fuel alliances, which arises out of the 
intersection between the two bodies of knowledge (see Picture 2.1 in Chapter 2). 
There are three key findings in this research that I assert enhance our current 
knowledge and understanding of the rise of agro-fuel alliances within the biofuel 
energy system: 1) the significance of past agrarian policy for shaping contemporary 
policy trajectories; 2) the role of markets; and 3) the importance of elite political 
commitment. 
1) The role of past agrarian transformation in influencing contemporary biofuel policy. 
Past agrarian policy has been largely under-examined within biofuel studies, 
particularly within the Indonesian context, where I argue it has been of utmost 
importance in shaping the trajectory of biofuel policy. The relevance of historical 
agrarian policy is primarily discussed in Chapter 4 where I analyse the two different 
crops that came to dominate biofuel feedstock in Indonesia i.e. sugarcane for 
bioethanol and palm oil for biodiesel.  
Both sugar cane and palm oil had a similar historical policy background in the 1970s 
and 1980s, when the government focused its policy on both crops in an attempt to 
increase the welfare of farmers and rural workers. I argue that government aims to 
increase rural welfare were inspired by historical agrarian policy that dated back to 
the colonial era, particularly for the sugar industry. This is because the colonial 
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government had successfully made the pre-independence Indonesian sugar industry 
the second largest producer in the world, while using small-scale farmers as the 
industrial backbone. At this time the profits from the sugar industry went to the 
colonial government, but farmers were able to generate large supplies inspiring the 
Indonesian government’s agrarian policy transformation. The government’s 
sugarcane policy in the 1970s and 1980s thus attempted to emulate colonial policy, 
but more effectively share the profit of the industry with farmers.  
The government later expanded its pro-farmers policy to palm oil crops to enable 
small scale farmers to benefit where previously only industrial plantations had done 
so due to various physical and industrial characteristics. Nonetheless, these pro-
farmers policies culminated in different outcomes for sugarcane and palm oil. Where 
the sugarcane agro-industry became fragmented and disintegrated, the palm oil 
industry became cohesive and larger with private companies and smallholders 
dominating the industry. I have asserted that the different outcomes for both crops 
set the stage for biofuel policy implementation in 2006, which saw sugarcane used to 
supply the bioethanol industry and jatropha (and later palm oil) used to supply the 
biodiesel industry.  
The fragmented sugarcane industry proved unable to supply the bioethanol industry 
despite large potential within the domestic market. Conversely, palm oil became the 
biodiesel industry’s preference for producing biodiesel, neglecting the government’s 
preference for jatropha. I have shown how the different outcomes of the bioethanol 
and biodiesel industries were largely determined by their supplier. The palm oil agro-
industry has an interconnected industrial chain that makes its output, crude palm oil 
(CPO) cheap and abundant, leading it to become the primary option for producing 
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biodiesel. Meanwhile, within the domestic sugar industry there was not enough 
capacity to produce cheap and reliable feedstock for the bioethanol industry.   
The analysis presented in Chapter Four has contributed to our understanding that 
the historical background of agrarian policy relating to different crops is an important 
aspect in the implementation of biofuel policies. Agrarian policy implementation in 
the past has not only shaped contemporary policy but has also determined industrial 
performance in respect to the different crops and ultimately influenced the biofuel 
industry’s performance. Importantly, this also contributed to the way the biofuel 
industry bonded with its feedstock industry, with one fuel type and relevant feedstock 
(biodiesel - palm oil) coming to dominance over the other (bioethanol - sugar cane).   
2) Understanding the dynamic of biofuel market structure. 
Most biofuel studies argue that a biofuel policy creates new lucrative markets from 
which private institutions can capitalize (e.g. Holander, 2011; Gillon, 2010, 2016; 
Wilkinson and Herrera, 2011). However, the idea that biofuel policy creates a new 
market needs to be refined to include consideration of who would benefit from this 
market. In Indonesia, the biodiesel industry thrived with its market growing, while the 
bioethanol industry failed despite the government’s attempts to develop both 
biodiesel and bioethanol industries. Indeed, Indonesia’s biofuel policy 
implementation created a potentially large domestic market for both bioethanol and 
biodiesel. Nevertheless, only the biodiesel industry prevailed while the bioethanol 
industry flopped. This shows that there are other factors, beyond government policy, 
that shape the biofuel industry and influence its ability to consolidate its business. 
The analysis of biofuel market structure for both bioethanol and biodiesel in Chapter 
5 revealed that only large and cohesive agro-industries were able to benefit from the 
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government’s biofuel policy. Although this was the apparent result of past agrarian 
policy as discussed above, a careful examination of market structure shows another 
factor that reshaped the conditions of Indonesia’s biofuel policy implementation i.e. 
the purpose for which biofuels were produced. Biodiesel is produced solely for fuel 
purposes, while bioethanol can be used flexibly for non-fuel purposes. Moreover, the 
bioethanol industry had already been developed for non-fuel purposes with a well-
established market prior to biofuel policy implementation, despite the fact that the 
industry was struggling to secure feedstock.  
In order to win themarket competition, biofuel needed to be competitive against its 
fossil fuel contender. The biodiesel industry could meet this requirement providing it 
used palm oil as its feedstock, while bioethanol could not. Bioethanol, however, 
already had a secure market for non-fuel purposes. This meant that fuel ethanol (FE) 
had to compete against industries needed bioethanol for non-fuel purpose and the 
fossil fuel industry. Thus, where biofuel policy implementation created a new 
lucrative market opportunity for biodiesel, it created only a new contender for the 
product within the bioethanol market.   
The government’s decision to regulate the domestic blended fuel market escalated 
the domestic biofuel situation. By appointing the state oil company Pertamina, as the 
sole blender for biofuel sold in the domestic market, the government limited domestic 
biofuel consumers. This was particularly important as biofuel needs to be blended 
with fossil fuel to be used in the engines of most vehicles. Pertamina’s decision to 
buy biofuel was influenced by the biofuel price compared with that of fossil fuel. For 
the biodiesel industry, such a condition would be overcome as they could sell to both 
the domestic and overseas markets. However, the bioethanol industry encountered 
more problems than the biodiesel industry in producing fuel (i.e. arising from 
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government tax policies), but did not need to compete with the fossil fuel industry 
since there were several other industries that needed bioethanol in their production 
lines. This made the production of bioethanol for fuel purposes become less 
attractive as a market for bioethanol producers.   
Thus, by understanding biofuel market structure, it becomes apparent that the 
absence of other market contenders competing for the same product is an important 
factor in terms of the impact of biofuel policies. This is an important finding as 
although policy implementation may create a new market as highlighted in previous 
research (e.g. Eden, 2012; Van Dam et al., 2008; Gillon, 2010, 2016; Wilkinson and 
Herrera, 2011), this study has shown that attentiveness to the wider market context 
for specific biofuel products and their feedstocks is required.   
In the context of Indonesia’s biofuel policy, past agrarian policy has influenced both 
the establishment of large agro-palm industries and the fragmentation of the 
bioethanol market. Meanwhile, biofuel policy implementation made FAME (the palm 
oil-based biodiesel) an important new product in the fuel market with fossil fuel as 
the only contender, but there were not the same implications for bioethanol - 
attesting to the importance of considering the specificities of different types of 
biofuel. Thus, there are two key political-economic factors that can be identified as 
positively contributing to the palm oil industry forging agro-fuel alliances with 
biodiesel companies, whilst having the opposite consequences for bioethanol 
companies. My final contribution to the literature is, I argue, in many senses the 
strongest or most important factor in consolidating and shaping the agro-fuel alliance 
- this is the level of political commitment from key political elites. 
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3)  The importance of insufficient political commitment in implementing biofuel policy. 
Based on the above discussion, the biodiesel industry already had factors that would 
ensure its development by relying only on market mechanisms, as opposed to 
requiring government intervention. Meanwhile, the bioethanol industry did not have 
the same positive factors as its biodiesel counterpart. Swinnen (2010) argued for the 
government to intervene in the sector to alleviate disadvantages that prevented it 
from growing. However, instead of addressing the problem separately for different 
forms of biofuel, the government formulated a policy to incentivise all biofuel 
producers including both bioethanol and biodiesel and directed this policy at the 
domestic market. As this research has shown, the policy failed due to its 
inconsistency with other policies and because ultimately it did not provide the 
industry with what it needed to grow. As such, the biodiesel industry responded to 
government policy failure by selling its product to overseas markets, while the 
bioethanol industry preferred to focus on the non-fuel purpose market, which 
effectively ended the production of bioethanol for fuel purposes.  
Other biofuel studies in countries such as such as Brazil (Wilkinson and Hererra, 
2011) and the US (Gillon, 2010) have shown a strong political commitment to 
implementing a successful biofuel policy. In the context of Indonesia, strong political 
commitment from the top elites did not seem to exist in the same way. The 
government decision to rescind its biofuel subsidy policy in 2015 has further 
confirmed the lack of political commitment in implementing the biofuel policy. I have 
suggested that this may be, in part, due to incumbency associated with the fossil fuel 
industry, although to deepen the strength of such an assertion would require further 
research. Interestingly, I have highlighted how it was precisely the lack of 
government political commitment that created a new opportunity for the large palm 
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oil industry, since, for reasons of economic policy, the government also promoted the 
palm oil down-streaming policy. 
Prior to biofuel policy implementation, the government had already implemented a 
policy designed for the palm oil industry to down-stream its product. This policy was 
meant to increase economic growth and reduce unemployment, particularly within 
the small-scale farming industry. Yet, because palm oil-based biodiesel is 
categorized as a derivative product of palm oil, these two areas of policy (i.e. down-
streaming and biofuel) intersected. With the government being inconsistent in 
implementing its biofuel policy, an opportunity emerged for the palm oil industry to 
comply with the government requirement to down-stream its product while 
maximising its profit by producing biodiesel (FAME), a palm oil derivative.  
Oliviera et al. (2017) argue that biofuel policies implemented in countries such as 
Brazil, the USA and the EU are distorted in accordance with corporate interest for 
profit due to governmental interest in solving energy security problems. They argue 
that agro-fuel alliances within the biofuel system are benefiting from the respective 
government policies through subsidies, mandatory usage and export restrictions. 
Although the Indonesian biofuel policy follows a similar pattern to that discussed by 
Oliviera et al. (2017), it offers a new insight into a vicious circle created by the 
intersecting interests of private industrial stakeholders and governments.  
In the Indonesian case the intersecting interests concern the government’s desire to 
boost economic growth and help small scale farmers by supporting biofuels, but 
without using public funds - and the palm oil industry wanting to keep the price of 
CPO in international markets stable to maintain its profits. By continuing to finance 
biofuel policy the government created demand for biodiesel, which, in turn, created 
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demand for palm oil and led to an increase in the price of CPO. This underpinned the 
case for the CPO supporting fund (discussed in Chapter 7), which saw the funds 
provided by palm oil industries effectively being used as a subsidy for the biodiesel 
programme. Since the palm oil industry was already integrated with the biodiesel 
industry, the subsidy scheme in the CPO supporting fund meant that the palm oil 
industry was in essence paying its own subsidiary companies and using the 
government as legal basis for doing so.  
This mechanism would ensure growing demand for CPO and stabilize or even 
increase CPO prices, maintaining the palm oil industry’s profits, while also ensuring 
the government’s aims of supporting farmers and boosting economic growth were 
met. The legal justification for the policy means the fund’s existence can also be 
perceived as the palm oil industry providing support for the government’s biofuel 
policy. As a consequence, the palm oil industry was able to garner further benefits in 
the form of government patronage due to its strategic role in assisting biofuel policy. 
The establishment of the CPO supporting fund has thus created a state-corporate 
partnership that is beneficial for both government and the palm oil industry which 
difficult to break due to the mutual relationship that has been formed. It becomes 
clear from this that large industries are able to capitalise on diverse forms of policy 
(including economic policy and legal frameworks) to effectively generate financial 
and political support from governments. This means that it is necessary to look 
beyond the remit and actions of the parts of governments focused on energy in order 
to more fully understand the politics of biofuels.     
To conclude, this research has examined the political economic processes, both past 
and present, that have shaped the creation of agro-fuel alliances in the Indonesian 
biofuel energy system. The Indonesian case study has increased understanding of 
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the politics of biofuels by opening up insight into the role of wider processes and 
policies (beyond energy policy) in shaping the emergence and consolidation of agro-
fuel alliances. It has shown how the material nature of crops combine with policy to 
shape outcomes that are often at odds with those apparently intended by the 
government. In doing so, the research has highlighted the importance not only of 
looking beyond energy policy, but of analysing the historical context for policy 
development in order to provide a fuller picture of the emergence of contemporary 
biofuel policy.  
This study thus makes a core contribution to the literature on biofuels within political 
ecology and agrarian political economy by advancing understanding of the 
constitution of agro-fuel alliances.  Although biofuel policy and politics may vary with 
respect to the different countries and different geographical compositions, the case 
of Indonesia’s biofuel policy shows that large agro-industry involvement within the 
biofuel system is constituted through complex processes that emerge over time, not 
all of which are initiated by large industry but rather occur in response to policy, 
market conditions and material politics. Crucially, the extent to which political elites 
are engaged with the processes of policy implementation has been shown to be key 
in the delivery of intended outcomes. While in the case of the earlier policy on 
biofuels there was a clear lack of political will and elite engagement, later policy 
(which was initiated by industry) had clear involvement from elites to ensure it was 
realised in practice. This analysis might potentially explain the reason for the 
contradictions that appear to emerge between the promise of biofuel and the reality 
that occurs.      
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8.2. Future Research             
This research has investigated the politics that shape contemporary biofuel policy 
implementation using a qualitative methodology and analytic approach. Although this 
research has covered the politics engulfing Indonesia’s biofuel policy from its 
historical, market and governance perspectives, there are also areas that have not 
been covered in this research, which could be explored in depth through future 
research. I identify three specific areas through which the research could be taken 
forward and expanded.  
First, there is a need to better understand global influences on domestic biofuel 
policy. This is because one of the reasons for Indonesia’s government offering 
patronage to the palm oil industry was due to the banning of palm oil products in the 
export destination countries and the knock-on effects for the national economy. This 
research does not discuss why these export destination countries banned 
Indonesia’s palm oil products, which actors were involved and how it was related to 
international biofuel politics. Such an examination of the interplay between domestic 
and global-regional policies within the international arena is thus signalled as a 
potentially important area for future research.   
Second, there are important questions more concerned with the micro-politics of 
policy making and the role of policy makers across different scales of government in 
the development and implementation of biofuel policy. For the current research, this 
would mean undertaking research within the Indonesian Parliament, as most 
government policy is discussed with members of Parliament and requires their 
approval. Such a study could potentially challenge (or confirm) the argument I have 
(tentatively) mounted regarding insufficient political commitment being related to the 
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incumbency of the fossil fuel industry. I highlight this because the current study only 
found a conflict of interest at the level of government officials and this could have 
been resolved with strong political commitment from the top political elite. 
Engagement with different scales of government in studies that build on this 
research would thus likely be important both within Indonesia and beyond.   
Third, without the constraints of time, access and financing for the project, it would 
have been better to conduct a longer field study observation and to have undertaken 
more interviews. I would have particularly liked to have been able to gain better 
access to industry actors to develop deeper insights into their perspectives. This 
would have allowed for a stronger understanding of how actors from different 
spheres are interacting and influencing one another. This could also create new 
insights into how biofuel politics influences stakeholders’ actions with implications for 
the trajectory of the biofuel policy.   
 
8.3. Policy Implications 
As a government official of the Ministry of Finance in Indonesia, I am also required to 
suggest solutions to the challenges and problems I have identified. This research 
offers important insights for practice, since biofuel industry performance in meeting 
government targets has been poor to date. Thus, the recommendations in this 
section are concerned with the potential for implementation of the research in the 
real-world context, particularly for Indonesia’s policy makers. Nonetheless, this does 
not mean the recommendations are relevant only for Indonesia. There is a global 
growing interest in deploying low carbon energy systems along with mounting 
evidence that such processes have culminated in unwanted consequences arising 
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during policy implementation (Castan-Broto, 2015) - as highlighted in this research 
biofuel policy is no exception to this trend.  
Based on the discussion in the empirical chapters, I suggest two possible routes to 
help the government in achieving its biofuel policy target. Firstly, since I have argued 
that a key problem is one of political will from the top political elite, it is they who 
need to formulate stronger regulations at higher levels, such as Government 
Regulation and Presidential Regulation levels. This is due to the authority that these 
regulations hold which is stronger than a Ministerial regulation. Stronger regulation 
would also have the potential to force the government’s elite officials to draft a 
biofuel incentive regulation that would benefit all biofuel producers, both biodiesel 
and bioethanol. 
Secondly, since large agro-industry involvement is an integral part of biofuel policy, it 
is important to also limit its activity particularly in terms of expanding plantation sizes. 
This is because plantation companies could expand their plantation sizes by using 
the pretext of supporting the government’s biofuel policy and such processes will 
require oversight to limit or prevent any negative effects from expansion. This would 
also require a strong commitment from the political elites, particularly the President. 
Moreover, limiting palm oil plantation expansion would also positively impact on the 
government lobby towards countries that banned palm oil and its derivative products. 
This is because palm oil plantation expansion is associated with the destruction of 
environment, biodiversity, livelihoods and culture. Thus, limiting expansion would 
show that Indonesia’s palm oil products do not have to be associated with these 
negative issues. 
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These recommendations do not necessarily resolve the problems engulfing 
Indonesia’s biofuel policy implementation. Instead, the possibilities to fix the current 
state of Indonesia’s biofuel policy could also emerge outside the above 
recommendations. However, a changing policy would open new possibilities for 
future research and learning as the approaches evolve. Thus, the recommendations 
provided in this section could also be developed through an exploration of scenarios 
for implementing biofuel policy.           
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Appendix One 
Interview Guide Questions 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL RESPONDENTS  
Theme:  Biofuel Scaling 
1. Tell me about your role or your unit role in delivering or implementing biofuel policy? 
Prompt (if answer is negative) 
- What about your role in delivering or implementing GHG emission reduction/agriculture 
policy? 
- How do you think of the correlation between GHG emission reduction/agriculture policy 
with biofuel policy? 
2. How does biofuel policy being formulated?  
Prompt 
- How is it being formulated? Bottom up/top down process? 
- Who/which unit initiate it? 
- How is it correlated with other policy such as RPJMN and RAN GRK?  
- How is biofuel policy position within the undergoing national general energy plan (RUEN)? 
3. How does biofuel policy being transmitted to the regional government? 
Prompt 
- How is it correlates with RPJMD policy? 
- Does all reg. govt. level (provincial and municipal/residential) have to create subsequent 
policy to implement biofuel policy or its feedstock?  
- Are there any evaluation for the implementation of biofuel policy in regional govt. 
(Provincial and municipal/residential)? 
4. Are there consultation/hearings/discussion with the third party such as academicians, NGOs, 
private stakeholders, regional governments or local people when formulating the biofuel 
policy? 
Prompt 
- How strong does third party engagement with biofuel policy? Is it compulsory or optional?  
- Which level of reg. govt. strongly engage with this policy? Is it provincial or 
municipal/regent level? 
- Who are these private stakeholders? (Biofuel companies or CPO companies; private or SOE) 
- Which party have strongest influence? Is it NGO’s or academician or private stakeholder or 
political will from the top?    
5. How did you evaluate the biofuel mandatory blending policy? 
Prompt 
- Does the target ever achieve?  
- What are constraints and solution for unachieved target? 
6. How is the role of CPO supporting fund (CSF) in achieving the mandatory blending policy? 
(asked to respondent from MoF, MERM, Bappenas and DEN)  
Prompt 
- Does price subsidy is the only mechanism to support blending policy? 
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- Do you think CSF is adequate to achieve the blending policy target (due to the increase 
demand for biofuel)?  
- Any govt. program besides CSF to support biofuel policy? 
Theme: Land Usage 
7. What are the government roles in providing land for biofuel feedstock? 
Prompt 
- Is there any map for marginal land? 
- How is marginal land being defined? 
- How is your involvement in creating map for marginal land? 
8. Are there hearing with the local and indigenous people before deciding sites for biofuel 
feedstock or palm plantation? 
Prompt 
- How do you resolve the land conflict for biofuel refinery sites or feedstock expansion? 
- Are there any active roles by the govt. as a mediator between private stakeholders with the 
local/indigenous people particularly in preventing land conflict? 
9. How does ISPO role in preventing deforestation, forest fire and land conflict for biofuel 
feedstock? (Mainly asked to DEN, MoA, MoFE and Bappenas) 
Promtp 
- Do you think ISPO has positive impact for biofuel policy?  
-  
10. Do you think govt. policies such as CSF, ISPO, RAN GRK are impacting biofuel policy? 
Prompt 
- Negatively/positively? 
- Are there other factors influencing biofuel policies? 
11. Is there anything else you want to ask me?  
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REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RESPONDENTS 
Theme: Biofuel Scaling  
1. Tell me about your role or your unit role in delivering or implementing biofuel policy? 
Prompt (if answer is negative) 
- What about your role in delivering or implementing GHG emission reduction/agriculture 
policy? 
- How do you think of the correlation between GHG emission reduction/agriculture policy 
with biofuel policy? 
2. How does biofuel policy being formulated?  
Prompt 
- How is it being formulated? Bottom up/top down process? 
- If bottom up: Who/which unit initiate it? If top down: how do you follow up this policy?  
3. How does biofuel policy being transmitted to the regional government? 
Prompt 
- How is it correlated with other policy such as RPJMD and RAN GRD? 
- How is biofuel policy position within the regional general energy plan (RUED)? 
- Are there any subsequent policies needed to implement biofuel policy or its feedstock at 
this govt. level? 
- Is there evaluation on biofuel policy implementation at this govt. level or by the central 
authority? 
4. Are there consultation/hearings/discussion with the third party such as academicians, NGOs, 
private stakeholders or local people when formulating the biofuel policy at this government 
level? 
Prompt 
- How strong does third party engagement with biofuel policy? Is it compulsory or optional?  
- Who are these private stakeholders? (Biofuel companies or CPO companies; private or SOE) 
- Which party have strongest influence? Is it NGO’s or academician or private stakeholder or 
political will from the top?    
Theme: Land usage 
5. What are the government roles in providing land for biofuel feedstock? 
Prompt 
- Is there any map for marginal land? 
- How is marginal land being defined? 
- How is your involvement in creating map for marginal land? 
6. Are there hearing with the local and indigenous people before deciding sites for biofuel 
feedstock or palm plantation? 
Prompt 
- How do you resolve the land conflict for biofuel refinery sites or feedstock expansion? 
- Are there any active roles by the govt. at this level as a mediator between private 
stakeholders with the local/indigenous people particularly in preventing land conflict? 
7. How does ISPO role in preventing deforestation, forest fire and land conflict for biofuel 
feedstock? 
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Prompt  
- Do you think ISPO has positive impact for biofuel policy? 
- Do you have any involvement with ISPO? 
8. Do you think govt. policies such as CSF, ISPO, RAN GRD are impacting biofuel policy? 
Prompt 
- Negatively/positively? 
- Are there other factors influencing biofuel policies? 
9. Is there anything else you want to ask me?  
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PRIVATE STAKEHOLDER RESPONDENTS 
Theme: Biofuel Scaling 
1. Tell me about your role in delivering or implementing biofuel policy? 
2. How do you think on government target on B20 and the incoming B30?  
Prompt 
- Is it achievable or too ambitious? Why? 
- What are main policy instrument to support this target? 
- Does the current CSF scheme sufficient for biofuel industry to meet the B20 policy? Why? 
3. What are the obstacles of the implementation of biofuel policy? 
Prompt 
- Are there problems in the bureaucracy (all level)? 
- Are there lack of support from govt.? which level? 
- What are other factors being obstacles for biofuel implementation?   
4. Have you ever been involved in consultation/hearings/discussion with the government or 
NGO/academia when formulating or implementing/evaluating the biofuel policy? 
Prompt 
- Which government level?  
- Which NGO? Local/national/transnational? 
- Can you voice your concern of the policy during the meeting? 
- Are there any follow up with your meetings? (if any) 
- How do you access to government?  
Theme: Land usage 
5. Do you think other government policy, such as ISPO, RAN GRK/RAN GRD, CSF affected on the 
implementation of biofuel policy?  
Prompt 
- How do they affect the policy? Negatively or positively? 
- Is it related on issue such as land usage or others? 
6. Does land availability is a major issue for biofuel development? 
Prompt 
- Do you think the issue involve only with its feedstock? 
- Are there issue on land availability for the refinery site? 
7. Are there hearing with the local and indigenous people before deciding sites for biofuel 
feedstock or palm plantation? 
Prompt 
- How do you resolve the land conflict for biofuel refinery sites or feedstock expansion? 
- Are there any active roles by the govt. as a mediator between you with the local/indigenous 
people particularly in preventing land conflict? 
8. Is there anything else you want to ask me? 
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NGO/ACADEMIA STAKEHOLDER RESPONDENTS 
Theme: Biofuel Scaling 
1. Tell me about your role in delivering or implementing biofuel policy? 
2. How do you think on government target on B20 and the incoming B30?  
Prompt 
- Is it achievable or too ambitious? Why? 
- What are main policy instrument to support this target? 
- Does the current CSF scheme sufficient for biofuel industry to meet the B20 policy? Why? 
3. What are the obstacles of the implementation of biofuel policy? 
Prompt 
- Are there problems in the bureaucracy (all level)? 
- Are there lack of support from govt.? which level? 
- What are other factors being obstacles for biofuel implementation?   
4. Have you ever been involved in consultation/hearings/discussion with the government or 
private stakeholder when formulating or evaluating the biofuel policy? 
Prompt 
- Which government level? 
- Can you voice your concern of the policy during the meeting? 
- Are there any follow up with your suggestion after the meeting? (if any) 
- How do you access to government?  
Theme: Land usage 
5. Do you think other government policy, such as ISPO, RAN GRK/RAN GRD, CSF affected on the 
implementation of biofuel policy?  
Prompt 
- How do they affect the policy? Negatively or positively? 
- Is it related on issue such as land usage or others? 
6. Does land availability is a major issue for biofuel development? 
Prompt 
- Do you think the issue involve only with its feedstock? 
- Are there issue on land availability for the refinery site? 
7. Are there hearing with the local and indigenous people before deciding sites for biofuel 
feedstock or palm plantation? 
Prompt 
- How do you resolve the land conflict for biofuel refinery sites or feedstock expansion? 
- Are there any active roles by the govt. as a mediator between you with the local/indigenous 
people particularly in preventing land conflict? 
8. Is there anything else you want to ask me? 
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Appendix Two 
Coding Process Stage 1 
  
Open code Selective code 
anxiety Energy crisis 
consequences of low fuel reserve   
indonesia become net oil importer 
country   
large trade deficit from energy sector   
06 increase biofuel reduce fossil fuel   
08 Main purpose for biofuel policy   
14 main purpose of biofuel policy   
22 importance of biofuel policy   
9 reasons to pursue biofuel policy   
point out on Indonesia low fuel reserve   
mandatory blending value Economic interest 
non enterprise entity   
production increased because subsidy   
22 Opportunity of biofuel business   
propose solution   
energy exclude   
Biofuel category as oil Biofuel potential  
biofuel role   
Business opportunity   
Cheaper than fossil fuel   
contribution of biofuel to reduce trade 
deficit   
government want private sector to be 
involved in fuel reserve problem   
most of biofuel production goes to 
domestic market   
mutualism between private and 
governmnet   
potential benefit of biofuel   
15 Value of biofuel policy   
07 government policy   
absent of regulation Power between central government ministry 
Power on MERM   
Regulated under MERM   
coordination with MoA   
close relation with top elit to force offcials 
to cooperate   
difficulty to cooperate   
MERM support biofuel industry   
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Ministry of Agriculture support on biofuel   
first time cooperate with other ministry   
losing monopoly on power   
first founder Biofuel industries 
Aprobi expenses   
Independency of biofuel industry   
Membership free   
simple rule   
The growing of biofuel industries   
avoid food crisis Non edible feedstock disadvantage 
14 other types of biofuel   
14 R&D for non CPO feedstock   
Not enough supply   
9 Land problem for non CPO feedstock   
16 disadvantage of using non CPO 
feedstock   
16 MA helps farmer to plant Jathropa Failure of Jathropa 
9 Failure of Jathropa   
yiled of jathropa   
16 absent of mills   
16 Unfavourable small scale   
16 Ministry of agriculture involvement   
9 Farmer scepticism   
expensive   
08 non CPO feedstock colaps   
the use of Jathropa as feedsctok   
strategic of energy industry Oil company & oil business 
other country determine oil price   
importing fossil fuel yield higher profit   
fossil fuel import more profitable   
Hesitation on buying biofuel by Pertamina   
benefit of low CPO price Advantage of CPO as feedstock 
CPO as feedstcok   
CPO availability   
08 CPO advantage   
22 At the beginning of biofuel CPO cheap   
11 CPO advantage from land availability   
14 abundance of CPO   
14 CPO advantage   
16 CPO as feedstcok   
23 CPO advantage   
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07 palm oil dominance   
9 advantage of CPO   
9 cost efficiency   
9 Biofuel problem of land minimal with 
CPO   
9 CPO as the only viable option   
9 no need to convert land   
16 CPO designated as energy crop Positioning in biofuel sector 
9 CPO become priority for feedstock   
02 CPO companies relation   
08 corporate resitant   
22 CPO price compare with others   
11 power on CPO companies   
Relation with oil company Relation with fosiil fuel business 
oil price decline   
oil price skyrocketing   
less profit from biofuel   
issue on price   
9 biofuel impact toward oil import 
business   
9 domestic competition with fossil fuel 
trigered export   
9 low domestic consumption trigred 
export   
21 less prioritize by Pertamina   
22 Pertamina disinterest with biofuel   
Pricing based on fuel quality in sulfur 
content Power on Pertamina over biofuel industries 
20 Pertamina is the biggest biofuel buyer   
Biofuel pays transportation cost   
Pertamina pays transportation cost   
pricing biofuel with oil   
Fierce competition   
compete with fossil fuel   
price disparity   
23 power on Pertamina   
21 Direct appointment to suply subsidized 
biofuel   
22 closeness   
Resentful with pertamina   
23 policy gatekeeper gatekeeper 
23 politics of energy   
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9 effect of invisible hand   
9 invisible hand   
20 Involvement Pertamina in formulating 
biofuel policy but limited on pricing policy 
Relation between Pertamina and central 
government 
08 Power on Pertamina   
22 Power on Pertamina   
expensive biofuel price Feedstock price increase 
Fossil fuel cheaper than biofuel   
23 CPO price volatility   
22 Uncontrolable CPO price   
22 CPO price increase   
CPO price increase   
Subsidy origin Subsidy introduces 
Subsidy to stimulate biofuel industry   
succesfull discussion with parlemen   
Fiscal incentive for biofuel industries   
government responsibility   
21 Biofuel policy ineffective   
08 Disussion with parliament   
Biofuel subsidy was first proposed to 
parliament   
complicated discussion   
reason behind biofuel subsidy Mandatory blending policy 
ambitious policy   
20 Biofuel policy depend on subsidy   
20 Impact of subsidy   
22 Biofuel FAME The need to blend 
22 the need to blend   
9 efect of biofuel to engine   
22 risk of using too much biofuel   
22 ideal blending composition   
22 Biofuel low calori level   
21 biofuel policy under utilized Underutilized 
22 future solution   
22 manufactured process of biofuel   
22 real definition of mandatory blending   
22 refining capacity   
06 CPO companies bargain Power on the CPO companies 
08 palm oil dominance   
CPO down streaming industry   
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gatekeeper of biofuel andCPO company   
22 options for production   
15 GAPKI owned APROBI   
15 involvement in the creation of policy   
08 biofuel behemoth   
22 control of large companies   
22 CPO companies with refinery   
15 CPO companies suplied biofuel 
industry Relations between biofuel and CPO Industry 
22 Biofuel industry as part of CPO 
companies   
22 biofuel and CPO industries mutualism   
23 CPO companies support   
22 Biofuel dependency on CPO   
Biofuel industries as part of CPO 
industries   
Biofuel to support CPO industry   
14 Biofuel policy benefit CPO industry   
22  CPO SOE ability CPO company advantage 
22 CPO company without refinery   
9 Biofuel designated feddstock   
22 the need of refining facility   
22 price determinan   
22 Large CPO companies   
22 disproportionate ability   
23 biodiesel dominate   
impact of biofuel policy to CPO bussiness Impact of biofuel policy to CPO industry 
CPO companies does not own biofuel 
company   
CPO companies expand to biofuel 
industry   
Biofuel export to EU Biofuel export 
14 Export of biofuel   
22 price in EU   
9 incompetitive price trigered export   
22 the role of biofuel on domestic market Role of international market 
22 Problem on price   
22 independent biofuel industries shut 
down   
22 independent biofuel industries start to 
die out   
22 Biofuel more expensive   
21 low export market   
15 Oil price influenced biofuel demand 
overseas   
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15 overseas biofuel demand   
consequences for more biofuel 
production   
07 Biofuel more expensive than fossil fuel   
Accused of being subsidized Subsidi and dumping issue 
dumping issue   
biofuel industries with GOI try to counter 
subsidy accusation   
Export stop permanently   
issue hinders biofuel export to EU   
Trade issue   
Import halted   
EU emmision standard EU Emision standard and claim 
EU opinion on CPO based biofuel   
emission issue CPO company claim on emision standard 
Emission standar by palm based biofuel 
company   
14 GHG calculation method Pretext of emsission reduction program 
14 neglected of emission policy   
14 no research on carbon emision   
17 absent of evaluation   
9 relation with carbon emmision reduction 
program   
17 incapability of official   
17 obscure relationship   
22 Relation with GHG emission reduction   
08 biofuel impact to forestry CPO association with deforestation 
15 research stated that CPO did not 
caused deforestation   
15 CPO companies are better   
15 CPO companies are claimed to be 
unlikely to break the law   
15 breaking the law   
15 comparing with others on the past   
15 the locals and smalholders as the 
culprit of deforestation   
15 definition of forest   
15 asert on reason Deforestation for development 
15 dispute on deforestation definition   
15 legal and illegal deforestation   
15 Legal by law   
15 simplification of Illegal deforestation   
15 unclear boundary   
15 consensus to decide boundary   
17 bottom up target setup Unclear target of emission reduction 
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17 difference betwee 2 documents   
17 difference between document   
17 biofuel companies protested   
17 NDC status   
17 new target GHG reduction   
17 Purpose for NDC   
22 calculating biofuel subsidy Conversion cost 
22 Conversion cost   
22 dispute on the amount of conversion 
cost   
22 Gap created   
22 Government decision with conversion 
cost   
22 neglecting recomendation   
22 role of BPDPKS   
Palm plantation recomendation CPO Supporting fund 
Law on plantation   
CPO Supporting fund estabilishment   
CPO fund collected   
07 Public hearing   
07 efect of CPO supporting fund   
15 Reduce in export   
07 Main purpose of CPO fund scheme   
07 primary task of BPDPKS   
07 Fall of CPO price Fall on CPO price 
07 opportunity from biofuel   
15 Biofuel to stimulate price increase   
Decline on CPO demand and price   
07 reason of price fall   
15 low oversea demand reduce CPO 
price   
14 no impact to import Biofuel policy outcome 
07 Biofuel does not reduce fuel import   
14 target not achieve   
07 CPO reliability on land Land for biofuels 
08 biofuel as pretext for land grab   
15 Expansion of plantation   
21 utility of land   
22 Land belongs to CPO plantation Land profiting 
08 benefit of single land ownership   
08 land profiting   
08 land securing   
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9 difficulty on obtaining large area   
08 securing land for CPO   
08 Land speculators Purpose of land 
02 government decide the designated of 
land   
07 government involvement in land 
management   
07 Land use purpose   
08 amount of land to obtain Huge chunk of land 
08 the locals loss   
11 begining to come   
11 peaceful takeover   
15 no dedicated plantation for biofuel   
15 reason for LUC   
02 difference problem in spatial planning 
02 public hearing for spatial plan   
02 representative   
02 time frame for spatial plan   
11 spatial planning   
11 spatial planning is central authority   
15 pointing on constitutional court   
16 LUC is not MA concern   
9 problem on spatial planing   
9 the use of marker in map image   
9 unfeasible solution for land problem   
little use of biofuel subsidy Inefective subsidy 
similarity of cause   
Subsidy reduced   
22 independent biofuel companies 
reluctant   
reason to cut biofuel subsidy   
22 government subsidy   
Biofuel subsidy stop   
9 problem on infrastructur Problems on infrastructure 
23 problem on distribution   
9 problem with distribution   
9 problem on supply   
08 uneven distribution   
14 infrastructure problem   
Distribution chain good   
20 Distribution problem   
06 short term over long term Lack of goodwill 
08 policy maker wants   
08 popular policy favorable   
incentive rejected Inefective incentive 
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Involvement fo MoF   
resentment   
obstacle System 
Governmnet budget mechanism   
government policy is the main problem   
Impact on smalholders Consequences of stoping biofuel policy 
Impact on export    
farmer suffer most   
15 Smalholders loss   
16 farmers dependency with large 
plantation   
11 same treatment with oil industry as 
suggestion CPO price control 
22 if CPO price controled it reduces price   
23 future solution   
14 future solution   
22 impact on farmer and smalholders consequences of controling CPO price 
15 Transfer of payment due to export levy   
15 disproportionate burden   
14 Farmer sufer   
07 smallholder and farmer loss   
CPO Fund shrink Government inconsistency 
government unfair proposed policy   
changing system   
different opinion   
06 inconsistent policy   
08 inconsistency of policy   
government judment   
08 CPO companies profitering Opportunity for CPO industries 
15 open market for CPO   
22 Advantage of large CPO companies   
15 conglomeration of agroindustry   
9 CPO price problem   
consequences on govertment negligience consequences on govertment inconsistency 
problem on feedstcok   
Biofuel capacity underutilized   
biofuel policy stagnate   
22 concern of power difference   
07 Centralized policy centralized policy 
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02 Municipal government very little role   
06 official incapaility   
11 regional govt involvement   
14 insignificant reg govt role   
16 Regional governmnet role   
21 Centralized policy   
Regional government in favour of biofuel 
industry Regional government support on biofuel policy 
Regional government welcome biofuel 
industry   
08 regional government openes   
11 regional government role   
11 regional governmnet role   
9 regional government role   
08 ease on permit 
Misused of Reg. government endorsement for 
biofuel industry 
11 regional government authorithy   
08 reg govt endorsement   
9 effect of desentralization   
9 problem on soft skill Regional governmnet problems  
9 regional government incapability   
11 vary in problem   
06 uneven ability   
06 translating the policy   
9 unclear authority   
16 rigid beurocracy   
11 regional dependent on central Relations between central and regional 
06 less coordination   
11 different perception   
07 Biofuel inside   
11 future solution Increase authorithy 
11 strenghten authority   
9 More authority for regional government   
06 future solution   
08 Government support on land speculan Impact of problems 
300 
 
11 eager but unable   
9 attempt to verify data inacuracy of land data 
9 fault occurance   
15 Data inacuracy   
22 Land belong to the locals   
22 Land is scarce   
9 land grab by the people   
Claim debunk B20 Mandatory 
claim on B20   
22 claim on B20 debunk   
14 claim on B20   
06 supportive for mandatory blending 
policy   
14 policy evaluation   
17 intangible hierarchy in accessing 
information Different scale different knowledge 
08 Gov official knowledged   
14 Official capacity   
22 avoiding responsibility   
22 Incapability of official   
22 difference trajectory   
22 different scale   
9 intangible hierarchy Invisible hierarchy 
06 Macro and micro policy   
06 power on Bappenas   
08 invisible hierarchy   
22 Power on MERM   
9 deadlock settled by president   
9 limited capacity   
06 less priority in public hearing biofuel complex 
08 less priority for scientific reason   
9 paradox of policy   
9 problem of comitmen   
9 problem of leadership   
9 role of academician   
9 difficulties to amend policy of spatial 
planning Land and spatial planing 
9 land availability   
9 Problem on permit   
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9 regional government lack participation   
11 chain of command   
11 sektoral regulation   
difficult process Uncoded script 
11 official suspicious   
22 Government red tape   
9 future solution   
08 biofuel industry being accepted   
08 people acceptance   
06 unclear position   
14 subsidize biofuel   
15 contentious of export duties   
15 different activity companies of CPO   
15 El Nino reduced CPO production   
15 GAPKI agree with export duties   
22 influence of car manufacturer   
9 car manufacturer reluctant   
9 consumer lack of choice   
9 DEN main task   
9 Mysterious source   
9 primary stakeholder of biofuel policy   
9 problem on pricing policy   
9 testing limited capability   
9 unverified data   
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Appendix Three 
Coding Process Stage 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Energy crisis
2 Economic interest
3 Biofuel potential 
4 Power between central government ministry
5 Biofuel industries
6 Non edible feedstock disadvantage
7 Failure of Jathropa
8 Oil company & oil business
9 Advantage of CPO as feedstock
10 Positioning in biofuel sector
11 Relation with fosiil fuel business
12 Power on Pertamina over biofuel industries
13 gatekeeper
14 Relation between Pertamina and central government
15 Feedstock price increase
16 Subsidy introduces
17 Mandatory blending policy
18 The need to blend
19 Underutilized
20 Power on the CPO companies
21 Relations between biofuel and CPO Industry
22 CPO company advantage
23 Impact of biofuel policy to CPO industry
24 Biofuel export
25 Role of international market
26 Subsidi and dumping issue
27 EU Emision standard and claim
28 CPO company claim on emision standard
29 Pretext of emsission reduction program
30 CPO association with deforestation
31 Deforestation for development
32 Unclear target of emission reduction
33 Conversion cost
34 CPO Supporting fund
35 Fall on CPO price
36 Biofuel policy outcome
37 Land for biofuels
38 Land profiting
39 Purpose of land
40 Huge chunk of land
41 problem in spatial planning
42 Inefective subsidy
43 Problems on infrastructure
44 Lack of goodwill
45 Inefective incentive
46 System
47 Consequences of stoping biofuel policy
48 CPO price control
49 consequences of controling CPO price
50 Government inconsistency
51 Opportunity for CPO industries
52 consequences on govertment inconsistency
53 centralized policy
54 Regional government support on biofuel policy
55 Misused of Reg. government endorsement for biofuel industry
56 Regional governmnet problems 
57 Relations between central and regional
58 Increase authorithy
59 Impact of problems
60 inacuracy of land data
61 B20 Mandatory
62 Different scale different knowledge
63 Invisible hierarchy
64 biofuel complex
65 Land and spatial planing
Themes
No Selective codes
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Appendix Four 
Sample of Interview Transcript (Private Stakeholder) 
Backgroundnya chemical enginer kemudian setelah itu masuk ke industri pupuk urea 
dan ammonia di kawasan aceh. Kemudian sempat jadi guru setelah itu terjadi konflik 
aceh mundur bergabung dengan teman-teman buat bisnis biodiesel tahun 2006. 
Bekerja sama dengan PTPN IV. Perusahaannya punya anak ITB alumni tahun 77, 
mereka kumpul untuk bikin perusahaan. 
Waktu bikin perusahaan ini harga solar HSD masih jauh berbeda dengan CPO 
sebagai bahan baku waktu itu masih USD400 per ton jadi hitungannya masuk 
dibikinlah di adolina. PTPN IV juga support bahan baku. Feedstock waktu itu sudah 
pake sawit karena arah kita adalah untuk green energy dalam perjalannnanya saya 
disuruh membangun pabrik itu di adolina berjalan di tahun 2006-2008 produksi 
setahun tiba-tiba harga CPO meningkat terus, bahan bakunya sendiri sudah 
melebihi harga HSD, sehingga tidak masuk akal. Akhirnya tutuplah pabrik itu. 
Gagasan waktu itu ada beberapa temen di PTPN IV alumni ITB dengan gagasan 
untuk membuat pabrik biodiesel. karna waktu dihitung semua dengan berbagai 
analisis bahwa itungannya masuk semua untuk profit. PTPN IV juga mendukung 
karena untuk dipakai sendiri oleh PTPN IV karna kebutuhan mereka juga sudah 
cukup banyak. Untuk transportasi, genset, dll. Produksi sekitar 10 ton perhari yaitu 
FAME. FAME tidak bisa di gunakan seluruhnya untuk mesin kendaraan. Pertama di 
rekomendasikan 5%, 10% dan 15% kemudian 20% walaupun belakangannya 
asosiasi otomotif jepang merekomendasikan untuk mobil-mobil mereka 7.5%. Kalau 
pemerintah ngomong pakai 20% itu bohong itu. Gak ngerti dia masin asal ngomong 
aja. 
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Angka 20% gak tau darimana, karena resminya otomotif jepang menerbitkan 
rekomendasi yaitu B7.5 dan dikirim ke pertamina. Pertamina pegang surat itu tapi 
orang2 ya gitu. 
Rekomendasi diberikan tahun 2008, waktu itu mobil-mobil jepang sudah disesuaikan 
kesitu (7.5%) memang dulu ada mobil lama dengan karet itu bisa lumer kalo kena 
FAME tapi yang belakangan mobil baru tetap direkomendasikan 7.5% 
pertimbangannya waktu itu apa gak tau. Nah berbarengan dengan itu muncul 
teknologi baru. Energy biodiesel generasi 1.5 yaitu hydrogenated vegetable oil jadi 
minyak sawit ini dinjeksikan dengan gas Hidrogen itu keluar langsung minyak solar 
persis seperti minyak solar fosil. Ada produk samping …. Jetfoil macam-macam. Itu 
dirintis oleh BIOPI ENI dan Nestee Oil. Singapur bikinnya sehingga dosen saya 
datang kesan melihat. uDah berjalan itu sekarang sekitar tahun 2013 provennya 
termasuk untuk scale up nya. 
Nah berdasarkanitu juga akhirnya PTPN IV mencoba kerjasama dengan Pertamina, 
bikin kerjasama dengan Pertamina bagaimana kalau kita membangun itu bikinlah FS 
riset panggil Force n Sulivan sebagai konsultannya. Itukan termasuk konsultan top 
dunia, 10 besar lah. Kita kaji lah…. 
Dalam proses kajian itu terbentur pada masalah harga. Harga feedstock kita sudah 
tahu tinggi, tapi untuk pasar eropa itu masih masuk. Karena di Eropa dan USA 1 
Liter HSD itu hampir 1 euro itu kan Rp13.000 (saat itu) sudah sangat ok banged.  
Harga pokok produksinya itu kalo kita kurangi selisihnya banyak. Harga pokok 
termasuk bahan baku? Saya kalau melihat harga pokok sering bahan baku saya 
keluarkan karena bahan baku sangat fluktuatif. Kalau saya ngomong harga sekian 
maka aka nada pertanyaan di saat harga berapa? Gitu 
305 
 
Maka saya selalu menggunakan conversion cost istilahnya. Dengan perjalannan itu, 
artinya pemerintahpun sibuk dengan harga tersebut. Dan pemerintah tidak bisa 
membedakan jenis biodiesel itu. pokoknya semua yang keluar dari minyak nabati itu 
disebut biosolar. Padahal itu berbeda (produk dan prosesnya). Keluarlah kebijakan 
harga biodiesel itu setara harga CPO + USD125. Itu ada Kepmen nya. Nah kalau 
dengan USD125 gak masuk, pas aja kalau kita menggunakan CPO. Itu yang 
mengeluarkan Kepmen adalah ESDM (mandatory blending). Dan yang lucunya lagi 
yang menerbitkan itu adalah ESDM yang disuruh beli adalah pertamina, pertamina 
ada di bawah Kemen BUMN nolak seringkali. Karena anggarannya beda untuk 
subsidinya. Jual FAME ke pertamina kan harus di subsidi jualnya 125 (harga pokok 
produksi ) masih lebih tinggi sementara HSD yang dijual pertamina lebih rendah. 
Mereka ada alokasi subsidinya.  
Nah ini yang ngomong itu pemerintah bicara belum 1 kamar. Itu pangkal Indonesia 
seperti itu 
Saya baca Malaysia, yang basisnya bukan CPO tapi RBDPO yaitu CPO yang sudah 
diambil asam, jadi sedikit lebih mahal ditambah USD120 kalau gak salah itu masuk 
dan itu yang ngatur petronas. Semua dibawah petronas. 
Ini gak, ada 2 departemen yang berbeda yang satu ngomong ini yang satu suruh beli 
kalau gak beli masalah.  
Nah tetap hidup bagi beberapa perusahaan yang sudah punya refinery tapi dia tidak 
menggunakan CPO sebagai bahan baku tetapi produk samping dari refinery 
sawitnya yang lagi bikin saat ini. Yaitu PFAD dan stearin di harga di pasar ini PFAD 
kira-kira 75% CPO nah ada (pengiritan 20%) yang RBD stearin 95% harga CPO 
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(dapat pengiritan 5% disitu). Di tetapkan sama dia segitu dibikin biodiesel tapi di 
hitung mereka pake harga CPO +USD125 cukup. 
Tapi bagi perusahaan yang tidak punya refinery gak bisa masuk langsung ke 
biodiesel. maka itu bermainlah disitu Wilmar, Musim Mas, sinar mas, dia masih 
hidup karena sudah punya refinery jadi bahan baku yang dipakai adalah produk 
sampingnya. Kalau perusahaan yang gak punya refinery, maka harus beli CPO dulu 
sehingga mahal. Menurut saya strategi yang sudah punya refinery yang menetapkan 
125 karena sebelumnya keluar draf 188 yaitu CPO +USD188 sebagai harga 
biodiesel per ton kemudian entah kenapa yang berlaku menjadi permen adalah CPO 
+125.  
Harga segitu bagi pengusaha biodiesel murni sangat kecil untungnya malah gaka da 
untung karna 125 itu conversion cost. Conversation cost adalah semua bisaya yang 
timbul dalam membuat 1 ton biodiesel (tenaga kerja, utilitasm chemical, dll) untuk 
konversi ke liter tinggal kali 0.86 aja. 
Akhirnya kami yang di PTPN yang merintis itu, kalau turun ke 125 ya berhenti gak 
jadi (untung) lebih baik jual CPO saja. Perusahaan besar pengen di 125 saya curiga 
jahatnya untuk mengurangi competitor jadi mereka yang gak punya refinery gak bisa 
masuk ke sini. Kalau dia masuk kesini harus investasi di refinery dulu. Orang mikir 
sementara kapasitas refinery (untuk minyak goreng) di Indonesia sudah 2 kali lipat 
dari kebutuhan. Kecuali kebijakan khusus kayak kita buat ini merupakan amanat 
pemerintah ini. Supaya kestabilan harga minyak makan tidak dimainkan begini-
begini. 
(sehingga dalam hal ini perusahaan sawit besar menjadi pelaku monopoli di industry 
biodiesel yang bisa mengontrol harga pasokan biodiesel). perkebunan besar yang 
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sudah punya refinery (yang masuk bisnis biodiesel). PTPN IV tidak punya refinery, 
baru dibuat yg di Sei Mangke. Tidak ada BUMN yang memiliki refinery, semua 
hanya jual sawit (CPO). Tidak ada satupun PTPN yang memiliki fasilitas hilirisasi 
industri sawit. PTPN baru buat refinery karena ada penugasan langsung dari 
presiden untuk bikin refinery supaya dapat mengontrol/mengendalikan harga minyak 
makan.  
Mulailah start FS dan lain-lain walaupun setelah FS refinery tidak begitu bagus juga 
karena minyak makan sudah sangat dikendalikan oleh mereka (PBS) itu namanya 
merk 5 besar musim mas, wilmar, sinar mas ya kelompok-kelompok itulah yng 
sudah maju, yang kita masuk ke sektor itu sudah sulit kecuali masuk pada segmen 
murah yang seperti minyak getas, pemerintah nyuruh supaya minyak dijual 
dikemasan kecil-kecil yaitu kemasan seliter-seliter tapi kemasannya tidak menarik 
dalam bentuk bantal (bukan botol pet) jadi gak bisa di tegakkan. Itu untuk 
mengimbangi, kalau itu mahal beli yang ini, harganya Cuma Rp11 ribu kalau yang 
biasa kan RP13 ribuan. 
Jadi dengan harga CPO sekarang rata-rata USD600 per ton dengan biaya olah 
sudah cukup tinggi itu menyebabkan tidak terlalu bagus dari sisi keekonomian harga 
minyak makan. Tapi buat mereka masih bisa karena sudah dikontrol harga oleh 
mereka. Kapasitas refinery nasional sekitar 15 juta ton per tahun hanyak untuk 
menjadi minyak makan. Kemudoan dari 15 juta yang terpasang yang hidup Cuma 8 
juta setengahnya karena kebutuhan nasional itu sekitar 5 juta ton sisanya ekspor. 
Padahal produksi sawit sekitar 22 juta ton (versi pak munir bukan versi Kementan). 
Versi Kementan terlalu optimis (30 juta ton), gak sampai belum tahap itu, memang 
akan menuju kesana mengingat kita masih muda (perkebunannya) tapi setahun 2 
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tahun terakhir dikeluarkan ya sekitar 22-23 juta ton memang kita sudah lebih dari 
Malaysia. 
22 juta ton sudah termasuk smallholder. Data ini dari GAPKI, saya lebih percaya 
kepada GAPKI. Gak masuk akal kalau mencapai 30 juta ton karena produktivitas 
nasional antara 3.5- 4 ton CPO per hektar kalau Malaysia sudah menuju 4-5 ton per 
hektar. Tapi kalau melihat angka-angka kebun BUMN sudah mencapai angka 5 ton 
tapi kebun rakyat paling Cuma 2-3 ton per hektar. Itu yang terlalu optimis dipakai 
oleh deptan untuk cari nama juga dia. Karena yang punya masyarakat kan gak ter 
record. Yang terrecord yang punya perkebunan, yang masyrakata Cuma estimasi 
saja yang terlalu optimist pada hal kenyataan gak seperti itu. jadi ketauan kita beli 
yang masyarakat itu rendemennya aja. 22 juta ton produksi tahun 2015 sisa yang 
diluar kapasitas refinery di ekspor dalam bentuk CPO.  
TBS masuk mills keluar CPO baru refine untuk turunannya. Pas refine keluar 3 
macam yaitu minyak makan, PFAD, Stearin. Dari sini baru turunn banyak sekali 
termasuk FAME. FAME belum jadi dari CPO tapi cara menentukan harganya dari 
CPO. Kalau ingin masuk ke FAME langsung dari CPO boleh, jadi mau bikin FAME 
itu banyak skema, langsung dari CPO yang keluar langsung dari mill bisa bikin 
kemudian dari turunan PFAD juga bisa bikin dari stearin juga bisa. Pokoknya yang 
prinsipnya lemak nabati semua bisa berproses menjadi biodiesel tapi dengan ada 
plus minusnya. Yaitu beda jenis input beda biaya yaitu akhirnya bermain dengan 
konsep riset yang bagus. 
Seperti si wilmar yaitu dalam kondisi seperti ini bagusnya CPO aja dalam kondisi 
seperti ini kita olah dulu trus ini baru bikin jadi sangat dinamik. Karena Bea keluar itu 
tinggal ngitung-ngitung kalau saya mengekspor hilir yang sudah di olah bea 
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keluarnya sekian kalau buat CPO biayanya sekian. Bea kluar itu kalau kita 
mengeluarkan CPO murni karna tujuannya supaya orang ngolah di dalam.  
Itu CPO tambah 125 sudah lebih tinggi dari HSD sementara kalau kita 
menggunakan bahan baku CPO sebagai input biodiesel masih belum untung karena 
125 conversion cost kita belum dapat apa-apa. Bisa kita hitung aja lah, ini kan 578 
(harga CPO per ton) saat ini. Tambah 125 berarti ini menjadi 703 per ton kali 13400 
(kurs) terus dibagi lagi 0.86 kira-kira. Ini menurut cerita per tonjadi tinggal ini kali 
0.86/7. Ini, makanya itu tidak masuk makanya gak hidup sebetulnya bagi yang tidak 
punya refinery. Kalau menggunakan harga itu dapat 9420 rupiah per kilo perliter kali 
0.87 dapat 6.987 ini harga yang dibeli pemerintah, makanya ada subsidi. Berapa 
harga yang ada di pasar? Selisih dengan harga pasar itu yang disubsidi. Subsidi Ini 
yang diminta untuk dibebankan kepada pertamina. Pertamina mau tapi pertamina 
masalahnya terkadang bayarnya 3 bulan sekali, turun subsidinya dulu dari pusat. 
Pengusaha disuruh nanggung 3 bulan kan itu cash, akhirnya apda gak mau, nah 
caranya di akali oleh yang sudah punya refinery. Ini bukan segini tapi 578 x 0.75 
pake PFAD yang merupakan pecahan dari CPO begitu kita olah keluar minyak 
makan atau olein. Keluar PFAD (5%) dan stearin (8%) harganya kira-kira 70 sekian 
persen sisanya lari. Ini yang dipakai sebagai bahan baku (PFAD dan stearin). Karna 
harga PFAD kira-kira 0.75CPO dan stearin 0.95CPO jadi dia dapat untung dari sini. 
(PBS dapat menekan biaya bahan baku). Jadi dia dapat harga ini (CPO) Dibeli 
pemerintah pake harga CPO tapi dai dapat untung dari pakai limbah pengolahan.  
Ini tidak dapat dilakukan oleh pengusaha yang tidak punya refinery karena 
conversion costnya sendiri gak segini. Tapi kalau boleh ekspor dengan harga 
internasional ini bagus bisa mencapai harga 400. Harga international CPO 578 
ditambah 400 kalo harga internasionaljadi kalao kita equivalenkan harga biodiesel 
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mereka disini kira-kira ada split disini 400 dengan harga CPO. Jadi kalau di 
internasional seperti ini, karena harga biodiesel internasional itu sudah mencapai 0.8 
USD per liter. 
Kalau conversion cost 188 masih masuk. 
Dengan conversion cost rendah banyak yang mati yang kecil-kecil (industri 
biodiesel). 
Pabrik bagus tapi bahan baku terputus-putus 
BPDPKS muncul yang hidup Cuma pengusaha sawit yang juga bergerak di bidang 
biodiesel. yang pengusaha biodiesel murni sudah mati semua. BPDPKS hanya 
menciptakan gap yang makin lebar antara pengusaha yang sudah maju dengan 
yang masih kecil. (dengan kata lain industri biodiesel bisa tetap hidup walau tanpa 
ada BPDPKS dengan mekanisme subsidi yang ada) perusahaan sawit besar hidup.  
Aspek teknikal 7.5% campuran dalam mesin kendaraan tapi campuran 20% bisa 
dilakukan dengan risiko di tanggung sendiri. Kalau truk-truk sawit itu mereka 
memang gak peduli, buat jangka pendek gak kenapa pakai saja untuk 1 atau 2 
tahun, tapi kalau untuk penggunaan jangka panjang karna kita gak tau rekomendasi 
7.5% itu atas dasar riset atau …..(tanpa ada keterangan). Cuma dia secara resmi 
membuat surat ke pertamina silakan telusuri sendiri. Cari surat rekomendasi dari 
asosiasi perusahaan lihat berapa persen yang di rekomendasikan. 
Dulu saya punya temen sempet dikopikan tapi sudah hilang. Mengapa pertamina 
tidak tertarik untuk masuk ke biodiesel FAME dia minta kita lsg masuk kedalam 
greendiesel karena itu memang drp in sifatnya, bisa dipake 100% (B100). Biodiesel 
kita masih FAME. Karena biodiesel FAME itu dasarnya bukan biodiesel itu adalah 
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bahan pelarut yang ternyata memiliki karakteristik sifatnya sama dengan bahan 
bakar. Dengan sedikit nilai bakar yang rendah ya gapapa, tapi sebenarnya dia itu 
pelarut.  
Kalau B30 saya setuju asalkan bukan FAME yang greendiesel. Karna itu tinggal 
drop in. Gak dicampur juga gak apa-apa. Secara mix nasional disini bukan dicampur 
yaitu kombinasi secara nasional yaitu biofuel 30% yang 70% fosil itu itu 
pengertiannya. Bukan berarti 30% itu dicampur (di mesin) bukan. (dengan kata lain 
ada dua jenis BBM). Karena masih FAME makanya campuran. Arahnya B30 
harusnya greendiesel. Kalau pake greendiesel sudah langsung drop in aja. Untuk 
masalah harga, kembali lagi. Karena pemerintah tidak membedakan antara harga 
FAME atau bukan. Walaupun greendiesel gini juga rumusnya, itu yang jadi masalah. 
Gak dibedakan karena terminology pemerintah untuk biofuel ya biofuel aja (BBN) 
atau bahan bakar lain. Tidak ada istilah biodiesel atau greendiesel. Jadi apapun 
yang namanya bukan fosil masuk kategori bahan bakar lain (BBN). Nah, kalau pake 
greendiesel lebih gak cukup 125. Karena greendiesel adalah CPO di injeksikan 
dengan H2 (hydrogen) langsung nanti akan keluar 3 jenis produk green diesel, jet 
fuel, propane. 
Jet fuel untuk bahan bakar jet, propane untuk LPG bisa. 
Factor penambahnya bukan 125 dan hydrogen ini dibuat dari gas alam, makanya 
industri ini harus muncul pada lokasi yang ada natural gas butuhnya Cuma sedikit 
tapi harganya gak segitu. Gas alam ini di crack jadi hydrogen. Ada pabrik untuk 
proses reforming (crak) dan industri ini sudah banyak di Indonesia terutama pabrik 
pupuk. Infrastruktur greendiesel Indonesia belum siap. Untuk di Sei Mangke 
sebenernya sudah layak karena gas sudah masuk di sini. Cuma masalah harga saja 
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yang beda dan harga gas harus masuk ke conversion cost 125 yang jelas tidak 
cukup. 
Pemerintah juga belum bisa membedakan jenis biodiesel FAME dan greendiesel, itu 
seharusnya dibuka harus masuk orang praktisi disitu, dibuka ini loh begini begini biar 
ngerti.  
Yang bilang dicampur 30% itu siapa? (pemerintah) gak bisa donk yang punya mobil 
(yang harusnya nentuin). Ada pak imam dari ITB saya kenal. Dia kan bukan pemilik 
teknologi mesin yang punya mesin itu ya harus asosiasinya yang nerbitin itu. 
samalah kalau kita punya mobil, mobil ini say buat untuk pertamax. Kan dia bilang 
kalau gak pke pertamax ya tanggung jawab sendiri. Kan gitu kan. Ini pake untuk 
premium kalo pake pertamax boleh kalau ada sesuatu tanggung sendiri bisa gitu 
juga sih. Tapi kan masalahnya harus kita kembali ke mobil siapa yang dipake, 
teknologi siapa, harus confirm dengan mereka. Tidak bisa kita riset sendiri tanpa 
libatin mereka (manufaktur company). Selama ini risetnya sendiri ya pak imam itu 
ITB, di uji sama beliau. Itukan short term. Terus ini dampaknya gimana? Belum 
pernah kan di riset sampe berapa tahun untuk lihat dampak mesin. Paling mereka uji 
bakar gimana itu efek ke mesin bakar torque. Dia memang ahli disitu. Tapi saya 
bilang, itu pak imam kan baru uji sekali dua kali di lab bapak, mobil orang dipake 5 
tahun baru ketahuan hasilnya. 
Gak tau saya, tapi begitu rapat-rapat gitu pertamina pun gitu. Kalau ada rapat 
bersama pemerintah gak ada yang berani ngomong di depan pengambil keputusan 
tapi baru ngomong ke kita macam-macam sedang di ruang rapat gak berani 
ngomong. Kenapa ya tidak tahu. 
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Tapi kalo kita gak percaya rekomendasi riset kita ya boleh-boleh saja pakenya 
tapikan tidak dalam dampak waktu dekat. (riset yang digunakan Cuma riset di lab 
saja) dan tidak mengacu kepada rekomendasi pabrikan mobilnya. 
Yang banyak dilibatkan (untuk biofuel) pertamina sedangkan swasta seperti 
Gaikindo tidak terlalu. 
Banyak yang gak terbuka untuk bicara soal biofuel. (hasil curcol) 
(pertamina gak berani bicara langsung kepada menteri karena bisa dicopot 
jabatannya) 
Riset kita kurang valid karena shorttime berbeda dengan riset yang dilakukan 
asoisasi otomotof jepang yang bersifat longitudinal. 
Tidak ada counter untuk sebuah rekomendasi riset, sehingga pada dasarnya hanya 
ada 1 periset yang melakukan itu (terbatas). Pemerintah (pejabatnya) juga tidak 
percaya sama sekali bahwa fuel energy kita akan habis dalam waktu 10 tahun ke 
depan yang ngomong Cuma pejabat secara pribadi tapi tidak tercermin dalam 
kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh instansinya. Jadi pejabat A ngomong itu B ngomong 
ini tapi institusinya melakukan apa berdasarkan ngomongan itu. itu yang tidak 
pernah muncul ke permukaaan (yaitu dalam bentuk design policy). 
Terkait masalah ijin: 
Saya tidak mengatakan jelek tapi tidak baik juga. Standar lah birokrasi Indonesia. 
Walaupun sudah didengungkan sudah banyak perubahan tapi kenyataannya ya 
masih begitu. Contoh untuk kawasan berikat Sei Mangke perijinannya sendiri juga 
masih luar biasa banyaknya. Untuk bikin refinery ini kita butuh banyak aturan. 
Kenapa tidak disederhanakan atau dikeluarkan oleh 1 lembaga saja. Ini daftar 
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regulasi yang dibuthkan untuk sebuah pabrik (19 aturan/ijin) harus ada semua 
kenapa gak disederhanakan padahal kan banyak yang bisa di gabung-gabung 1 
instansi ngeluaring berapa ijin sekaligus. 
Terkait PTSP: yah itu satu pintu (dengan sindiran soal 19 ijin). Yang 1 pintu ini Cuma 
pemda (tapi diralat) tidak ada 1 pintu disini. Untuk bisa beroperasi sebagai sebuah 
perusahaan normal semua ijin harus ada. PT INL ini refinery untuk produksi minyak 
makan bukan untuk biofuel (ini berikutnya). Walaupun untuk kawasan industri (ijin 
masih banyak) di luar kawasan mungkin lebih banyak lagi. Makanya kalau dibilang 
sederhana dimana sederhananya. Dari 19 baru 6 yang selesai (dari tahun 2016) 
yang strip2 belum dimulai karena bisa ditunda tapi wajib ada begitu mau edarkan 
makanan kalau gak di tangkap polisi tuh, di anggap barang tidak layak 
(Terpotong beberapa menit) 
Kalau pertamina mau membeli sehingga pembayaran tidak tertunda ada manfaatnya 
mendukung kawasan Sumu (ini pendapat terkait pembiayaan biofuel dengan asumsi 
tanpa BPDPKS). Kemaren memang ada aturan yang 125 ini adalah di gate di pabrik 
belum termasuk ongkos angkut dan ongkos angkut di atur.  
Jika pakai green diesel conversion cost lebih dari 125 dan sudah ada kajiannya. 
Harga gas itu bisa dikontrol oleh pemerintah. Kalau CPO gak bisa di atur oleh 
pemerintah. 
(this interview has been off topic on some part particularly after I received some new 
information but uncertain if that’s related or not with the research. This is the moment 
where I got carried away). 
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Angka 188 merupakan draft yang dikeluarkan awal (waktu diskusi dengan 
stakeholder) dan saya gunakan masuk tapi berubah jadi 125 pas aturan 
ditandatangan dan diterbitkan. 
(Dalam hal ini sulit untuk diketahui darimana asal usul angka yang diajukan untuk 
conversion cost, pak munir menganggap angka itu diajukan oleh PBS, tapi biar 
bagaimana angka tersebut pada posisi ini hanya menguntungkan pemerintah dalam 
jangka pendek, tetapi justru memberikan disinsentif bagi industry biofuel/biodiesel 
dalam jangka panjang. Karena industri ini menjadi sangat tergantung pada industri 
feedstock dan tidak menutup kemungkinan malah menciptakan konglomerasi yang 
lebih besar untuk indsutri feedstock, dalam hal ini sawit) 
Artinya kalau menggunakan angka 125 ya pegusaha kan bukan gotong royong jadi 
mereka tidak rugi tapi tidak menarik karena return terlalu lama, tidak ekonomis dan 
lain-lain. 
Harga biodiesel walaupun produksi secara masal akan sangat sulit untuk turun 
karena ada factor feedstock, sehingga harga biodiesel sangat tergantung dengan 
harga CPO (semakin mahal maka biodiesel semakin mahal dan sebaliknya). 
Pemerintah tidak bisa meng cap harga CPO karena kana membuat orang hulu 
marah. Begitu CPO dipaksa turun, maka TBS turun, begitu TBS turun kebunnya gak 
hidup begitu kebun gak hidup maka perawatannya asal-asalan gak di pupuk gak 
disiram. Walhasil rendemen turun. Kebijakan pemerintah ada di hilir sawit (biodiesel) 
tetapi sambil menjaga agar harga CPO tidak turun, karena yang terdampak juga 
petani sawit kecil yang jumlahnya 50% dari total petani. Apabila TBS turun maka 
petani tidak akan menanam sawit lagi tapi bisa ganti tanaman lain (jadi mirip dengan 
jathropa) jadi harus hati-hati. Pemerinta harus membuat ini sedemikian rupa 
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seimbang. Saya ada kajian berapa ini seimbangnya (Tapi dipotong oleh gw 
arggghhh) 
(There is a big problem that I always chip in the midle of respondent speech) 
Atau kembali kaya eropa dimana biofuel seliter 1 euro. Orang eropa sangat takut 
CPO kita karena murah/ CPO kita gak di band di Eropa. 
Mereka (eropa) juga melindungi petani mereka terutama rapeseed karena lebih 
mahal dari pada CPO. 
Saya coba mengakji kemaren, mulai dari petani, berapa sih harga wajar TBS. jadi 
saya coba korelasikan kalau dia nanam padi, returnya berapa. Kira-kira jangan 
beda-beda dari padi kalo gak dia potong ini nanam padi darat begitu ditetapkan 
harganya. Baru kita hitung dari TBS ke mill itu berapa costnya maka itulah harga 
CPO yang masuk akal bagi petani. Kalau ternyata harga CPO terlalu tinggi dipasar 
internasional, supaya menjaga ini jangan terlalu berat lewat pemotongan biaya 
ekspor, kalau terlau rendah justru akan mendukung industri biodiesel karea demand 
biodiesel akan meningkatkan harga CPO dalam negeri apabila pasar internasional 
lesu. Saya mulai dari petani. Nilai tukar petani dari padi lah karena pakai beras iu 
yang jadi acuan.  
Menurut kajian saya sekitar 600 lebih sedikit, itu harga yang tidak boleh turun. Kalau 
turun petani akan kehilangan semangat karena dia akan bandingkan dengan padi 
(tanaman lain yang lebh profitable), mereka juga gak mikir kalo semua nanam padi 
maka pas panen harga padi akan turun juga. 
Kebijakan antara ucapan dengan aksi suka beda tergantung ngomong sama siapa 
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Karena di Indonesia, lahan sudah habis. Lahan dalam pengertian free dan tidak 
bermasalah sudah tidak ada lagi. Lahan perkebunan milik perusahaan cenderung 
sudah ok (Mungkin BUMN dan PBS), tapi yang punya masyarakat yang statusnya 
gak jelas. Yang punya perkebunan cenderung tidak bertambah yang punya rakyat 
nambah sedikit-sedikit 2 ha 3 ha. 
Kalau biaya olah sebetulnya tidak terlalu significan. Yang signifikan adalah biaya 
CPO jika terlalu rendah pengusaha CPO lebih baik jual CPO saja (mungkin 
maksudnya conversion cost). Angka 125 untuk PBS yang punya PFAD dan stearin 
gak masalah tapi bagi pemain baru gak masuk. 
(Lanjut lagi) 
INL produksi maret 2018, kalau mau jual produk ini susah bisa bermasalah, harga 
pasarnya bisa dimainkan karena PFAD produk samping yang produk antara karena 
itu kalau kita masuk ke biodiesel maka ini akan prospek sekali sebetulnya. 125 saya 
dorong OK jalan kita, asal jangan dengan pertamina tapi BPDP itu. 
Kalau untuk greendiesel 125 gak cukup paling 150. Supaya ada margin yang bikin 
orang tertarik. Greendiesel gak perlu ada mix. Para pemain besar juga gak akan 
berkutat di 125 gak dapet. Yang sedang bangun ini wilmar di gresik. Di gresik dia 
reklamasi pantai bangun ini. 
Saya waktu dengan pertamina pun membahas masalah ini pertama muncul adalah 
NDA non disclosure agreement semua tandatangan baru kita bisa rapat. Hasil rapat 
tertutup kalau gak ada itu mereka gak mau rapat. Ada kemungkinan ada kebijakan 
politik yang mau mereka hindari berupa nama baik yang tercemar atau merasa tidak 
memiliki wewenang untuk bicara kalau gak dipecat. 
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Jadi yang ngomong pun harus dilevel tertentu dimana detil nya justru yang dibawah. 
Memang susah sekali. Saya berapa kali ke wilmar jalan-jalan dikasi makan tapi 
informasi gak dapet. Mereka semua sangat tertutup sekali. Kalo saya pikir kalau 
untuk masalah nasional kenapa gak dibuka. 
Ini tidak ada konsideran apapun yang terkait dengan GHG emission reduction jadi 
hanya konsideran tambahan. Apa manfaatnya (biodiesel) cari-cari oh ini (GHG 
reduction) konsideran utama ya untuk masalah energy shortage (bisnis). 
Sei mangke ini lahanya punya PTPN III BOT selama 25 tahun. 
Yang jelas kebijakan biofuel ini wajib karena cadangan minyak sudah tinggal 11 
tahun an lagi.  
Malasyia bisa dapat mencapai 5 ton per hektar karena mereka dikendalikan oleh 
Velda semacam koperasi pengusaha rakyat dibidang sawit. Petani gak  masuk ke 
GAPKI kalau VELDA khusus untuk rakyat.  
Perusahaan biodiesel milik PTPN IV cuma beroperasi 1 tahun tapi sudah mati. 
Terima kasih atas waktu Bapak untuk interview ini 
Finish 
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Appendix Five 
Sample of Interview (Government Stakeholder) 
RUEN dibuat oleh pemerintah dan ditetapkan oleh pemerintah yaitu 8 kementerian 
yang tergabung dalam DEN. Peran pemerintah daerah ada juga dalam RUEN 
terutama untuk masalah renewable termasuk biofuel dan biomass.  
Pedoman penyusunan RUEN ditetapkan oleh presiden (perpres),  semua dibuat 
oleh pemerintah tapi dalam proses pembuatannya anggota DEN melihat 
ketikdasinkronan sehingga dirombaklah ceritanya. Perombakan itu membuat semua 
dibicarakan kembali dengan kementerian teknis.  
Terkait biofuel dinyatakan didalam RUEN sampai tahun 2025 dibutuh kan 2 juta KL 
biofuel. Di tetapkan juga jenis tanamannya tapi yang tidak berkonflik dengan sisi 
pangan seperti singkong beracun (cassava) dan kemiri sunan (candlenut). Untuk 
menjaga agar terjaga ketersediaan feedstock maka direncanakan untuk membentuk 
BUMN khusus agar membeli hasil dari petani penanam tumbuhan feedstock 
tersebut. Agar kejadian jathropa tidak terulang kembali dimana petani sudah tanam 
tapi tidak ada yang mau beli hasilnya. Sehingga terkait rencana ini, petani sudah 
skeptis terlebih dahulu. Oleh karena itu muncul ide membentuk BUMN khusus 
tersebut. 
Jadi yang paling siap sebagai feedstock adalah kelapa sawit, luas total kebun sekitar 
12 juta. Untuk menjadi bahan bakar (biofuel) sawit tidak hanya mengandalkan CPO, 
melainkan juga bagian lain seperti TBS nya, batangnya, seratnya, kernelnya semua 
bisa digunakan sebagai bahan bakar untuk pembangkit listrik. Makanya pemerintah 
mengeluarkan permen 12 untuk mendorong itu.  
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Semua bagian sawit memiliki nilai jual sehingga dapat di ekspor dan ada pasarnya. 
Perusahaan sawit seperti PTPN III di Kalimantan sudah menggunakan limbah sawit 
sebagai bahan bakar untuk pembangkit listrik menggantikan batubara. PLN juga 
bersedia melakukan mix dalam bahan bakar untuk PLTUnya, jadi tidak 100 persen 
batubara.  
Biofuel dilihat dari POME?  
Terkait kebijakan B20, berdsarkan usulan Pokja BBN B20 (ketuanya dari Kementan 
dan dibentuk DEN bersama Aprobi). Saat itu di uji cobakan di Adaro kepada mesin 
kendaraan diesel (most likely truk) dan memang ada permasalahan berupa 
munculnya kerak (sludge) di mesin terutama setelah mencapai 20% mix. Sehingga 
setelah 20% sangat sulit untuk menambah porsi campuran jadi dapat dikatakan 
bahwa 20% merupakan campuran maksimum FAME tanpa menimbulkan dampak 
negative untuk mesin dalam jangka pendek.  Sehingga dalam hal ini kebijakan B20 
tidak semata untuk mengurangi konsumsi impor tetapi memajukan industry hilirisasi 
CPO dan biodiesel. 
Pemerintah tidak pernah melakukan pengujian biodesel di lab. Uji tersebut biasanya 
dilakukan oleh perusahaan. Tes atau penelitian yang dilakukan pemerintah biasanya 
dilakukan secara individu oleh peneliti-pneliti tertentu dan tidak berskala nasional 
serta tidak ada penugasan secara khusus untuk meneliti B20 ini. 
Kebijakan B20 ini merupakan kebijakan yang bottom up tapi dari para industrialis 
semua seperti industry otomotif, pabrik-parik dan aprobi, tak ada keterlibatan 
daerah. Sedangkan keterlibatan akademisi pun minim dimana riset-riset yang 
dilakukan akademisi bukanlah dedicated research unutk meneliti kebijakan B20 
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untuk kepentingan pemerintah melainkan sesuai dengan apa-apa saja yang mereka 
ingin lakukan (tujuannya lebih bersifat personal akademis di area-area tertentu).  
Potensi bioenergy dari biofuel hanya dari sawit saja yang menentukan pun tidak 
jelas dari siapa karena data dari pemerintah tidak perlu disebut sumbernya. 
Sehingga dapat dikatakan sumbernya seperti anonim tidak diketahui siapa yang 
melakukan riset atau angkanya dari mana tapi sah dan legal karena dikeluarkan oleh 
pemerintah. Data-data terkait potensi sawit memang di komparasi dengan data dari 
pusat penelitian sawit tapi ketika terjadi perbedaan angka munculah angka-angka 
yang bersifat kompromistis.   
Kebijakan B20 sendiri masih belum tercapai tujuan utamanya. Problem utama di 
infrastruktur, dalam hal ini biosolar sulit didapat oleh masyarakat karena memang 
tidak tersedia di SPBU hanya yang tertentu saja. Walaupun regulasi sudah 
mewajibkan untuk menyediakan dispenser untuk biosolar tapi banyak yang tidak 
patuh. Penerapan kebijakan juga problem, yang dijawa aja tidak patuh gimana yang 
diluar jawa. Kalau Cuma masalah mewajibkan bisa dibuat tapi problem utama 
adalah ketersediaan supply, jangan sampai sudah diwajibkan dan pemilik SPBU 
patuh dan menyediakan dispenser untuk biosolar tapi supply tidak tersedia terutama 
ketika harga di ekspor harga bagus maka menjadi masalah ketersediaan supply.  
Implementasi kebijakan lemah selain dari infrastruktur yang belum memadai. 
Produsen biofuel memproduksi biofuel tapi hasilnya produksinya di ekspor karena 
tidak terserap pasar domestic. Perusahaan mobil Toyota memproduksi mobil di DN 
yang spek mesinnya dibuat khusus supaya bisa menggunakan biofuel tanpa 
masalah, tapi mobil tersebut tidak dijual di pasar domestic melainkan di ekspor ke 
Argentina dan Brazil karena Indonesia belum siap dengan infrastruktur biofuelnya.  
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Investor baru yang ingin memproduksi biofuel dari bahan lain selain sawit selalu 
terbentur dengan masalah perijinan lahan. 
Pricing policy juga jadi masalah karena harga ke konsumen diseragamkan padahal 
ongkos produksi dan kualitas berbeda. Biodiesel pada dasarnya memiliki kualitas 
lebih baik karena rendah sulfur daripda bahan bakar fosil. Tapi penyeragaman harga 
terutama dengan bahan bakar fosil menyebabkan produksi biofuel menjadi lebih 
mahal dengan profit yang sedikit (bahkan pas-pasan) karena semakin rendah harga 
ICP maka harga diesel makin rendah, sedangkan harga biofuel tergantung dengan 
harga CPO yang cenderung menguat, sehingga jika besaran subsidi untuk fosil fuel 
tetap tapi untuk biofuel semakin tinggi.  
Kemudian harus ada kebijakan untuk penggunaan/pemanfaatan biofuel. Kenapa dari 
CPO dulu, karena bahan baku sawitnya sudah tersedia, lahannya sudah ada, 
production chain sudah matang sehingga atur dulu saja yang lebih mudah.  
Terkait daerah, terjadi perubahan kebijakan dimana sebelumnya pusat yang lebih 
berperan saat ini daerah juga ikut bertanggung jawab akan permasalahan energy di 
wilayahnya masing-masing. Jika sebelumnya apabila ada masalah seperti 
kelangkaan BBM, maka kepala daerah complain ke pertamina maka dengan adanya 
perpres baru kondisinya dibalik. Sehingga dalam hal ini peran daerah semakin 
diperkuat termasuk juga dalam peran untuk menanggung subsidi energy.  
Tapi peran utama daerah saat ini adalah dalam penyediaan lahan. Daerah 
mendapat tugas untuk menyediakan lahan terutama lahan untuk fasilitas pembangkit 
atau gardu distributor listrik. Tapi rekaman tidak menunjukan apakah kebijakan ini 
telah benar-benar dilaksanakan di level daerah, kalau di terima oleh pimpinannya 
iya.   
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Permasalahan di Biodiesel lebih kearah kelapa sawitnya tapi tidak terlalu parah 
karena perkebunannya sudah matang sudah ada disana, pembeli untuk produknya 
juga sudah ada jadi kelapa sawitnya pasti ada. Permasalah lahan muncul ketika 
biofuel tersebut bukan berasal dari kelapa sawit, karena lahan tersebut harus 
dikuasai juga oleh industry biofuel nya. Tapi industry pun mengalami kesulitan 
karena lahan untuk menanam feedstock biofuel non sawit itu terpencar-pencar tidak 
bisa dalam satu lokasi. Lahannya pun pada dasarnya tidak dimiliki tapi disewa 
sehingga muncul kesulitan untuk mendapatkan satu lahan yang besar  karena 
adanya kompetisi lahan dimana pemilik lahan juga menentukan produk apa yang 
ketika ditanam akan menghasilkan keuntungan besar. Dalam hal ini penanaman 
feedstock untuk biofuel non sawit selalu menjadi opsi terakhir untuk di tanam. 
Untuk expansi lahan pun sangat sulit karena ada permasalahan RTRW. Kalau di 
undang-undang setiap ada usulan baru untuk RTRW dibutuhkan waktu bisa sampai 
5 tahun karena aturan terkait RTRW direvisi per 5 tahun. Hal ini menyebabkan 
investasi untuk lahan untuk biofuel menjadi terhambat, karena keputusan yang 
dibuat cepat justru dapat menyebabkan kepala daerahnya di kriminalisasi karena 
melanggar UU RTRW. 
Salah satu solusi adalah dengan menerbitkan perpu (govt regulation in lieu of law) 
tapi perpu hanya bisa dikeluarkan apabila ada hal yang genting dan dalam konteks 
lahan untuk biofuel feedstock hal ini tidak dapat dijadikan argument yang kuat. 
Kurangnya argument untuk membuat perpu menyebabkan hanya 4 juta ha lahan 
yang bisa dipersiapkan khusus untuk biofuel feedstock.  
4 juta lahan yang dapat dianggap sebagai area untuk biofuel feedstock dibuat 
dengan menggunakan citra satelit. Tapi ada permasalahan lain yaitu daerah yang 
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bersangkutan tempat lahan tersebut berada tidak dilibatkan dalam pembentukan 
peta peruntakan lahan tersebut. Akibatnya terjadi perbedaan signifikan dari citra 
yang diciptakan oleh peta (yang difoto dari satelit) dengan kondisi sesungguhnya 
dilapangan. Hal ini menyebabkan area yang dicitrakan sebagai lahan potensial untuk 
biofuel feedstock sebenarnya bukan lahan yang kosong/marginal melainkan sebuah 
desa atau bahkan wilayah perairan bahkan untuk daerah tertentu peta tersebut 
menangkap wilayah yang bukan wilayah RI. Hal ini terjadi karena satelit dapat 
menangkap gambar yang merupakan area yang bukan hutan tetapi pembacaan citra 
satelit tersebut masih dilakukan secara manual dengan menggunakan spidol 
sebagai penanda area. 
Hal ini menjadi ironi karena pemda tidak memiliki kemampuan untuk melakukan 
pemetaan wilayahnya sendiri sehingga mereka hanya bergantung kepada pusat, 
tapi pusat pun hanya bisa melakukan pencitraan melalui satelit tanpa mengetahui 
apakah image yang dibuat sudah akurat sesuai dengan yang dicitrakan atau tidak.  
Masalah lain adalah munculnya perkampungan liar dimana orang lebih memilih areal 
yang kosong untuk mendirikan tempat tinggal tanpa memandang status kepemilikan 
hal ini bukan hanya dilakukan oleh suku-suku yang tinggal dipedalaman tetapi juga 
oleh masyarakat baik yang tinggal di perkotaan maupun pedesaan. Para peminpin 
daerah juga tidak bisa melakukan penertiban atas perkampungan liar tersebut 
karena pada dasarnya mereka juga merupakan basis pemilih sang kepala daerah 
pada saat pilkada.         
Leadership commitment adalah permasalahan utama yaitu kemampuan para 
pemimpin untuk tidak kompromi kepada para pemilihnya sendiri untuk menegakan 
aturan yang dibuat demi kepentingan umum. 
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Politik istana juga merupakan masalah pelik bagi sector energy karena walaupun 
sudah terjadi kesepakatan baik dari kementerian terkait maupun stakeholder terkait 
kebijakan energy, aturannya bisa tetap terhambat untuk disetujui presiden karena 
pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan akan berusaha meloby presiden melalui berbagai 
jalur untuk menghambat di tandatanganinya kebijakan terkait energy.  
 Biofuel tidak digunakan untuk pembangkit listrik oleh PLN tetapi BBN (biomass) 
banyak digunakan oleh perkebunan sawit untuk pembangkit listrik. 
Pertamina masuk ke industry biofuel tapi hanya sebagai pilot project menanam 
rumput gajah untuk feedstock yang pada akhirnya akan di ekspor karena pasar 
ekspor lebih tinggi harganya daripada pasar domestic, dimana fossil fuel juga 
disubsidi dan turunnya harga minyak juga memperparah situasi.  
Pricing policy biofuel sangat menentukan, di Thailand di tetapkan harga dari tebu 
dan cassava (feedstock biofuel) sehingga petani mendapat insentif untuk menanam 
tanaman tersebut di tambah lagi dengan benih yang gratis dari pemerintah 
kemudian di SPBU ada berbagai pilihan campuran biofuel dengan berbagai jenis 
harga. Selain itu di dalam negeri juga ada kendala yang diakibatkan di subsidinya 
fossil fuel terutama jika biofuel malah dioplos dengan fosil fuel yang di subsidi yang 
mana hal ini illegal untuk dilakukan. 
Kontribusi energy terhadap emisi karbon adalah 40% sehingga salah satu upaya 
untuk mengurangi emisi karbon adalah dengan memperbanyak porsi EBT. Yang 
menjadi masalah adalah inkonsisten di dari regulasi di mana pemerintah ingin 
mendorong penggunaan EBT tapi regulasi yang dikeluarkan justru sebaliknya.  
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Untuk pengembangan biofuel sendiri lebih terkonsentrasi pada biomass untuk 
pembangkit listrik sedangkan biofuel untuk sector transportasi masih belum 
berkembang.  
Ide dasarnya kebijakan biofuel ini dilaksanakan adalah untuk mengurangi volume 
impor BBM. Biofuel ini diperoleh tanaman tertentu yang banyak jumlahnya di 
Indonesia. Ketersediaan feedstock nya lebih mudah, yang kurang pricing policy. 
Sedangkan emisi pengurangan karbonnya sendiri di hitung berdasarkan jumlah 
pengurangan konsumsi BBM fosil (suatu hal yang aneh karena tidak 
memperhitungkan LCA dari biofuel). Konsumen BBM paling besar adalah sector 
industry kemudian transportasi dan terkahir household sehingga diarahkan supaya 
feedstock biofuel diperuntukan untuk industry agar konsumsi BBM fosilnya 
berkurang.   
Ada indikasi bahwa mengoptimalkan peranan EBT mendapat halangan dari bisnis 
migas. Para ‘mafia’ migas ini memiliki kepentingan terhadap bisnis migas dimana 
konsumsi BBM kita sekitar 1.5 juta barel per hari sedangkan kapasitas produksi 
adalah 800 ribu barel sehingga sisanya harus di impor. Jika 20% dari konsumsi BBM 
dipenuhi oleh EBT maka import BBM justru berkurang dan ini akan mengganggu elit 
tertentu yang berkepentingan dengan urusan import BBM.  
Terkait keberadaan ‘mafia’ migas, sulit untuk menemukan siapa mereka. Sebab 
disetiap pemerintahan mereka selalu ada. Para oknum ini selalu bersiap-siap untuk 
bermain di semua kaki manakala terjadi pemilu presiden, sehingga siapapun yang 
memimpin eksistensi mereka akan tetap dipertahankan oleh oknum-oknum yang 
pada akhirnya duduk kembali di pemerintahan.  
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Dalam penandatangan RUEN sendiri juga sulit, karena ada inkonsistensi dengan 
statement presiden, di mana awalnya presiden mengatakan supaya semua menteri 
di DEN focus untuk menyelesaikan RUEN tapi ketika disodori draft RUEN presiden 
menjadi ragu dan meminta supaya di kaji lagi angka-angkanya, seakan presiden 
tidak percaya dengan angka-angka yang diformulasikan oleh anggota DEN. 
Walaupun pada akhirnya di tandatangani presiden tetapi memang ada proses yang 
sulit untuk bisa di tandatangani presiden dan sebagian besar disebabkan oleh 
adanya factor sang pembisik yang tidak ketahuan siapa pelakunya.  
Sehingga yang diperlukan adalah leadership commitment supaya ada komitmen dari 
pemimpin baik pusat dan daerah supaya tetap pada komitment mereka semula 
untuk mengembangkan biofuel.  
Terkait dengan desentralisasi, seorang kepala daerah bisa menolak perintah dari 
presiden dengan alasan mereka dipilih oleh rakyat di daerahnya sehingga walapun 
presiden dalam hirarki lebih tinggi dari gubernur tetapi keduanya dipilih oleh rakyat 
sehingga seorang gubernur bisa mengatakan bahwa dia mendapatkan legitimasi 
dari rakyat yang memilihnya bahwa perihal yang diputuskan oleh presiden tidak 
diterima oleh rakyat di daerah si gubernur. Hal ini terjadi ketika kasus geothermal 
dimana pada saat hearing dengan semua stakeholder untuk menentukan harga jual 
listrik satu orang gubernur tidak setuju dan ketika di panggil presiden kenapa tidak 
setuju alasan itu yang mengemuka. Hal ini yang membuat investor bingung dan 
memberi ketidak pastian pada mereka. 
Bahlan di DEN sendiri ketika ada rapat-rapat di DEN untuk rapat anggota dimana 
yang hadir dari pemerintah adalah eselon 1 dimana mereka seharusnya menjadi 
representasi dari suara menteri tapi ketika di forum sidang anggota semua 
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keputusan berubah yang tadinya sudah setuju berubah jadi kebalikannya. Sehingga 
keputusan yang terjadi pun mentah kembali dan harus kompromi lagi begitupun 
ketika rapat paripurna dengan presiden. 
Daerah sendiripun apabila tidak mampu mengerjakan RUED cenderung 
menggunakan tenaga konsultan sehingga masih belum jelas apakah eksekutif yang 
menandatangani paham atau tidak isinya. Dalam hal ini DEN memberikan 
bimbingan teknis kepada daerah termasuk membuat model dan lain-lain.  
Dalam hal ini pak syamsir mengatakan seharusnya Bapeda yang mengusuri urusan 
EBT termasuk biofuel karena ini merupakan lintas sector tapi justru di daerah 
mereka justru menganggap sector EBT adalah urusan dinas energy sehingga lead 
nya tetap lah dinas energy. 
Kebijakan energy seharusnya merupakan kebijakan yang bottom up, dimana daerah 
yang seharusnya lebih tahu potensi energy mereka. Tapi kenyataanya daerah selalu 
menunggu pusat untuk mengetahui potensi apa yang mereka miliki dan dari situ 
menjadi dasar untuk membuat regulasi. Sehingga SDM di daerah juga menjadi 
masalah yang serius terutama pada saat memformulasikan kebijakan energy di 
daerah. 
R&D juga harus difokuskan untuk mengembangkan EBT seperti halnya di LN kayak 
Jepang dan Korea Selatan. 
Terima kasih atas waktu Bapak untuk interview ini. 
Finish. 
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